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ABSTRACT 
Garima Bhalla: Poverty Alleviation and Public Policy: Three Essays on Impact of Cash 
Transfers on Food Insecurity, Life Satisfaction and Informal Transfers 
(Under the direction of Sudhanshu Handa) 
 
This dissertation investigates non-obvious ways in which social programs can affect households 
such as resilience, psychosocial wellbeing and social capital. I use quasi-randomized longitudinal 
data collected for the evaluation of Zimbabwe’s Harmonized Social Cash Transfer (HSCT) 
Program. The HSCT is an unconditional cash transfer program targeted to ultra-poor households 
who are food poor and labor constrained. Data was collected through a detailed household 
survey, conducted at baseline and 12-month follow-up. The first paper shows that aggregate food 
consumption hides dynamic activity taking place within the household. In addition, I find that 
several dimensions of household vulnerability correlate more strongly with an experiential food 
security measurer, than with aggregate food consumption. My second paper finds that the impact 
of the cash transfer on subjective wellbeing is partially mediated through food security, but 
social participation measures indicate null to negligible mediation. Qualitative data reveal that 
while the cash transfer enables beneficiaries to be active participants in their communities, it also 
leads to tension between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. In the third paper, I investigate if 
the HSCT crowded-out inter-household transfers, that are gifts in cash or kind, provided to a 
household through informal sources, such as neighbors, friends, extended family, etc. I find that 
the program does not crowd-out informal inter-household transfers. Other mechanisms by which
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poor households manage risk and cope with liquidity constraints include contributions made to 
social networks or the ability to take out a loan. I do not find any impact of the Program on loans 
and amount outstanding of the beneficiary. However, number of households making 
contributions and the value of these contributions has increased, especially so for female-
respondent households. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Research Objective 
Cash transfers are increasingly being utilized as a preferred strategy for poverty 
alleviation. They refer to programs that provide direct cash to a targeted population group that 
fulfills specific eligibility criteria for receiving these transfers from the government. As such, this 
concept is as old as the welfare state: non-contributory pension schemes, disability benefits, child 
allowance and income support, student grants and scholarships, and assured work programs are 
all examples of direct cash transfers. However, reliance on cash transfers as the main vehicle of 
national social protection programs with poverty reduction as their main objective is relatively 
recent. These were first popularized in Latin America in the 1990s and have since then been 
embraced by several developing countries in Asia and Africa. Currently more than a hundred 
countries implement conditional or unconditional cash transfer programs (FAO, 2015). The 
theoretical basis for these programs is that regularity and predictability of cash payments allow 
poor households to smooth income and consumption across the year.  
 
Cash transfer programs operate across all four categories of the asset-based social 
protection framework provided by Adato and Bassett (2008):  
 Protection  - secure basic consumption needs
 Preventative – reduce impacts of shocks that cause fluctuations in consumption 
through reduction in risk and income variation and avoid distress sale of productive 
assets 
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 Promotional – help people to build their human, financial, and physical capital by 
enabling them to take-up educational and health services, access credit on better 
terms, and buy productive assets, 
 Transformational  - build assets and make institutional changes that strengthen 
economic, political, and social relationships 
 
Theory, therefore, tells us that social protection programs can have wide ranging effects 
on the entire household economy.  Fiszbein and Schady (World Bank, 2009), Handa and Davis 
(2006), and Adato and Basset (2008) provide excellent overviews of the impact of different cash 
transfer programs on poverty, food consumption, schooling, health, asset accumulation, 
economic productivity, and HIV prevention. Considerably less research however, has been 
conducted on impact of social cash transfers on experienced wellbeing of beneficiaries, the 
interplay between objective and subjective measures of wellbeing, and on understanding the 
underlying mechanisms that lie behind the impacts that we observe.  My dissertation investigates 
non-obvious ways in which social programs can affect households such as resilience, 
psychosocial wellbeing and social capital. There is scarce research on these nuanced, and 
potentially very important, but often ignored areas of wellbeing.   
 
1.2. Overview 
For my dissertation, I use data collected for the evaluation of the Harmonized Social 
Cash Transfer program (HSCT) Program in Zimbabwe. The HSCT is an unconditional cash 
transfer program targeted to ultra-poor households who are food poor and labor constrained. It is 
the country’s primary social safety net program. Data is collected through a detailed household 
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survey, conducted at baseline and 12-month follow-up. The household survey instrument is 
comprehensive covering demographic, social, economic, and psychological information, both at 
the household and individual level.  The study design is such that it allows me to use a 
difference-in-difference model to compare changes over time for the treatment and a matched 
comparison group.  
 
Paper 1: The Effect of Cash Transfers and Household Vulnerability on Food security in 
Zimbabwe 
In this paper, I investigate determinants of food security as measured by a well-known 
food security scale – the Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS) – and as measured 
by value of household food consumption composed of own-production, market purchases and 
gifts received. I find that several dimensions of household vulnerability correlate more strongly 
with the food security measure than with food consumption. Labour constraints, which is a key 
vulnerability criterion used by the HSCT to target households, is an important predictor of the 
food security score but not food consumption, and its effect on food security is even larger 
during the lean season. Difference-in-differences impact analysis shows that the HSCT 
programme has had statistically significant impacts on Food Security and Diet Diversity scores 
but null to low impacts on food consumption. However aggregate food consumption hides 
dynamic activity taking place within the household where the cash is used to obtain more food 
from the market and rely less on food received as gifts. The cash in turn gives beneficiaries 
greater choice in their food basket, which improves diet diversity.  
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Paper 2: Mediation Analysis of the Impact of an Unconditional Cash Transfer on 
Subjective Wellbeing 
This paper analyzes if an increase in income due to the cash transfer program increases 
the beneficiaries’ judgment of their overall life satisfaction (Direct Impact). To measure 
subjective wellbeing I use the five-item Satisfaction with Life Scale that captures beneficiaries’ 
judgments of their overall life satisfaction. I find that the total impact of the cash transfer on 
Satisfaction with Life score is in the range of 14 to 17 percent. I next analyze if the impact of the 
cash transfer on overall life satisfaction is mediated through how people spend that income, i.e. 
through satisfaction of basic needs as indicated by decreased food insecurity and/or through 
satisfaction of higher-order needs as indicated by increase in social participation. I find that 
about 16 to 26 percent of the total impact is mediated through a reduction in food insecurity. 
Measures used to track social participation revealed only null to negligible mediation impact.   
Interviews with beneficiaries and key informants and focused group discussions reveal that the 
impact of the cash transfer on social participation is complex. While it can enable beneficiaries to 
be active participants in their communities, it can also lead to tension between beneficiaries and 
non-beneficiaries.  
 
Paper 3: Do Government Cash Transfers crowd out Informal Inter-Household Transfers? 
Cash transfers enable households to overcome liquidity constraints and reduce income 
variability. Informal transfers, that are gifts in cash and/or kind, friends, provided to a household 
through informal sources, such as neighbors, friends, and extended family, also perform the same 
function. Do cash transfers provided by the government crowd–out private informal transfers? If 
so, the worry is that a government program might be weakening social networks that play an 
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implicit role in sharing idiosyncratic risk. Empirical literature indicates that crowding-out can 
occur on the extensive margin, i.e. the probability of receiving a transfer, and on the intensive 
margin, i.e. amount of transfer conditional on it being positive. I therefore estimate - 1) the 
probability a household will receive informal transfers and 2) determinants of the monetary value 
of informal transfers. Utilizing a difference-in-differences methodology, I find that the program 
does not crowd-out informal inter-household transfers. Other mechanisms by which poor 
households manage risk and cope with liquidity constraints include contributions made to social 
networks or the ability to take out a loan. I do not find any impact of the Program on loans and 
amount outstanding of the beneficiary. However, number of households making contributions 
and the value of these contributions has increased, especially so for female-respondent 
households. This suggests a type of ‘social re-engagement’ and an increased ability to participate 
in community life and ‘re-enter’ social networks. This is an important component of the 
program’s overall impact that is not always picked up in the evaluation of poverty programs. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE EFFECT OF CASH TRANSFERS AND HOUSEHOLD 
VULNERABILITY ON FOOD SECURITY IN ZIMBABWE 
 
 
2.1.Introduction 
The United Nations, as part of its post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda, has 
declared ending hunger and achieving food security as the second of its 17-goal agenda, to be 
achieved by 2030. At present, about 795 million people are still undernourished globally, and the 
prevalence rate in sub-Saharan Africa is 23 per cent. In Zimbabwe, the proportion of 
undernourished in the total population is even higher at 33 per cent (FAO, IFAD & WFP, 2015). 
In the past year, food security has worsened due to a poor 2015 harvest season and El Niño-
induced below normal rains in early 2016. The Government declared a state of national disaster 
in February 2016 and appealed for USD 1.5 billion aid for food and other emergency needs. Dry 
and high-heat conditions have resulted in a significant reduction in cropped area and increased 
crop failure, particularly in the drought-affected southern districts (FEWS NET, March, 2016). 
Addressing the challenge of growing food insecurity requires implementation and scale up of 
effective social protection programmes.  
 
In 2012 Zimbabwe launched the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer Programme (HSCT), 
an unconditional cash transfer targeted to ultra-poor, labor-constrained households.  Eligible 
households were identified according to HSCT operational guidelines through a detailed
targeting census conducted by the national statistical agency. The programme initially reached 
55,000 households though with the recent fiscal crisis in the country these numbers may soon go 
 8 
down. We utilize longitudinal data from a large impact evaluation conducted as part of the 
second scale-up wave of the programme. Data was collected on 3063 households across 60 
clusters in six districts. Households in 60 Wards were slotted to enter the programme 
immediately and serve as the treatment group for the evaluation, while households in the 30 
Wards resided in areas that were to enter the programme in a later phase and thus serve as the 
comparison group. 
 
To better understand food security we utilize baseline data to compare determinants of 
food security as measured by the Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS) and the 
value of per capita food consumption within the household. The analysis indicates that factors, 
which directly reflect household vulnerability, such as exposure to shocks, labour constraints, 
and income from casual labour, are significant in explaining variation in the Food Security score 
but not food consumption. This provides evidence that a consumption-based measure may not 
fully capture household vulnerability. We extend the vulnerability analysis by stratifying our 
sample of baseline households into those that were interviewed just prior to the harvest season 
(and so presumably would be more food insecure) and those interviewed during the harvest 
season (and so would be less food insecure). We find that the negative impact of being labour 
constrained is accentuated during the lean phase, but only for the Food Security measure, 
suggesting that the difference between the two measures is even more apparent when risk is high. 
This finding underlines the important practice of utilizing labour-constrained status as an 
attribute for identifying programme beneficiaries, as is done in the HSCT and other national cash 
transfer programmes throughout sub-Saharan Africa.  
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Utilizing a difference-in-differences methodology, we find that after 12 months of 
implementation, the Zimbabwe HSCT Programme has had a null to low impact on value of food 
consumption but statistically significant positive impacts on Food Security and Diet Diversity 
scores. A detailed analysis that disaggregates food consumption into consumption sourced from 
own-production, market purchases and gifts received, reveals that access to cash allowed 
households to purchase more food from the market, diversify its own-production of certain 
foodstuffs, and rely less on gifts as a source of food.  Disaggregation of food consumption into 
different food groups also reveals that the cash allows households greater choice in their food 
basket. These changes are captured by the Food Security score and the Diet Diversity score but 
not in the value of aggregate food consumption.  
 
This paper makes contributions to two distinct but inter-related literatures. First, we 
provide evidence on the relative merits of using a comprehensive consumption expenditure 
measure versus a food security scale to assess household vulnerability and food insecurity.  
While consumption is the preferred measure for economists, those working specifically in food 
security maintain that consumption alone does not pick up the multiple and nuanced dimensions 
of food security that go beyond access.  Second, we contribute to a small but growing literature 
on the effects of state-sponsored unconditional cash transfers in Africa on household behavior 
and wellbeing. Existing evidence on cash transfers is dominated by studies from Latin America 
on conditional cash transfers, and many of those are from one single program 
(Progresa/Oportunidades).  The generalizability of that evidence to different contexts and 
without conditions is not straightforward. 
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2.2. Literature Review 
Food security is defined as the situation “when all people, at all times, have physical, 
social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and 
food preferences for an active and healthy life" (FAO, 2009). A common framework utilized by 
scholars to highlight the different dimensions of food security is a four-tier categorization – 
availability of food; access to food, which refers to the ability of households to obtain food from 
the market or own production or gifts; utilization of food; and stability, which is the ability of 
households to withstand risks and shocks that erode any of the other three dimensions (Webb et 
al., 2006).  
 
During the 1980s, due in large part to the work of Sen (1981), there was a shift of 
emphasis from food-availability indicators to food-access indicators. Sen’s argument was that it 
is not enough if the country or region has adequate food supplies to feed its population, but the 
population also needs to have the ability to access this food. Another shift in focus has been in 
moving from objective to experiential measures. This change has been driven by the recognition 
of the experiential aspect of the process that leads to the condition of being hungry. Some 
households can be food insecure, and yet not immediately experiencing hunger. The rationale for 
utilizing experiential-based indicators is that it “puts people’s experiences and behavioral 
responses at the core of the definition of what food security means” (Ballard et al., 2013, p.23), 
rather than focusing on determinants of food security (income/expenditure) or its outcomes 
(nutrition). Table 2.1 lists some of the most common currently used food security measures. 
Access-to-food measures are highlighted, as these are the main focus of this paper.  
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Table 2.1. Measures Corresponding to each pillar of Food security 
Pillar of 
food 
in/security 
Barriers/ 
determinants 
Indicator/s Level Type of 
indicator 
Availability Agricultural and 
economic (e.g. 
market prices) 
Proportion of 
undernourished 
(derived from total 
food stock, population, 
and income distribution 
data) 
State Objective 
Access Above factors +  
socioeconomic 
(ownership of assets 
like land and 
livestock, social 
networks) 
 Food consumption 
(kcal) 
 Food expenditure a 
(S) 
 HFIAS 
 Diet Diversity b 
Household 
(can also be 
collected at 
individual 
level) 
Objective 
and 
subjective/e
xperiential 
Utilization Above factors +  
behavioral (health 
and child care 
practices), intra-
household dynamics  
Anthropometrics Household 
(can also be 
collected at 
individual 
level) 
Objective 
Stability Economic (local, 
state, and 
international), social, 
agro-climactic, 
behavioral 
Resilience Index c  Objective 
and 
subjective 
a Value of all food expenditure including value of gifts and own production consumed, divided by family 
size 
b Value of expenditure (including gifts and own production consumed) on eight different food groups: 
cereal, roots and tubers, meat/poultry/fish, fruits and vegetables, pulses, dairy, sugar/fats, and food eaten 
out 
c The Resilience Index indicator has only recently been conceptualized. It is yet to be operationalized and 
therefore currently there are no indicators to satisfactorily measure the fourth pillar. This is because it is 
difficult to capture the dynamic aspect of food insecurity. Conceptually,  
R = f(IFA = income and food access; ABS = access to basic services; AA = agricultural assets; NAA = 
non-agricultural assets; APT = agricultural practice and technology; SSN = social safety nets; CC = 
climate change; EIE = enabling institutional environment; S = sensitivity; AC = adaptive capacity) 
 
Cash transfers are a policy instrument that can help build household resiliency in 
obtaining access to food. In their Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis (RIMA) model, 
Alinovi, Mane and Romano (2009) include income and food access as one of the six different 
dimensions that determines resiliency. Alleviating poverty and increasing food consumption are 
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primary objectives of cash transfer programmes. The theoretical basis for these programmes is 
that regularity and predictability of cash payments allow poor households to smooth 
consumption across the year and build human and physical capital that will allow them to absorb 
shocks (Arnold et al., 2011; FAO, IFAD & WFP 2015). Their impacts on food consumption and 
nutrition have been well documented (Adato and Bassett, 2008; Kenya CT-OVC Evaluation 
Team 2012). According to a comprehensive review by the Department for International 
Development of the United Kingdom (Arnold et al., 2011), about half the value of the cash 
transfer is spent on food. However, impacts vary depending on the duration over which the 
transfer is received, age of the recipient, and size of the transfer. In Malawi, Miller et al. (2011) 
demonstrate large effect sizes that are statistically significant on food expenditure, consumption, 
and diet diversity. They also find upwards of a 32 percentage point (pp) difference in the 
following four questions that capture food adequacy: do households consume less than enough; 
are they still hungry after meals; do they experience more than eight days per month without 
adequate food; are at least two meals consumed daily. These large effect sizes are explained in 
part by the size of the cash transfer, which ranged from $4.29 to $22 per month, and on average 
accounted for sixty percent of per capita total household expenditure. 
 
In this paper we use a longitudinal ward-level matched case-control design to analyze the 
impact of a cash transfer programme implemented in rural Zimbabwe on household food security 
after 12 months of implementation. Within access-to-food measures we focus on value of 
household food consumption, household diet diversity, and a household food security score as 
measured by the Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS). The HFIAS was developed 
by the Food and Nutritional Technical Assistance (FANTA) project of USAID. It is a 9-item 
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scale, with a reference period of the past four weeks where households are asked to rate their 
experience on a scale from ‘Rarely’ to ‘Often’, generating a total score from 0 to 27. It thus 
“provides a continuous measure of the degree of food insecurity of the household” (Coates, 
Swindale & Bilinsky, 2007, p.18). A higher score indicates the household suffers from more 
food insecurity and is relatively worse off. It captures the experiential aspect of food insecurity 
by including anxiety about future availability of food; consumption of food items that are not 
preferred; and limiting diet diversity as part of its construct. These three domains were identified 
based on the ethnographic work done by Radimer, Olson & Campbell (1990) in the United 
States. Coates et al. (2006) confirmed these domains to be common across diverse cultural 
settings.  
 
The HFIAS then, goes beyond a food expenditure measure by capturing not just present 
food consumption status but also the uncertainty and vulnerability associated with maintaining or 
improving that status1. Vulnerability has been defined in different ways but the basic idea is that 
it is forward looking and captures  the risk or “likelihood that at a given time in the future, an 
individual will have a level of welfare below some norm or benchmark” (Hoddinott and 
Quisumbing, 2003, p. 9). It is a forward-looking concept as opposed to a snapshot in time 
presented by food consumption expenditure. This distinction has been well documented in the 
literature on poverty (Dercon, 2001; Chaudhuri et al. 2002; Hoddinott and Quisumbing, 2003). 
In the food insecurity literature, the direction this research has taken has been generally that of 
validation studies. Jones et al. (2013) provide a review of four key validation studies of HFIAS 
in Iran (urban Tehran), Tanzania (poor rural households), Burkina Faso (urban households), and 
                                                        
1 Aside from construct validity, an additional reason why practitioners might choose to utilize the HFIAS 
in the field is its relative ease of deployment since it is less time intensive to complete than a complete 
food consumption module. As a result, it is also less expensive to deploy.  
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Ethiopia (community health volunteers). They find evidence of the construct validity of the 
HFIAS and high internal consistency. They also find that the HFIAS score is negatively 
associated with other proximate determinants for food security such as household wealth/assets, 
maternal education, husband’s education, household per capita income and expenditure, and diet 
diversity. In Zimbabwe, Nyikahadzoi et al. (2013) found the HFIAS score to be higher in elderly 
headed households and within these households, food insecurity is negatively associated with 
social capital, remittances, and off-farm income. In another study among smallholder farmers in 
the Mudzi district of Zimbabwe, Mango et al. (2014) found that the HFIAS score is predicted by 
household labour, education of the household head, household size, remittances, livestock 
ownership and access to market information.  
 
Migotto et al. (2005) compare a Consumption Adequacy Question (CAQ) with household 
caloric consumption, expenditure, diet diversity, and anthropometry in Albania, Indonesia, 
Madagascar and Nepal. They find that the CAQ is only weakly correlated with these indicators 
and that there is poor overlap among them in that they do not categorize the same households as 
food insecure. They assess if the CAQ is too subjective to make comparisons across households, 
perhaps because it captures relative food insecurity (relative to food status in the past and 
relative to others in the community). They find that perception of food adequacy is highly 
correlated with subjective perceptions of future and past wealth, and thus may be capturing 
‘vulnerability’, which the other quantitative indicators do not capture. However, they caveat their 
findings because statistical significance of subjective answers could simply be capturing 
‘attitudinal characteristics’. A longitudinal study that is able to control for responder bias would 
help in answering this question. Frongillo and Nanama (2006) use longitudinal data on 126 
 15 
households in nine villages in Burkina Faso across five time periods from 2001-2003. They 
calculate a household food insecurity score from an HFIAS-like scale and find it to be negatively 
and significantly correlated with economic status (total assets and net income per adult 
equivalent) and dietary intake indicators (such as food share expenditure) but not significantly 
correlated with anthropometric indicators. In another longitudinal study, Loopstra & Tarasuk 
(2013) find that changes in income and employment over the span of one year among 331 low-
income families living on market-rent in Toronto are significantly associated with changes in 
severity of food insecurity. 
 
2.3. Research Setting and Design 
2.3.1. The Zimbabwe Harmonized Cash Transfer Program 
We use data collected for the evaluation of the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer (HSCT) 
Programme, an unconditional cash transfer program, introduced in 2011 by the Government of 
Zimbabwe. Program implementation is being done in a phased manner and it is anticipated that 
eventually the Program will cover the entire country. In January 2016, the Program covered 
52,500 households, and approximately 300,000 households are expected to be eligible for the 
program at full-scale.  
 
Benefits are structured such that the size of the transfer varies with household size: a one-
person household receives USD10, two-person receives USD15, three-person receives USD20, 
and a household made up of four or more persons receives USD25. The program thus provides 
between $10 and $25 per month, which represents about 20 percent of total household 
consumption expenditure.  
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The program is targeted at households that are food-poor and labor constrained. Eligible 
households are identified through a detailed targeting census that is conducted by ZIMSTAT, the 
national statistical agency. All households are screened using the targeting survey fielded by 
ZIMSTAT, and data is then processed to compute a proxy poverty score that serves as the first 
eligibility criterion. A household is considered food-poor when it is living below the food 
poverty line2 and is unable to meet the most basic needs of its members. A list of ten indicators 
that measure the ability of the household to meet basic needs is used to determine eligibility on 
this criterion.3 At least three of these have to be met for the household to be eligible for the 
Program.  
 
The Program has a clearly defined approach for categorizing a household as labor 
constrained, which is the second eligibility criterion. Throughout the paper, we use this definition 
to operationalize the attribute of being labor constrained. A household is considered labor 
constrained when: 
1. There is no able bodied household member between 18-59 years who is fit for 
productive work, OR 
2. The dependency ratio is three or more, i.e., one fit to work household member 
between 18-59 years has to take care of three or more dependents. Dependents are 
                                                        
2 Food poverty line is the threshold where total household expenditure is below what is required to meet 
the food energy requirement for each household member, set at 2,100 kcal/day/person. 
3 The 10 indicators as given in Form1R, which is used for assessing eligibility are: only one or no meals 
per day; grains lasted for less than three months last harvest season; no/minimal livestock; no blankets; no 
rooms/huts for sleeping; rudimentary house material; live on begging or some piece work; get no/minimal 
regular support from relatives or others; have no valuable assets, e.g. animal drawn cart, vehicle; and the 
household is landless or owns less than one acre. 
 17 
those household members who cannot or should not work because they are under 18 
years of age or they are elderly (over 59 years of age) or they are unfit for work 
because they are chronically ill or disabled or still in school, OR 
3. The dependency ratio is between two and three and the household has a severely 
disabled or chronically sick household member who requires intensive care.  
 
2.3.2. Study Design 
The phased roll out of the HSCT allows us to use households in regions slotted to enter 
the program at a later date to form a comparison group. Within districts the program operates at 
an administrative unit known as the Ward. Child Protection Committees (CPCs) are formed 
within each Ward who are responsible for ensuring that targeting of households is conducted 
thoroughly and who are in charge of communication of program rules and operational activities 
(such as payment dates) between the district social welfare office and beneficiary households. 
The geographic area of a Ward varies by population density as each Ward comprises a cluster of 
anywhere from 10-20 villages. The Ward comprises the primary sampling unit for the sample 
design. 
 
Phase 1 of the HSCT expansion occurred in 2011-12 and covered ten districts. Wards for 
the treatment group of the evaluation were selected from Phase 2 areas, which entered the 
program in 2013. Wards for the control group were selected from areas that were slotted for 
Phase Four expansion and that were geographically close to Phase 2 areas. A detailed analysis of 
all Wards in these areas (Phase 2 areas and Phase 4 areas geographically close to Phase 2 areas) 
was then conducted by the study team led by the national research partner Ruzivo Trust based in 
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Harare. Each Ward was assigned a point score based on five characteristics: forest cover, 
nearness to main roads, resistance to shocks, nearness to business centers, and water sources. On 
each criterion a Ward was scored from 1 (low) to 3 (high) and the maximum score possible was 
thus 15.4 Power calculations based on the expected number of households per Ward indicated 
that a total of 60 Treatment and 30 Comparison Wards were necessary for the study.5 The 60 
treatment Wards were stratified across the three treatment districts (Mudzi, Mwenezi and Binga), 
and the 30 comparison Wards were likewise stratified to areas adjacent to the three treatment 
districts.  
 
Wards in treatment areas were ranked from highest point score (most vulnerable) to 
lowest and paired with each stratum. Then, for each treatment Ward pair with a given score, a 
comparison Ward with the same score in the same stratum was selected to serve as the ‘matched’ 
comparison Ward. In cases where more than one comparison Ward existed with the same score, 
one was picked randomly. In cases where no comparison Ward existed with the exact same 
score, the Ward with the closest point score was selected. Figure 2.1 provides a map showing the 
geographic location within Zimbabwe of the study sites.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
4 Details of the Ward level analysis are available upon request.  
5 Sample size calculations were based on the power to detect a meaningful change in the height-for-age z-
score of children under age 60 months, the indicator for which the largest effective sample size was 
required (Handa et al., 2013). 
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Figure 2.1. Map of Zimbabwe 
 
 
 
 
Source: Constructed using Stata 13.1. The darker outlines in the map are province boundaries. 
 Shape files obtained from http://www.gadm.org/ 
 
 
In the selected study Wards (both treatment and comparison), program targeting was 
conducted by the Department of Social Services following standard program operation 
guidelines. Out of the eligible households, the evaluation team randomly selected 34–60 
households in each ward, using the random number generator tool in excel. This generated a 
sample of 3,063 households across 90 wards. Data were collected through a detailed household 
survey, conducted at baseline and 12-month follow-up. The study sample size is provided in 
Table 2.2.  At follow up, the household attrition rate was 14 per cent. As part of the impact 
evaluation, detailed attrition analysis was conducted, and while differential attrition was ruled 
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out, it was concluded that overall attrition (households remaining in the study were no longer 
representative of households in the original sample) might be a problem (American Institutes for 
Research, 2014). To correct for this problem, inverse probability weighting was used to adjust 
sampling weights. We use these generated analytical weights for our panel data impact analysis.  
 
Table 2.2. Study Sample Size 
  Treatment Comparison Total 
2013 2,029 1,034 3,063 
2014 1,748 882 2,630 
        
Total 3,777 1,916 5,693 
 
 
Note that all households in comparison Wards in the study sample are actual eligible 
households who will receive benefits once the program reaches their area, and eligibility criteria 
are the same across the country. Given the universal program take-up, these households thus 
serve as a close approximation for the counterfactual for treatment households. The distinction 
between this design and what might be deemed a perfect design--a social experiment-- is that 
Wards were not randomly assigned to treatment. In a large-scale national program where 
program roll out is determined by both technical (e.g. poverty) and political considerations, 
randomizing roll out is often not feasible. When the eligibility criteria are applied uniformly, 
targeting is supply-driven (as the case in Zimbabwe), and take-up is universal, the threat to 
internal validity in our design is the geographical differences across Phase 2 and Phase 4 areas. 
Our stratified matched design was chosen to minimize geographical differences.  
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2.4. Household Characteristics and Food Security 
2.4.1. Socioeconomic Characteristics associated with Food Security  
We utilize Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to understand if the HFIAS is capturing 
information about a household’s vulnerability that conventional food access measures, such as 
food consumption expenditure, are not able to detect. Theoretically, the HFIAS should inform us 
not just about a household’s food consumption status, but also about the anxiety it experienced to 
sustain that level of food consumption. For ease of comparison with other indicators we 
positively code the HFIAS so that higher scores indicate better food security, and refer to it as 
Food Security.  
 
Table 2.3 presents the results of the OLS analysis where our two measures of food 
security, the Food Security Score and Log of per capita Food Consumption Expenditure, are 
regressed on proximate determinants of food security using baseline data only. Since our two 
dependent variables are measured on different scales, we cannot directly compare coefficient 
estimates. However, we can compare the relative importance of factors in explaining variation in 
each measure. As expected, we find that the larger the household size, the lower the value of its 
per capita food consumption. However, the relationship between household size and the Food 
Security score is not significant. Female-headed households have on average about seven per 
cent lower value of per capita food consumption, and age of main respondent is significant 
across both measures, although the magnitude of the estimate is small. If the main respondent 
has attended school then the Food Security score is higher by 0.6 points and per capita food 
consumption value increases by eight percent.6 
                                                        
6 The main respondent is the person that is interviewed when we visit the household to conduct our 
survey. Typically, the main respondent is the head of the household. However, at times the head is away 
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Table 2.3. Estimates of Socioeconomic Characteristics of Households Associated With 
Food Security Score and Per Capita Food Consumption Expenditure 
 
(1) (2) 
  Food Security Score 
Log Per Capita 
Food Consumption 
$ 
Household Demographics: Estimate 
Std. 
Error Estimate 
Std. 
Error 
Household Demographics: 
    Household Size (log) 0.263 0.969 -1.498*** 0.104 
# Children under 5 -0.290 0.247 0.088*** 0.027 
 # Children 6-17 -0.421** 0.179 0.082*** 0.022 
 # Adults 18 - 59 -0.398 0.241 0.094*** 0.017 
 # Elderly (>60) -0.132 0.270 0.098*** 0.029 
Main Respondent Characteristics: 
    Female (Yes=1) -0.419 0.292 -0.069** 0.031 
Age (Years) -0.028*** 0.010 -0.002* 0.001 
Widowed  (Yes=1) -0.323 0.302 0.025 0.038 
Divorced/Separated  (Yes=1) 0.051 0.457 0.021 0.045 
Main resp. has schooling  (Yes=1) 0.601* 0.304 0.077** 0.032 
Other socioeconomic Characteristics: 
    Distance to Food Market (Km) -0.077*** 0.025 0.001 0.002 
Distance to Input Market (Km) 0.022*** 0.008 0.001 0.001 
Distance to Water Source (Km) -0.016 0.118 -0.008 0.009 
Productive Assets Scorea 0.507*** 0.089 0.074*** 0.008 
Household Amenities Scoreb 0.528*** 0.106 0.051*** 0.010 
# of livestock type 0.096 0.103 0.037*** 0.008 
Any income from wage labor? (Yes=1) 1.530*** 0.462 0.151*** 0.040 
Any income from maricho labor? (Yes=1) -0.787** 0.305 0.036 0.024 
Planted crops last rainy season (Yes=1) 1.722*** 0.514 -0.008 0.044 
Labor Constrained (Yes=1) -0.898** 0.386 -0.011 0.043 
Aid received (in USD) -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Monthly remittances low (< $25/month) -1.350** 0.518 -0.192*** 0.040 
Has loan outstanding  (Yes=1) -0.579 0.376 0.116** 0.045 
Other covariates: 
    Suffered from a shock? (Yes=1) -1.975*** 0.402 0.000 0.036 
Mashona Indicator -1.255*** 0.353 0.251*** 0.043 
Masvingo Indicator -1.037** 0.447 0.255*** 0.036 
Constant 19.010*** 1.448 4.766*** 0.134 
     
                                                                                                                                                                                  
when the survey team is visiting and in such cases, we interview a member of the household who is 
available to answer questions. 
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Observations 3035 
 
3035 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.130 
 
0.467 
 Notes: 
 * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,*** p<0.01.   
Standard errors clustered at the ward level. Standardized baseline weights utilized.  
a Productive assets score obtained through Principal Components Analysis of 30 different 
variables that indicate ownership of assets such as tractor, plough, and other agricultural tools 
and total land area of the household. Based on this analysis and the scree plot shown in 
Appendix A Figure A.1a, we retain the first principal component as our Productive Assets 
score for the household, which explains 21.5 per cent of the variability in the data. The 
subsequent components each explain less than six per cent of the variation.   
b Household Amenities score also obtained through Principal Components Analysis of 
variables that indicate ownership of the following amenities: a toilet, a cooking room, 
ventilation in the cooking room, access to energy for lighting within the house, household 
structure with more than two rooms, and sturdy walls made of bricks, stone or cement. Scree 
plot for this analysis is shown in Appendix A Figure A.1b. We retain the first component as 
the Amenities score for the household. It explains 31.3 per cent of the variation among the 
variables. 
 
The main results of Table 3 are in the socioeconomic characteristics section. As expected, 
ownership of productive assets and presence of household amenities such as sturdy walls and 
toilet facilities positively impact food consumption and the Food Security score. Wage income 
has large significant impacts on both consumption and the Food Security score. Conversely, low 
level of monthly remittances, signifying absence of a strong support system, has a large negative 
impact on both food consumption and food security. However, some variables such as labour-
constrained status of the household, which directly indicate the vulnerability of the household 
due to the uncertainty they introduce in the household’s source for food, are significant in only 
explaining Food Security score, but not food consumption. Other variables that impact only the 
Food Security score are indicators for whether the household earns any income from casual labor 
(referred to in Zimbabwe as maricho), has planted any crops in the last rainy season, or has 
suffered from any shock in the last 12 months. Maricho or casual wage labor is the fall back 
option for subsistence households throughout rural Africa, and is undertaken by landless or 
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extremely poor households, or when the household suffers a shock or when grain stocks have run 
out and cash is needed. These results suggest that households smooth their consumption across 
time and their vulnerability in maintaining that consumption level is not immediately reflected in 
aggregate value of food consumption, but it is captured by the Food Security score. 
 
2.4.2. Initial Harvest Period vs. Peak Harvest Period 
We extend our vulnerability analysis by taking into account the fact that the baseline 
survey was implemented between April and June, so that some households were interviewed just 
prior to harvest and others during or just after. In an agrarian rural setting such as the one in 
which the HSCT was implemented, the time of the harvest can make a big difference to the food 
status of household members. Most rural households rely heavily on own-production of cereals, 
but also rely on the market, as own-production is not sufficient to meet their food requirements 
(FEWS NET, 2014).  
 
Figure 2.2 provides a graphic representation of Zimbabwe’s typical seasonal calendar. 
Zimbabwe has a unimodal rainy season lasting from November to March. This is also the main 
planting season of the year. Tobacco is the main cash crop of Zimbabwe and its harvest begins in 
March. The main maize harvest, which is the staple crop of the country, begins in May. The peak 
vegetable gardening and cotton-picking season then begins in July. Food insecurity starts 
increasing around September/October as grain stores from the last harvest are depleted by then 
(FEWS NET, July 2013). 
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Figure 2.2.  Zimbabwe Seasonal Calendar 
 
 
 
 
Source: Famine Early Warning Systems Network 
 
Figure 2.3 depicts how the Food Security score progresses across April-June, the survey 
window for 2013, and also the period when households are beginning to move out of the lean 
season to initial and then peak harvest period when they are typically flush with grains from 
own-production. Note that the food security score is based on a four-week reference period. 
Households interviewed in April/May were requested to think back to March/April, when they 
would have not yet entered the maize harvest period. As seen in Figure 2.3, there is a 
discontinuity during the week of May 14-21, after which households’ food security begins to 
progressively improve. This presents an opportunity to divide the sample according to initial vs. 
peak harvest period to understand if the standard set of socioeconomic and demographic factors 
influences food security differently in a relatively worse-off vs. better-off period. We do not 
include Mashonaland East in this part of our analysis since no households in that province were 
approached during peak harvest period. 
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Figure 2.3. Food Security score by Week 
 
 
 
 
Results of our seasonality analysis are presented in Table 2.4, where we estimate a fully 
interacted model that allows all effects to differ between initial harvest and peak harvest period 
by interacting each covariate with an indicator variable for ‘Pre/Initial Harvest’. Analytically, 
this model is equivalent to estimating separate models for the two groups, but an interacted 
model has the advantage of testing statistical differences between the two. We find that although 
the Chow tests inform us that the two groups/periods are jointly different, only a few of the 
individual interaction terms emerged as significant. In Table 2.4, we control for all variables as 
shown in Table 2.3, but here we show only those variables for which a significant interaction 
term emerges. The full results of the interacted model are presented in Table A.1 of the 
Appendix A.  
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Table 2.4. Results from Fully Interacted Model Comparing Pre/Initial Harvest vs. 
Peak Harvest 
 
(1) (2) 
  Food Security Score 
Log P.C. Food 
Consumption  
 
Estimate 
Interacted 
Estimate Estimate 
Interacted 
Estimate 
Pre/Initial Harvest Dummy 5.799* 
 
-0.104 
 
 
(3.092) 
 
(0.267) 
 
      # Adults 18 - 59 0.103 -0.903** 0.098*** 0.027 
 
(0.340) (0.447) (0.032) (0.041) 
     Distance to Food Market -0.100** 0.099* 0.005* -0.011* 
 
(0.042) (0.054) (0.003) (0.006) 
     Distance to Input Market 0.038*** -0.035* 0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.013) (0.020) (0.001) (0.001) 
     Any income from maricho labor? 
(Yes=1) -0.281 -1.410** 0.071* -0.046 
 
(0.527) (0.632) (0.042) (0.062) 
     
Labor Constrained (Yes=1) 0.784 
-
3.422*** 0.010 0.066 
 
(0.700) (1.060) (0.064) (0.075) 
     Monthly remittances low (< 
$25/month) -0.317 -2.709** -0.141** -0.099 
 
(0.774) (1.071) (0.070) (0.081) 
     Masvingo -0.448 -1.240 0.209*** 0.149** 
 
(0.628) (0.856) (0.046) (0.073) 
     Constant 15.191*** 
 
4.795*** 
 
 
(2.559) 
 
(0.234) 
 
     Observations 2121 
 
2121 
 Notes: 
 * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,*** p<0.01.   
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the ward level. Standardized baseline weights utilized.  
The model controls for all variables as shown in Table 2.3. Only significant interaction terms are 
shown in this table. 
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Maricho labour income increases food consumption during peak harvest but during pre-
harvest, it hurts the food security score of households. This suggests that households that engage 
in maricho labour in the pre-harvest period are poorer and are forced to rely on casual labour. 
Importantly, we find that if the household is labour constrained or receives low monthly 
remittances, its food security is weakened in this period. Being labour constrained stands out as 
an especially vulnerability-inducing attribute. It is important to note that several social protection 
programmes throughout Africa – Ethiopia, Liberia, Malawi, Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia – 
utilize labour-constrained status as a targeting criterion for identifying programme beneficiaries.7  
 
2.5. Impact of the HSCT Programme on Household Food Security 
2.5.1. Summary Statistics 
Table 2.5 reports mean characteristics at baseline for both treatment and comparison 
groups. We retain only the panel sample of households for this part of our analysis. There are 
1,746 households in the treatment group and 880 in the comparison group. To test for baseline 
balance between the two groups, we use OLS regressions with clustered standard errors at the 
ward level (to account for clustering of households within wards). Mean differences in a set of 
30 key household characteristics were tested, and none of these were found to be statistically 
different at the five per cent level at baseline.  
 
Average household size in the sample is about five, with a per capita monthly 
expenditure of $32-33. More than two-thirds of the main respondents are women, their average 
                                                        
7 Some programme names include the Malawi Social Cash Transfer Programme, the Kenya Cash Transfer 
for Orphans and Vulnerable Children, Ghana’s Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty, Ethiopia’s 
Productive Safety Net Programme–Direct Support, and the Mozambique Food Subsidy Programme 
(Garcia and Moore, 2012). 
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age is 56 years, and more than half have had at least some level of schooling. Around 25-28 
percent of these households take care of one or more disabled members. In addition, around 37 
percent have at least one member who is chronically ill and almost two-thirds have one or more 
elderly members. These characteristics contribute to a high dependency ratio, which is reflected 
in the large number of households that are categorized as labor constrained (about 83-84 percent 
of the sample8). That our sample should have such a high concentration of labor-constrained 
households makes sense because as mentioned earlier, one of the program criterions for 
household eligibility is labor-constrained status of the household. This demographic profile is 
also reflected in the unique U shape of the age distribution among HSCT households shown in 
Figure A.2 of Appendix A. There are a large proportion of young people (almost 60 per cent of 
individuals in our sample are below 18 years of age, and most are adolescents), a few working-
age adults, and then the distribution again expands to indicate a higher concentration of people 
beyond age 60. This profile reflects the ‘missing generation’ problem characterizing much of 
sub-Saharan Africa, wherein older caregivers are providing for adolescents, because prime-age, 
able-bodied workers are ‘missing’, due to high mortality rates induced by high HIV/AIDS 
prevalence rates. The addition of the labour-constrained criterion in addition to food poverty is 
important because it led to the selection of socially vulnerable households.  
 
Table 2.6a provides means of food security measures across our two time periods. A 
higher Food Security score indicates the household has higher food security and is relatively 
better off. Cronbach’s alpha for the food security scale in the two time periods is 0.86 at baseline 
and 0.87 at follow-up, suggesting that the sub items of the scale have relatively high internal 
                                                        
8 The reason this is not hundred percent is because the questions used to determine labour constraint are 
not exactly identical in the evaluation survey and the targeting form used by ZIMSTAT, and the two sets 
of data were collected at different times.  
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consistency.9,10 The average Food Security score increased from 13 at baseline to above 16 at 
follow-up, a pattern that holds for both treatment and comparison groups. This improvement is 
because the baseline survey window began in the pre-harvest season (April-June 2013) while the 
follow-up survey in 2014 was conducted entirely during peak harvest time (June-September 
2014) when households are generally flush with food supplies.  
 
Value of average household food consumption per person per month has decreased by a 
dollar for the treatment group and almost two dollars for the comparison group. Kernel densities 
of the Food Security score and log of per capita monthly food consumption are provided in 
Figure A.3 of Appendix A.  
 
A widely used indicator of diet diversity is the Diet Diversity Score (DDS), which 
measures the number of different food groups consumed over a given reference period with a 
score ranging from 0 to 12, since there are 12 food groups11 recommended for inclusion 
                                                        
9 The nine sub-items of the scale items are: 1) did you worry that your household would not have enough 
food?, 2) were you or any household member not able to eat the kinds of food you preferred because of a 
lack of resources?, 3) did you or any household member have to eat a limited variety of foods due to a 
lack of resources?, 4) did you or any household member have to eat some foods that you really did not 
want to eat because of a lack of resources to obtain other types of food?, 5) did you or any household 
member have to eat a smaller meal than you felt you needed because there was not enough food?, 6) did 
you or any household member have to eat fewer meals in a day because there was not enough food?, 7) 
was there ever no food to eat of any kind in your household because of lack of resources to get food?, 8) 
did you or any household member go to sleep at night hungry because there was not enough food?, and 9) 
did you or any household member go a whole day and night without eating anything because there was 
not enough food? 
10 Cronbach's alpha is a measure of internal consistency and is used as a measure of scale reliability. It 
measures how closely related a set of items are as a group. Generally, a coefficient of 0.80 or higher is 
considered acceptable for conducting research. 
11 The 12 food groups are: Cereals; Roots and Tubers; Vegetables; Fruits; Meat/Poultry; Eggs; 
Fish/seafood; Pulses and Legumes; Milk and Milk products; Oil/Fats; Sugar/honey; and Miscellaneous 
(species and beverages). 
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(Swindale & Bilinsky, 2006). Average household diet diversity based on this score increased 
from about 6 at baseline to 6.76 for the comparison group and 7.16 for the treatment group.  
 
Table 2.6b provides a correlation matrix of standard pairwise Pearson’s Correlation 
coefficients using 2013 (baseline) data only. Correlations are in the expected direction but are 
low (correlation of Food Security score with per capita food consumption expenditure is only 
13.6 per cent), suggesting, as we discussed in the previous section, that they are measuring 
different dimensions. Past empirical studies have also found low correlations between 
expenditure/income and a subjective food adequacy indicator (Migotto et al., 2005; Headey and 
Ecker, 2012). 
 
 
Table 2.5. Mean Baseline Characteristics of Sample Households         
 
Comparison Group Treatment Group p-value of 
difference   Mean Std. Error Mean Std. Error 
Household Demographics: 
     Household Size 5.18 0.193 5.02 0.142 0.504 
# Children under 5 0.80 0.061 0.76 0.048 0.550 
 # Children 6-17 2.24 0.110 2.23 0.081 0.931 
 # Adults 18 - 59 1.28 0.087 1.20 0.052 0.407 
 # Elderly (>60) 0.85 0.042 0.83 0.032 0.801 
% of households that have disabled members 28.05% 0.017 25.34% 0.015 0.222 
% of households that have chronically ill members 37.74% 0.024 36.71% 0.015 0.712 
% of households that have elderly members 64.57% 0.028 64.12% 0.022 0.894 
Main Respondent Characteristics: 
     % Female  65.53% 0.021 69.65% 0.016 0.116 
Age (Yrs.) 56.35 1.255 56.27 0.881 0.951 
% Widowed 36.77% 0.020 37.15% 0.017 0.883 
% Divorced/Separated 8.17% 0.011 9.54% 0.011 0.389 
% Main resp. has schooling 60.53% 0.025 55.83% 0.019 0.129 
% Main resp. currently attends school 1.32% 0.005 1.66% 0.003 0.586 
Highest grade of Main resp. 3.49 0.129 3.30 0.136 0.307 
Other Socioeconomic Characteristics: 
     Monthly Per Capita Total Expenditure (in usd) 33.43 1.412 32.01 1.037 0.418 
Monthly Per capita Food Expenditure (in usd) 20.81 1.001 20.33 0.824 0.714 
HFIAS Score (1-27) 13.93 0.386 14.03 0.267 0.841 
Diet Diversity Score (1-10) 6.27 0.151 5.94 0.119 0.089 
Distance to Food Market (Km) 3.36 0.466 3.87 0.238 0.316 
Distance to Input Market  (Km) 20.51 2.246 18.74 1.477 0.508 
Distance to Water Source  (Km) 1.29 0.210 1.36 0.112 0.760 
# of livestock type 2.29 0.085 2.21 0.082 0.477 
% households that receive wages 11.09% 0.012 10.21% 0.010 0.575 
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% households undertaking casual/maricho labor 48.87% 0.034 46.20% 0.022 0.513 
% households that planted crops last season 86.89% 0.026 90.11% 0.009 0.247 
% households categorized as labor constrained 82.91% 0.020 83.97% 0.012 0.647 
Aid received (in USD) 77.67 14.210 54.35 3.445 0.111 
% of households that have an outstanding loan 8.85% 0.008 9.37% 0.013 0.741 
% of households that have suffered from a shock 86.87% 0.020 90.04% 0.013 0.190 
Notes: Attrition-adjusted weighted results, p-values obtained by clustering at ward 
level       
 
Table 2.6a. Mean of Food Security Measures  
  Comparison Treatment p-value 
baseline 
difference   Baseline Follow-up Baseline Follow-up 
Food Security Score 13.07 16.34 12.98 16.46 0.841 
P.C. Food Consumption $ per month 20.81 19.09 20.33 19.33 0.714 
Diet Diversity Score 6.27 6.76 5.94 7.16 0.089 
N 879 880 1742 1743   
Notes: Attrition-adjusted weighted results, p-values is of baseline difference between the two groups and obtained 
by clustering at ward level 
      Table 2.6b. Correlation Matrix of Food Security Measures using Baseline Data 
  
  
Food 
Security 
Score 
P.C. Food 
Consumption 
$ per month 
Diet 
Diversity 
Score 
  Food Security Score 1 
    P.C. Food Consumption $ per month 0.1361 1 
   Diet Diversity Score 0.2604 0.3482 1 
  Notes: Attrition-adjusted weighted results 
  
3
3
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2.5.2. Empirical Methods 
We utilize the longitudinal sample (containing two time periods, baseline and follow-up) 
to conduct a difference-in-differences (DD) analysis to estimate the impact of the programme on 
food security.  
 
Equation (1): 
𝑌ℎ𝑗𝑡  =  β0 + β1Post𝑡 + β2Transfer𝑗 + β3(Transfer ∗ Post)𝑗𝑡
+ β4HHDemographicsℎ + β5HHMainRespℎ + β6Strata𝑗 + β7Prices𝑗𝑡
+ β8Week𝑡 + εℎ𝑗𝑡   
where  
Yhjt is the food security outcome of interest for household h in Ward j at time t. 
Postt is an indicator that equals ‘1’ if the time period is 2014 (12 month follow-up). 
Transferj is an indicator that equals ‘1’ if the household is in a treatment Ward.  
HHDemographics is a vector of baseline household demographic characteristics, 
which include log of household size, and the number of people below age 5, between 
age 6-17, between age 18-60, and those over 60.  
HHMainResp is a vector of characteristics of the main respondent that includes 
indicators for if the main respondent is female, widowed, divorced/separated, has 
attended school, currently attends school, and linear variables for the highest grade 
attained and age. 
Strata are indicators of the strata used in selecting Wards. It includes two dummies to 
indicate if the household was located in Mashonaland East or Masvingo. The 
reference strata is Mtabeleland North.  
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Pricesjt refer to a vector of cluster-level prices of eight staple items.  
Weekt is the week in which the household is interviewed.  
 
In this framework the variable of interest is β3, which represents the DD programme 
impact. Estimation is via Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with standard errors clustered at the 
level of the primary sampling unit (Ward). We use baseline values for main respondent 
characteristics and household demographics, while prices are maintained as exogenous and 
allowed to vary by time period. We tested separately to see if the programme had an inflationary 
effect in treatment wards and found none, a plausible finding given that the overall coverage of 
the programme is only 10-15 per cent in the ward. 
 
As described earlier, the study design is a ward level longitudinal matched design where 
households in both comparison and treatment districts went through official program targeting. 
Participation in the program is not demand-driven: the program eligibility identification process 
determines eligibility, and there were no refusals to participate in the program among eligible 
households, i.e., take up is universal among the eligible. The likelihood for selection bias in this 
context is minimal. 
 
The identifying assumption of the DD model is of ‘parallel trends’, i.e., the trajectory of 
the dependent variable over the study time period would be the same across treatment and 
comparison wards in absence of the program. As described in the Study Design section, 
comparison wards were ‘matched’ to treatment wards by a scoring system based on five 
variables, which cover level of development and agro-ecological characteristics, to try to 
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maintain the validity of this assumption. In addition, baseline balance tests indicate that 
households across the treatment and comparison samples are balanced on a number of key 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics (see Table 2.5). This is as expected since all 
households are eligible for the HSCT, having been selected according to the same program 
eligibility criteria. This further supports the validity of the key identifying assumption.  
 
The DD model does not control for differences between the treatment and comparison 
groups on account of household or individual unobserved characteristics. Our impact estimate 
(β3 in the above equation) may be biased if there are unobserved characteristics influencing both 
the program and our outcome measure. A fixed effects model at the household level can address 
the issue of unobserved characteristics that are fixed over time as a source for endogeneity, and 
is therefore our preferred model: 
 
Equation (2): 
𝑌ℎ𝑗𝑡  =  αℎ +  β1Post𝑡 + β2Transfer𝑗 ∗ Post𝑡 + β3Prices𝑗𝑡 + β4Week𝑡 +  νℎ𝑗𝑡 
where  
Yhjt is the food security outcome of interest for household h in Ward j at time t. 
αh (h=1….H) is the intercept for each household (h household-specific intercepts). 
Post, Prices, and Week are as described in Equation (1). 
β2 represents the impact estimate and νht is the time-varying error term. 
Standard errors are clustered at the ward level. 
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Note that the threat unobservable characteristics impose to the validity of our model is 
minimal because, as mentioned above, households in both arms are selected according to 
program rules and take up is universal among the eligible, so there is no self-selection into the 
treatment group. There is a second reason, however, why employing the fixed effects model is 
warranted for estimating the impact on the Food Security score. Subjective or experiential 
measures can lead to responder bias since some element of their predisposition or attitudinal 
characteristics will enter into the responses they give for the set of nine questions that comprise 
the food security scale. It is, therefore, important to have panel data, where we follow the same 
respondent from one year to the next to control for this type of responder bias. We estimate 
Equation (2) using only the subsample of households where the main respondent has not changed 
from baseline to follow-up. Out of the 2,630 households that comprise our panel sample, over 76 
percent (2,007 households) have the same main respondent across the two time periods.    
 
2.5.3. Results and Discussion 
Table 2.7 provides the results of our difference-in-differences model. Given the 
importance of the week in which the households were interviewed, our difference-in-differences 
estimates control for week of interview, in addition to the standard set of baseline household 
demographics and main respondent characteristics, and contemporaneous prices.1 Results using 
the full panel sample are shown in first half of Table 2.7. We find that per capita food 
consumption increased by $2 per month, which represents a ten per cent increase over baseline 
value of food consumption. As per the design of the programme, a household size of five (the 
median household size in our sample) receives $5 per person, so a $2 increase in food 
                                                        
1 Table A.2 in Appendix A shows the results of the Difference-in-Difference estimates on the full sample 
without controlling for week. We find significant impacts on Diet Diversity score, but not on per capita 
food consumption or on the Food Security score.  
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consumption represents forty percent of the transfer dollars the household receives. In addition, 
we find a statistically significant impact on Food Security and Diet Diversity scores, which have 
increased by 1.2 points and 0.77 points.  
 
The HSCT programme is designed so that per capita transfer size decreases with 
household size. However, the transfer size increases proportionally with household members 
only up to a point (four members) and then remains flat at USD25 for all households greater than 
four members. Since the median household size in our sample is five, over 50 per cent of 
households have more than four members. To account for this variation in the intensity of the 
treatment, we restrict our sample to households with four or fewer residents (bottom panel of 
Table 2.7). In this case, we do not find a statistically significant average treatment effect on food 
consumption value or on the Food Security score. The magnitude of the impact on food 
consumption has more than doubled to $4.4, but the t-statistic (1.6) is below the critical 
threshold.  
Table 2.7. Difference-in-Difference Model:  Impact on Food Security Measures  
 
(1) (2) (3) 
  
  
Per capita Food 
Consumption $ 
Household Food 
Security Score 
Household Diet 
Diversity Score     
On the Full Sample:  
Impact Estimate 2.004* 1.238** 0.767*** 
  
 
(1.160) (0.557) (0.198) 
  
      Treatment Indicator -0.941 1.316*** -0.145 
  
 
(1.385) (0.492) (0.163) 
  
      Follow-up Indicator -5.897* -5.285*** 0.039 
  
 
(3.274) (1.778) (0.639) 
  
      Week of Interview 0.253 0.813*** 0.036 
  
 
(0.333) (0.174) (0.062) 
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Observations 5245 5245 5245 
  Adjusted R-squared 0.323 0.119 0.191 
  
      On Small Households ((Household Size<=4 members): 
Impact Estimate 4.397 0.972 0.802*** 
  
 
(2.722) (0.697) (0.258) 
  
      Treatment Indicator -1.929 0.242 -0.359 
  
 
(2.321) (0.589) (0.226) 
  
      Follow-up Indicator -11.113 -1.376 0.878 
  
 
(6.783) (2.225) (0.884) 
  
      Week of Interview 0.365 0.391* -0.042 
  
 
(0.639) (0.215) (0.088) 
  
      Observations 2355 2355 2355 
  Adjusted R-squared 0.231 0.088 0.215 
  Notes: 
* p<0.10   **p<0.05   ***p<0.01 
Standard errors clustered at the Ward level in parentheses.  
Estimations use difference-in-difference modeling among panel households. All estimations 
control for baseline household size, main respondent’s gender, age, education and marital 
status, strata, household demographic composition, and a vector of cluster level prices.  
 
To control for attitudinal bias in the Food Security score, we restricted the sample to only 
those households where the main respondent had not changed from 2013 to 2014 and run an 
individual fixed effects model, which controls for personality traits and other unobserved 
idiosyncrasies of the individual that are fixed over the one-year time period. Results are provided 
in Table 2.8. The impact estimate on food consumption is no longer statistically significant, in 
both the full panel sample as well as the subsample of smaller households. However, impact 
estimate on the Food Security and Diet Diversity scores are significant across both samples. The 
effect sizes are larger for the smaller household sample, particularly in the case of the Food 
Security score. One reason why we observe this may be because per person value of the transfer 
is higher in smaller households.   
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Table 2.8. Individual Fixed Effects Model:  Impact on Food Security Measures  
 
(1) (2) (3) 
  
  
Per capita Food 
Consumption $ 
Household Food 
Security Score 
Household Diet 
Diversity Score     
On the Full Sample:  
Impact Estimate 1.159 1.734** 0.636*** 
  
 
(1.798) (0.686) (0.223) 
  
      Follow-up Indicator -5.019 -4.058* 0.995 
  
 
(5.693) (2.272) (0.800) 
  
      Week of Interview 0.331 0.666*** -0.060 
  
 
(0.480) (0.215) (0.074) 
  
      Observations 4002 4002 4002 
  Adjusted R-squared 0.012 0.190 0.168 
  
      On Small Households ((Household Size<=4 members): 
Impact Estimate 3.277 2.380*** 0.692** 
  
 
(3.255) (0.818) (0.273) 
  
      Follow-up Indicator -10.364 -3.254 1.467 
  
 
(10.701) (2.824) (0.977) 
  
      Week of Interview 0.585 0.534* -0.090 
  
 
(0.922) (0.269) (0.087) 
  
      Observations 1971 1971 1971 
  Adjusted R-squared 0.030 0.142 0.219 
  Notes: 
* p<0.10   **p<0.05   ***p<0.01 
Standard errors clustered at the Ward level in parentheses.  
Estimations control for week of interview, and a vector of cluster level prices 
 
We find a consistent positive impact on the Diet Diversity score across all models in the 
range of 0.64 to 0.80 points. Table 2.9 provides a list of the 12 foodstuffs that make up the score. 
We find a 13 percentage point (pp) increase in the number of households consuming fruits, 16pp 
increase for pulses and legumes, 12pp for dairy, 15pp for fats, 13pp for sweets and finally about 
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6pp for miscellaneous items, which include non-alcoholic beverages and condiments. Why are 
these increases not consistently reflected in the food consumption measure? One answer is that 
the value of food consumption variable hides dynamic activity that is taking place within the 
household as it makes choices to obtain food from different sources. This means that even 
though the treatment and comparison groups may on average spend roughly the same amount on 
food, the cash transfer beneficiaries have more cash available. This additional cash allows them 
to: 1) approach the market to diversify their food basket; 2) diversify own-production to other 
foodstuffs, and; 3) rely less on gifts as a source for their food.  
 
Table 2.9. Household Diet Diversity Impact Estimates 
    
Impact 
Estimate Baseline Mean 
Diet Diversity Score 0.767*** 6.045407 
  
(0.198) 
 
Presence of Food Item in Diet 
Impact 
Estimate 
Baseline Mean 
(%) 
(1) Cereals -0.001 99.9 
  
(0.001) 
 (2) Roots & Tubers 0.033 11.3 
  
(0.051) 
 (3) Vegetables 0.002 98.9 
  
(0.007) 
 (4) Fruits 0.126** 33.4 
  
(0.056) 
 (5) Meats 0.005 38.8 
  
(0.039) 
 (6) Eggs -0.038* 6.8 
  
(0.020) 
 (7) Fish 0.016 22.6 
  
(0.037) 
 (8) Pulses & Legumes 0.161*** 57.5 
  
(0.044) 
 (9) Dairy 0.123*** 31.8 
  
(0.042) 
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(10) Fats 0.147*** 64.1 
  
(0.046) 
 (11) Sweets 0.134*** 46.9 
  
(0.035) 
 (12) Misc. (Condiments & Beverages) 0.060*** 92.5 
  
(0.020) 
 No. Of Observations 5245 2622 
Notes: * p<0.10   **p<0.05   ***p<0.01  
Standard errors clustered at the Ward level in parentheses 
Notes: Attrition-adjusted weighted results. Estimations use difference-in-
difference modeling among panel households. All estimations control for week of 
interview, baseline household size, main respondent’s gender, age, education and 
marital status, strata, household demographic composition, and a vector of cluster 
level prices. 
 
Table 2.10 provides baseline mean value of consumption for each of the 12 categories 
that make up the Diet Diversity score and disaggregated by source into own production, market 
purchases, and gifts. Since these households are subsistence farmers, own production is the 
primary source of food (~57 per cent), followed by purchases (~23 per cent), and a non-
negligible amount (~21 per cent) of food is sourced from gifts (last column of Table 2.10). 
Cereal (in particular maize) is the staple food and accounts for 36.5 per cent of total food 
consumption value, followed by vegetables (23 per cent), meats (8.4 per cent) and pulses and 
legumes (eight per cent). Vegetables, fruits, eggs, and dairy are mostly own-produced. Over half 
of the cereal, roots and tubers, meat, and pulses consumption expenditure are from own-
production. Fish, fats, sweets, and miscellaneous items are mostly purchased from the market. 
There is less variation in gifts, which account for about 20 per cent of consumption for most food 
items.  
 
 
Table 2.10. Baseline Mean Values of Total Household Food Consumption Value by Source 
(1) Total 
 
Own Production Purchases Gifts 
  in USD 
 % of Total 
Consumption 
in 
USD 
% of Food 
Item in 
Col (1) 
that is 
produced 
in 
USD 
% of 
Food Item 
in Col (1) 
that is 
purchased 
in 
USD 
% of Food 
Item in 
Col (1) 
that is 
gifted 
Cereals 29.8 36.5 16.2 54.3 7.5 25.2 6.1 20.5 
Roots & Tubers 0.9 1.1 0.5 52.1 0.2 22.1 0.2 25.8 
Vegetables 18.8 23.0 14.6 77.5 1.6 8.3 2.7 14.2 
Fruits 2.3 2.8 1.8 76.8 0.1 5.1 0.4 18.1 
Meats 6.9 8.4 3.8 55.9 1.1 16.2 1.9 27.9 
Eggs 0.2 0.3 0.2 78.6 0.0 16.2 0.0 5.3 
Fish 1.4 1.7 0.2 17.9 0.7 48.4 0.5 33.7 
Pulses & Legumes 6.6 8.0 4.5 68.1 0.3 4.6 1.8 27.3 
Dairy 3.7 4.5 2.7 72.9 0.3 7.4 0.7 19.7 
Fats 4.7 5.7 0.6 12.2 2.8 59.4 1.3 28.4 
Sweets 2.5 3.1 0.0 0.4 2.0 77.9 0.5 21.7 
Misc. (Condiments & 
Beverages) 3.7 4.6 1.2 31.1 2.0 52.5 0.6 16.4 
Other Food 0.3 0.3 0.2 60.5 0.1 31.0 0.0 8.5 
Total 81.8 100.0 46.4 56.7 18.6 22.7 16.9 20.6 
Notes: Attrition-adjusted weighed means. Total number of observation is 2622 
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Table 2.11 provides impact estimates on each of these 12 categories, disaggregated by 
their source. Since cereal (maize) is the main staple food, we first look at cereals in the first row. 
We find that though there is no significant impact on value of total cereal consumption, there is 
significant activity behind this aggregate measure. The cash transfer has led to an 18 per cent 
increase in purchases of cereals. Almost all of it however is offset by a 21 per cent reduction in 
gifts. Similarly, though there is no overall impact on value of vegetable consumption, we find 
vegetable purchases have increased by 21 per cent, though most of this may be offset by a 
reduction in vegetable production and gifts. We also find a 25 per cent increase in consumption 
of fruits, composed of increases in own-production and purchases. Fats and sweets follow a 
similar pattern with significant increases in consumption, derived from market purchases. There 
is also a 40 per cent increase in value of pulses and legumes consumption, stemming from a 32 
per cent increase in own production. These findings indicate that these households are 
diversifying production away from cereals to pulses and legumes, and fruits. Dairy follows a 
similar pattern to that of pulses – the impact estimate on total consumption value is 22 per cent, 
with most of it composed from an increase in own-production. Interestingly, gifts as a source of 
food have significantly reduced across several foodstuffs. The last row provides impact estimates 
on household aggregate food estimates. While there is only a nine per cent impact on value of 
aggregate food consumption, which is significant at the ten per cent level, this result hides the 36 
per cent increase in purchases (significant at the one percent level) and 23 per cent decline in 
gifts (significant at the five percent level).  
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Table 2.11. Impact Estimates on Household Food Expenditure, Disaggregated by 
Source (Log of USD) 
  Total Own Purchases Gifts 
Cereals -0.006 -0.014 0.185** -0.213** 
 
(0.047) (0.145) (0.089) (0.081) 
Roots & Tubers 0.081 0.038 0.043 0.005 
 
(0.099) (0.073) (0.032) (0.037) 
Vegetables -0.093 -0.123 0.206** -0.084 
 
(0.069) (0.109) (0.089) (0.102) 
Fruits 0.261** 0.245** 0.059** -0.026 
 
(0.117) (0.118) (0.023) (0.036) 
Meats 0.050 0.004 0.077 -0.071 
 
(0.106) (0.088) (0.066) (0.052) 
Eggs -0.042 -0.010 -0.021 -0.011* 
 
(0.026) (0.022) (0.015) (0.006) 
Fish 0.020 -0.028 0.043 0.017 
 
(0.069) (0.030) (0.054) (0.043) 
Pulses & Legumes 0.401*** 0.324*** 0.021 0.099 
 
(0.111) (0.113) (0.029) (0.071) 
Dairy 0.221** 0.120* 0.038 0.051 
 
(0.099) (0.066) (0.040) (0.050) 
Fats 0.325*** 0.054 0.317*** -0.032 
 
(0.084) (0.040) (0.081) (0.043) 
Sweets 0.211*** 0.007 0.280*** -0.073** 
 
(0.058) (0.006) (0.058) (0.034) 
Misc. (Condiments & Beverages) 0.115* 0.022 0.204*** -0.098** 
 
(0.068) (0.052) (0.056) (0.039) 
Total 0.088* 0.066 0.359*** -0.233** 
  (0.051) (0.082) (0.071) (0.098) 
Notes: * p<0.10   **p<0.05   ***p<0.01 
Attrition-adjusted weighted results. Standard errors clustered at the Ward level in 
parentheses. 
Estimations use difference-in-difference modeling among 5245 panel households. All 
estimations control for week of interview, baseline household size, main respondent's 
gender, age, education and marital status, strata, household demographic composition, and 
a vector of cluster level prices. 
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2.6. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
We investigated different measures of food security in the context of the Zimbabwe cash 
transfer programme. We analyzed determinants of household food security and food 
consumption, and find that variables indicative of vulnerability, such as being labour 
constrained, not having planted a crop last season, relying on maricho/casual labour, or having 
suffered from an income shock, are important in explaining variation in the Food Security score 
but do not explain variation in value of food consumption. The common theme across these 
variables is that they capture some of the uncertainty these households face with respect to food 
access. However, physical assets, household amenities, a steady wage, and monthly remittances 
explained variation in both value of food consumption and the Food Security score. We 
complement this analysis by comparing households that were interviewed during two different 
periods of time, one period which induced greater vulnerability than the other, to understand 
which factors play a protective role and which ones get accentuated during tough periods. Here 
we find that being labour constrained weakened food security, but has no impact on value of 
food consumption in the pre-harvest period. This evidence supports the programme feature of the 
HSCT wherein eligibility of a household to become a beneficiary of the cash transfer is 
determined not just by poverty but also by its dependency ratio, a proxy for labour constraints 
status. Given the current drought and food security crisis in Zimbabwe, social protection 
programmes, such as the HSCT and their methodology for identifying beneficiaries, assume even 
more importance.  
 
Our impact analysis of the HSCT programme on food security and consumption supports 
the notion that relying on an aggregate food consumption measure is inadequate in assessing 
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food security. The difference-in-differences model yields an effect size of $2 per month, which 
represents about forty percent of the transfer dollars the average household receives. Further, the 
Fixed Effects model does not indicate any impact food consumption but there are statistically 
significant impacts on the Food Security and Diet Diversity scores across all models. This is 
because aggregate food consumption hides dynamic activity that is taking place within the 
household that produces robust results for household diet diversity. These labor-constrained and 
food-poor households depend on subsistence farming (~57 per cent of total food consumption is 
own-produced) and gifts and aid (approximately 20 per cent) to make up their total food basket. 
The increase in value of their food consumption is not equal to the amount of the transfer but it 
allows them to rely less on gifts and aid (reduction of 23 per cent) as a source of food, the 
composition of which they are not able to control. The cash transfer also enables them to make 
market purchases to diversify their diet (market purchases increase by 36 percent) as well as 
diversify their own production to dairy, pulse, legumes, and fruits.  
 
Our paper has important policy implications. The right to food is recognized in Article 25 
of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and Article 11 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Achieving food security and improved nutrition is the 
second of seventeen proposed Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the 2030 Agenda, 
agreed upon by the United Nations and its member Heads of State. While progress has been 
made, about 800 million people are still chronically undernourished, and one in four people 
remain undernourished in sub-Saharan Africa (FAO, 2014). To accurately monitor progress, we 
will need to rely on valid measures of food security that capture the uncertainty and mental stress 
associated with food access. A measure such as value of household food consumption does not 
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provide us with the complete picture of the household’s vulnerability with respect to food. This 
paper builds on previous research by providing evidence of the multidimensionality of food 
security and subsequently the usefulness of relying on a combination of measures to assess 
failure/success of a programme/policy instrument. Our ability to do this within the context of a 
large government program whose objective is to address food security enhances the external 
validity of the results. 
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CHAPTER 3: MEDIATION ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF AN UNCONDITIONAL 
CASH TRANSFER ON SUBJECTIVE WELLBEING 
 
3.1. Introduction 
We aim to understand how an increase in income due to an unconditional cash transfer 
program currently being implemented in Zimbabwe impacts the subjective wellbeing of 
beneficiaries. The cash received serves as an exogenous shock that allows us to isolate how an 
increase in income impacts subjective wellbeing. Historically, wellbeing has been measured in 
the context of preference satisfaction (Hicks et al, 2013) and since income is utilized to satisfy 
preferences, income has been the most commonly used indicator for measuring wellbeing. This 
model assumes a rational agent model and a functioning market economy. Another commonly 
used approach focuses on the satisfaction of basic human needs and rights. This approach 
recognizes the multi-dimensionality of ‘wellbeing,’ and explicitly recognizes that there are many 
different things in life that matter, such as health, education, physical environment, and 
interpersonal and political relationships fostered by prevalent institutional structures. However, a 
third approach has now gained prominence, which stresses the importance of taking into account 
the individual’s self-perception of how well they are doing. Since the goal is to measure 
wellbeing, it is best to ask the individuals themselves, as they are most aware of their own state 
of wellbeing, which is a combination of both material, social, and eudaimonic aspects of their 
lives. Frey and Stutzer (2002) argue that a subjective approach offers a complementary approach 
to studying human wellbeing and importantly, it allows us to capture human wellbeing directly. 
People themselves weight the monetary and non-monetary (including capabilities) dimensions of 
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their life. While there has been an expansion in the development and usage of wellbeing 
indicators that go beyond income and capabilities, such as the Happy Planet Index13 and Gross 
National Happiness Index14, one feature of these indices is that weights are assigned to their 
subcomponents and these weights reflect the priorities and preferences of policymakers. 
Helliwell and Barrington-Leigh (2010) instead suggest using direct measures of wellbeing as a 
way out of this problem and further, to use these direct measures to infer weights to conduct 
cost-benefit analyses15. The Report of the Commission for the Measurement of Economic 
Performance and Social Progress, also called the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitsourri report, has endorsed 
collection of subjective wellbeing (SWB) data. It states that national statistical offices should be 
measuring wellbeing at the individual and household level and that it is possible to collect 
meaningful and reliable data on subjective as well as objective wellbeing. This has seen 
operationalization in the 2013 OECD ‘Guidelines on Measuring Subjective Wellbeing’ (OECD, 
2013).  
 
In this paper, we focus on one component of subjective wellbeing, Satisfaction With Life. 
We aim to understand how an exogenous increase in income due to the cash transfer program in 
Zimbabwe impacts the beneficiaries’ judgment of their overall life satisfaction. We first analyze 
                                                        
13 The HPI score is obtained by multiplying mean life expectancy of residents of a given country by their 
mean experienced wellbeing. It is then adjusted to reflect inequalities in the distribution of experienced 
wellbeing and life expectancy and divided by that country’s Ecological Footprint per capita.  
14 The GNH Index is developed from the 33 indicators categorized under nine domains: Psychological 
wellbeing, health, education, time use, cultural diversity and resilience, good governance, community 
vitality, and ecological diversity and resilience. The nine domains are equally weighted but within each 
domain, objective indicators are given higher weights compared to subjective and self-reported indicators.  
15 However, construction of weights using SWB may be problematic because there might be ‘latent 
heterogeneity’ across individuals in their welfare weights and this in turn may be correlated with the value 
of the covariate associated with that individual, thus biasing the coefficient estimate (Ravallion, 2012).  
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the direct impact of the transfer and then analyze two specific mediators through which the 
additional cash income might influence life satisfaction: satisfaction of basic needs as indicated 
by decreased food insecurity and satisfaction of a higher level need as indicated by an increase in 
social participation or ‘social capital.’ The choice of these mediators is motivated by Maslow’s 
theory of hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1943), according to which need satisfaction occurs in a 
hierarchical manner: first are basic physiological needs, followed by safety needs, emotional 
needs of love and intimacy, self-esteem needs, and finally at the highest level is the need for self-
actualization such as intellectual and aesthetic needs. However, Maslow recognized that 
reversals of this order might be observed in some outliers and that it is not required for one need 
to be satiated completely before the next one manifests itself.  To put to test the idea of a 
hierarchy, we hypothesize that even at very low-income levels, money may be used to satisfy not 
just basic physiological needs but also higher-level needs such as social participation, which 
improves the person’s SWB. 
 
In 2012 Zimbabwe launched the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer Programme (HSCT), 
an unconditional cash transfer targeted to ultra-poor labor-constrained households. We utilize 
longitudinal data from a large impact evaluation conducted as part of the initial scale-up of the 
programme. Data was collected on 3063 program-eligible households across 90 wards in six 
districts. Households in three districts were slotted to enter the programme immediately, while 
households in the other three districts were to enter the programme in a later phase. 
 
We find that that even in the short period of a year, the HSCT has had a positive impact 
on the beneficiary’s perception of satisfaction with life. The total impact of the transfer on the 
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Satisfaction of Life score is in the range of 14 to 17 percent. The point estimate at the higher end 
of that range is obtained from our most robust model, the individual fixed effects model. Our 
mediation analyses uncovered an average causal mediation effect of about 16 percent through 
lowered food insecurity and 5 percent through an increase in occurrence of contributions made to 
social networks. Trust was not found to be a mediating factor in increasing life satisfaction in 
this particular context. Interviews with beneficiaries and key informants and focused group 
discussions reveal that while the cash transfer enabled beneficiaries to be active participants in 
their communities, it was also leading to tension between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.  
 
This paper contributes to two distinct literatures. First, we provide new estimates on how 
income from unconditional cash transfer programs impacts satisfaction with life in the context of 
an agrarian region in sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, this paper is the first to use the multi-item 
Satisfaction with Life Scale to measure subjective wellbeing in Zimbabwe. Second, we 
contribute to the literature on how income, basic needs fulfillment and SWB are related, i.e. we 
investigate the mechanisms by which the cash transfer is able to impact SWB. From a policy 
perspective, it is important to understand how the cash transfer is able to influence overall life 
satisfaction. This informs the design and implementation of this policy, and others like it, to help 
maintain their effectiveness. 
 
3.2. Literature Review 
People’s evaluation of their lives fall into two categories, affective and cognitive (Diener, 
2000). The focus of this paper is on cognitive evaluation, by which we mean a person’s judgment 
on overall satisfaction with their life or certain specific aspects of their life such as health, job, or 
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relationships. Cognitive evaluation demands that the individual reflects on his/her life. In 
contrast, affective evaluation refers to the experience of pleasant emotions and moods (positive 
affect) and unpleasant emotions and moods (negative affect). Measuring the affective component 
requires different research methods such as experience-sampling methods (ESM), the Day 
Reconstruction Method (DRM), and physiological methods. According to the review contained 
in the World Happiness Report Update (Helliwell et al, 2016), life evaluations are more closely 
related to life circumstances, rather than events that have occurred the day or week the interview 
question was posed to the respondent. Consequently, this paper focuses on cognitive evaluation 
by the individual of their wellbeing.  
 
There are three ways in which life evaluation is typically measured in the wellbeing 
literature. One method, adopted by the World Values Survey, is to simply ask a single question, 
‘All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?’ A second 
method used by the Gallup World Poll, called the Cantril Ladder question, asks respondents to 
rate their life on a ladder that has ten steps, numbered from zero to ten. Zero represents the worst 
possible life and ten the best possible life. Initially it was assumed that since the Cantrill ladder 
question uses the ladder as a framing device, responses to this question would be more 
influenced by income than responses to the life satisfaction question. However that was not 
found to be true. Instead, studies utilizing data from several countries have found very similar 
coefficient estimates of socio-economic factors explaining variability in both these two life 
evaluation measures (Helliwell et al, 2016; Helliwell and Barrington-Leigh, 2010). A third 
instrument, which we use in this paper, is the Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS), (Diener et al. 
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1985). The SWLS asks the respondent to rate the following five questions, from ‘Strongly 
Disagree’ to ‘Strongly Agree’: 
 In most ways my life is close to my ideal  
 The conditions of my life are excellent  
 I am satisfied with my life  
 So far I have gotten the important things I want in life 
 If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing  
Life satisfaction score of the respondent is the mean of the five items. High scores on the 
SWLS indicate greater satisfaction with one’s life. Diener et al (2009) state that experiments 
with different scales suggest that scales with more options and an odd number of options should 
be preferably utilized. We retained the odd number of options but chose a five-point scale over a 
seven-point scale that Diener et al. (1985) had used to obtain the average score for each 
participant. We did this to make it easier for the respondent to answer since the complete 
household questionnaire was already quite detailed. The impact evaluation team trained the team 
of enumerators and team leaders for a period of one week prior to each round of data collection. 
After training, the survey instrument was pilot tested, to ensure the questions were being asked 
and understood in the right manner.  
 
The SWLS has been extensively used and validated. It is more reliable than the single-
item question because it is a sum of multiple items that measure the same construct and errors 
are reduced through aggregation (Krueger and Schkade, 2008; Rojas, 2008; Eid and Diener, 
2004; Pavot and Diener, 2008). Despite being the preferred option over the single-item question, 
it has not been adopted as widely due to survey length constraints. Coefficient alphas for the 
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scale have been shown to range from 0.79 to 0.89 in several studies indicating high internal 
consistency (Pavot and Diener, 2008) Test-retest reliability has also been high with coefficients 
ranging from 0.84 to 0.80 for one-month interval and 0.54 over four-year span, indicating 
moderate temporal stability but also that SWLS is subject to change over time and thus sensitive 
to life events (Pavot and Diener, 2008; Kobau et al, 2010).    
 
However, there are challenges associated with using self-reported subjective measures. 
Answers may depend on the mood of the respondent that particular day or misinterpretation of 
the question by an individual respondent or even an incapacity to articulate or translate their 
overall wellbeing into digits on a cardinal scale. Yet, many of these errors are random and do not 
bias estimation results. In a comprehensive review of studies across the globe, Diener et al 
(2009) conclude that standard wellbeing indicators have adequate reliability and validity to draw 
inferences about an individual’s wellbeing.  An inherent challenge in measuring subjective and 
experiential constructs is that of scale heterogeneity16 or systematically different threshold levels. 
If this heterogeneity is correlated with covariates of subjective welfare then regressions using 
these measures as the dependent variable will yield biased results (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 
2001). This is similar to the issue of unobserved personality traits that influence both the 
individuals’ socio-economic characteristics and how they respond to subjective wellbeing 
questions. Ravallion et al (2016) find evidence that subjective welfare regressions are robust to 
scale heterogeneity. They find that though scale heterogeneity is a concern for interpersonal 
comparisons of welfare, it does not pose a hurdle to conduct analysis of determinants of 
                                                        
16 Scale heterogeneity means that respondents interpret and answer these questions relative to their 
personal frame of reference, or more formally, the thresholds of these scales, i.e. “the values of the 
underlying welfare metric at which ordinal responses on the stipulated scales change” (Pg 698, Ravallion 
et al, 2016) are idiosyncratic and not constant from one person to another. 
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subjective welfare. The issue of bias arising due to unobserved personality traits can be dealt 
with by using panel data, which surveys the same individual over time, as we do in this paper,  
 
From a policy perspective, it is important to understand how an individual’s life 
circumstances in specific domains such as income, health, or education can impact their overall 
life satisfaction. One well-studied relationship is that of income. Previous studies have found this 
relationship to be curvilinear (Howell et al 2013; Cummins et al 2011; Howell and Howell 2008; 
Diener and Biswas-Diener, 2002; Diener and Diener, 1995). There is a strong positive 
relationship between the two at lower levels of income/wealth and a weaker relationship at 
higher levels of income. This finding, which is basically a diminishing marginal effect of money 
on SWB, has been explained by several theories. Relative income theory (Easterlin, 1974), and 
Adaptation level theory (Brickman et al 1978) explain the weak association between income and 
SWB. Cummins (2012) has explained this phenomenon by describing income as an ‘external 
buffer’ for maintaining SWB homeostasis. Cummins uses the word ‘homeostasis’ to drive home 
the analogy that just like the human body physiologically maintains its body temperature, 
similarly the human mind aims to maintain a set level of SWB. However, Adaptation Level 
theory, according to which any changes in life evaluations are temporary and people return to 
their baseline as soon as they adapt to new circumstances, has been rejected in light of recent 
evidence. The World Happiness Report (Helliwell et al, 2016) reports that life evaluations differ 
both, across countries and within countries, and that these differences can be explained by 
different life circumstances. The report also cites studies which show that migrants tend to have 
life evaluation scores that are similar to residents of the country they have migrated to, rather 
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than of comparable residents in the countries they came from.  Further, certain events like major 
disabilities and unemployment have a substantial and sustained impact on SWB.  
 
So what are the specific life circumstances that are driving differences in SWB? The 
World Happiness Report (Helliwell et al, 2016) uses individual life evaluations (about 1000 per 
year in each country) to rank 156 countries by their happiness levels, as measured by the Cantril 
ladder question, and analyzes the distribution of happiness both within and across countries. 
Their latest update released in March 2016 utilizes data from 2005-2015 to explain variability in 
the national annual average life evaluation scores with the help of six key variables. They find 
that almost 75 percent of the variation can be explained by these variables alone, in the following 
order of importance: GDP per capita, social support, healthy life expectancy, social freedom, 
generosity and absence of corruption. The team of researchers behind the World Happiness 
Report have previously reported and published similar results (Helliwell and Barrington-Leigh, 
2010). They note that these same factors explain life evaluations within several countries in 
similar ways17. However, they make a key point, “Because international differences in income 
are even greater than differences in the social context, they explain a larger fraction of 
differences in subjective well-being among countries than among individuals within the same 
country” (Helliwell and Barrington-Leigh, 2010, pp.733).  
 
Helliwell and Barrington-Leigh (2010) note that though drivers of SWB are the same 
across countries, the relative importance of these drivers may vary. In their comparison of OECD 
and non-OECD countries, they find that non-economic factors may be more important in 
                                                        
17 Coefficients of these explanatory variables obtained using pooled global samples of individual data 
were identical to the means of these coefficients obtained from regressions using separate country 
samples.  
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determining SWB in countries with higher average income or institutions. This phenomenon is in 
line with Need Theory, which extends Maslow’s theory of hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1943). 
At lower levels of income/wealth, money is used to fulfill basic physiological needs such as 
food, water, and shelter, and therefore there is strong positive relationship of money with SWB. 
Higher-order needs are complex and require more than money to be satiated. This has led to the 
common assumption that for people living at or below the poverty line, income or wealth 
contributes to happiness because it is (or even should be) used for fulfillment of basic needs. 
However, using data from Thailand, Guillen-Royo et al. (2013) argue that wealth might 
contribute to happiness for personal or symbolic reasons, which are not related to basic needs, 
even in poor settings. Similarly, Ng et al (2014) use structural equation modeling in their study 
on underprivileged children in Hong Kong to find that hopeful thinking and perceived 
community support predict children’s satisfaction with life, and that community support plays a 
critical mediating role in the impact of hope on life satisfaction. 
 
As mentioned above, after income, the World Happiness Report (Helliwell et al, 2016) 
finds social support to be the next most important determinant. They measure social support 
through a binary variable asking respondents if they have someone, family or fiends, they can 
count on to help them if needed.  Previous research has also demonstrated that social capital is an 
important predictor of overall life satisfaction (Helliwell & Putnam, 2004; Yip et al. 2006; 
Cramm et al, 2010; Han et al., 2013). An important challenge in this research is to operationally 
define social capital and agree on valid measures of this construct. Currently, researchers follow 
the practice of measuring both the ‘structural’ dimension of social capital (number of network 
connections and participation in organizations) and cognitive dimension of social capital 
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(attitudes such as trust, reciprocity, and mutual help). Han el al (2013) use data on 5,934 
individuals in Seoul, South Korea, and find that social capital, both at the individual level and 
area-level, is positively associated with SWLS. They measure social capital using organizational 
participation (measured by involvement in 11 different organization types using a five-point 
Likert scale and then coded as a binary variable indicating individuals who had not participated 
in any organization), perceived helpfulness (measured by one item: ‘‘There is no one whom I can 
get a help or lean on in times of trouble’’), and a third variable indicating trust in authorities. Yip 
et al (2006) use multi-level modeling to analyze if social capital increased wellbeing in rural 
China. Their sample included 1,218 individuals in 48 villages. They find that cognitive social 
capital (as measured by a composite index constructed from 12 questionnaire items on trust, 
reciprocity, mutual help, etc.) is positively associated with SWL. However, they do not find a 
statistically significant association between SWL and structural social capital, as measured by 
organizational membership.  
 
Research on how income from cash transfer programs impacts satisfaction with life is 
scarce but beginning to grow. Attah et al (2016) provide qualitative evidence obtained through 
key informant interviews and focus group discussions from Kenya, Ghana, Zimbabwe, and 
Lesotho to describe that the cash is enhancing the psychosocial wellbeing18 of beneficiaries 
(expenditure on basic needs of children such as food, soaps and uniforms is leading to a sense of 
self-esteem amongst children), which in turn affects educational outcomes.  They also cite wider 
                                                        
18 They define ‘psychosocial’ wellbeing as the dynamic relationship that exists between internal 
psychological processes (such as self-esteem, self-respect, and self-reliance) with psychological states 
(persons capacity to cope with stress) and external social processes (the ability to engage in meaningful 
and effective relationship with others). 
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impacts on psychosocial wellbeing such as autonomy, self-reliance and ability to become an 
active participant in social life.  
 
This paper is part of the Transfer Project, a research consortium led by UNICEF, FAO 
and UNC-CH which partners with national governments to understand the overall impacts of 
national cash transfer programs in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Within the Transfer Project, one aim is 
to systematically assess the impact of such programs on dimensions of non-monetary wellbeing, 
including self-assessed or subjective wellbeing. Results from evaluation reports, in addition to 
survey tools and description of study designs are available at the project website 
(https://transfer.cpc.unc.edu). Specific results from the Malawi Social Cash Transfer Program, 
one of the Transfer Project studies, show promising results in terms of SWB, with an increase of 
20 percentage points in the proportion of beneficiaries who think their life will be better in two 
years, and a 18 percent improvement in a quality of life scale (Kilburn, Handa, Angeles, Mvula 
& Tsoka, 2016). 
 
Haushofer and Shapiro (2016) use a randomized control trial to estimate the impact of a 
large lump-sum cash transfer provided by the NGO GiveDirectly on rural households in Western 
Kenya between 2011 and 2012. OLS estimates indicate that the transfer led to a 0.16SD increase 
in happiness, and a 0.17 SD increase in life satisfaction. The happiness and life satisfaction 
variables are single-item questions taken from the World Values Survey. Our paper in contrast 
uses a multi-item scale to measure SBW, and looks at the effect of smaller, regular payments, 
which is an important feature of national social protection programs. We also explicitly look at 
mechanisms through which changes in income affect SWB.   
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3.3. Research Setting and Design 
3.3.1. The Zimbabwe Harmonized Cash Transfer Program 
We use data collected for the evaluation of the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer (HSCT) 
Programme, an unconditional cash transfer program, introduced in 2011 by the Government of 
Zimbabwe. Program implementation is being done in a phased manner by district and it is 
anticipated that eventually the Program will cover the entire country. In January 2016, the 
Program covered 52,500 households and approximately 300,000 households across the country 
are expected to be eligible to receive benefits once the program is taken to scale. 
 
The program is targeted at households that are food-poor and labor constrained. It is 
structured such that the size of the transfer varies with household size: a one-person household 
receives USD10, two-person receives USD15, three-person receives USD20, and a household 
made up of four or more persons receives USD25. The program thus provides between $10 and 
$25 per month, which represents about 20 percent of total household consumption expenditure. 
Eligible households are identified through a detailed targeting census that is conducted by 
ZIMSTAT, the national statistical agency. All households are screened using the targeting survey 
fielded by ZIMSTAT, and data is then processed to compute a proxy poverty score, which serves 
as the first eligibility criterion. A household is considered food-poor when it is living below the 
food poverty line19 and is unable to meet the most basic needs of its members. A list of ten 
indicators that measure the ability of the household to meet basic needs is used to determine 
                                                        
19 Food poverty line is the threshold where total household expenditure is below what is required to meet 
the food energy requirement for each household member, set at 2,100 kcal/day/person. 
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eligibility on this criterion.20 At least three of these have to be met for the household to be 
eligible for the Program.  
 
The Program has a clearly defined approach for categorizing a household as labor 
constrained, which is the second eligibility criterion. Throughout the paper, we use this definition 
to operationalize the attribute of being labor constrained. A household is considered labor 
constrained when: 
1. There is no able bodied household member between 18-59 years who is fit for 
productive work, OR 
2. The dependency ratio is three or more, i.e., one fit to work household member 
between 18-59 years has to take care of three or more dependents. Dependents are 
those household members who cannot or should not work because they are under 18 
years of age or they are elderly (over 59 years of age) or they are unfit for work 
because they are chronically ill or disabled or still in school, OR 
3. The dependency ratio is between two and three and the household has a severely 
disabled or chronically sick household member who requires intensive care.  
 
3.3.2. Study Design 
The phased roll out of the HSCT allows us to use households in regions slotted to enter 
the program at a later date to form a comparison group. Within districts the program operates at 
                                                        
20 The 10 indicators as given in Form1R, which is used for assessing eligibility are: only one or no meals 
per day; grains lasted for less than three months last harvest season; no/minimal livestock; no blankets; no 
rooms/huts for sleeping; rudimentary house material; live on begging or some piece work; get no/minimal 
regular support from relatives or others; have no valuable assets, e.g. animal drawn cart, vehicle; and the 
household is landless or owns less than one acre. 
  66 
an administrative unit known as the Ward. Child Protection Committees (CPCs) are formed 
within each Ward who are responsible for ensuring that targeting of households is conducted 
thoroughly and who are in charge of communication of program rules and operational activities 
(such as payment dates) between the district social welfare office and beneficiary households. 
The geographic area of a Ward varies by population density as each Ward comprises a cluster of 
anywhere from 10-20 villages. The Ward comprises the primary sampling unit for the sample 
design. 
 
Phase 1 of the HSCT expansion occurred in 2011-12 and covered ten districts. Wards for 
the treatment group of the evaluation were selected from Phase Two areas, which entered the 
program in 2013. Wards for the control group were selected from areas that were slotted for 
Phase Four expansion and that were geographically adjacent to Phase Two areas. A detailed 
analysis of all Wards in three Phase Two districts of the program (Mudzi, Mwenezi, and Binga) 
and three Phase Four districts (UMP, Chiredzi, and Hwange), was then conducted by the study 
team led by the national research partner Ruzivo Trust based in Harare. Each Ward was assigned 
a point score based on five characteristics: forest cover, nearness to main roads, resistance to 
shocks, nearness to business centers, and water sources. On each criterion a Ward was scored 
from 1 (low) to 3 (high) and the maximum score possible was thus 1521. Power calculations 
based on the expected number of households per Ward indicated that a total of 60 Treatment and 
30 Comparison Wards were necessary for the study.22 The 60 treatment Wards were stratified 
                                                        
21 Details of the Ward level analysis are available upon request. 
 
22 Sample size calculations were based on the power to detect a meaningful change in the height-for-age 
z-score of children under age 60 months, the indicator for which the largest effective sample size was 
required (Handa et al., 2013). 
  67 
across the three treatment districts, and the 30 comparison Wards were likewise stratified to 
areas adjacent to the three treatment districts.  
Wards in treatment areas were ranked from highest point score (most vulnerable) to 
lowest and paired within each stratum. Then, for each treatment Ward pair with a given score, a 
comparison Ward with the same score in the same stratum was selected to serve as the ‘matched’ 
comparison Ward. In cases where more than one comparison Ward existed with the same score, 
one was picked randomly. In cases where no comparison Ward existed with the exact same 
score, the Ward with the closest point score was selected. Figure 3.1 provides a map showing the 
geographic location within Zimbabwe of the study sites. 
 
Figure 3.1. Map of Zimbabwe 
 
 
 
 
Source: Constructed using Stata 13.1. The darker outlines in the map are province boundaries. 
  Shape files obtained from http://www.gadm.org/ 
 
In the selected study Wards (both treatment and comparison), program targeting was 
conducted by the Department of Social Services following standard program operation 
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guidelines. Out of the eligible households, the evaluation team randomly selected 34–60 
households in each ward, using the random number generator tool in excel. This generated a 
sample of 3,063 households across 90 wards. Data were collected through a detailed household 
survey, conducted at baseline and 12-month follow-up. The study sample size is provided in 
Table 3.1. Note that all households in comparison Wards in the study sample are actual eligible 
households who will receive benefits once the program reaches their area, and eligibility criteria 
are the same across the country. Given the universal program take-up, these households thus 
serve as a close approximation to the counterfactual for treatment households. The distinction 
between this design and what might be deemed a perfect design--a social experiment-- is that 
Wards were not randomly assigned to treatment. In a large-scale national program where 
program roll out is determined by both technical (e.g. poverty) and political considerations, 
randomizing roll out is often not feasible. When the eligibility criteria are applied uniformly, 
targeting is supply-driven (as is the case in Zimbabwe), and take-up is universal, the only threat 
to internal validity in our design is the geographical differences across Phase Two and Phase 
Four areas. Our stratified matched design was chosen to minimize geographical differences.  
 
Table 3.1. Study Sample Size 
  Treatment Comparison Total 
2013 2,029 1,034 3,063 
2014 1,748 882 2,630 
        
Total 3,777 1,916 5,693 
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3.3.3. Attrition 
As can be seen from Table 3.1, at follow-up the household attrition rate was 14 percent.23  
Table 3.2 provides results for general attrition analysis. It provides baseline means for two 
samples. The first is the panel sample that is comprised of households that are in the study both 
at baseline and follow-up. The second sample is the attrited sample that is comprised of 
households that were not interviewed at follow-up. P-values of the differences in means between 
the two samples are found to be significant, thus indicating that overall attrition might be a 
problem (households remaining in the study may be no longer representative of households in 
the original sample). To correct for this, inverse probability weighting was used to adjust 
sampling weights. We use these generated analytical weights throughout our analysis, where 
applicable.  
 
Table 3.324 provides results of our differential attrition analysis. Mean values across 
treatment and comparison groups are provided for both the panel sample and the attrited sample. 
P-values of the differences in means between treatment and comparison are not significant, thus 
ruling out selective attrition. Finally, in Table B.1 of Appendix B we provide linear probability 
estimates of the probability of attrition. In only two cases out of sixteen, do we find that the 
coefficient of that variable interacted with the treatment dummy is significant, thus implying that 
probability of attrition as explained by that particular variable is higher for treatment group 
compared to the comparison group.  
                                                        
23 The study sites are sparsely populated with households often living in deep isolation. It was thus not 
always logistically feasible to return to households multiple times if no one was at home at the time of 
visit.  
24 For a detailed analysis of attrition that utilizes a longer list of variables than shown in the tables here, 
please see 12-month Impact Evaluation report (American Institutes for Research, 2014). 
  
Table 3.2. Household Level General Attrition               
  Panel Attrited p-Value: 
Comparing 
Panel and 
Attrited Household Demographics: N Mean 
Std 
Dev.  N Mean 
Std 
Dev.  
Household Size 2630 5.175 2.854 433 4.463 2.705 0.000 
# Children under 5 2630 0.773 0.946 433 0.783 0.969 0.855 
 # Children 6-17 2630 2.288 1.788 433 1.883 1.721 0.000 
 # Adults 18 - 59 2630 1.246 1.198 433 1.089 1.086 0.012 
 # Elderly (>60) 2630 0.864 0.760 433 0.684 0.681 0.000 
% households that have disabled members 2630 0.267 0.443 433 0.234 0.424 0.170 
% households that have chronically ill members 2630 0.374 0.484 433 0.333 0.472 0.085 
% households that have elderly members 2630 0.654 0.476 433 0.574 0.495 0.015 
% households categorized as labor constrained 2630 0.838 0.369 433 0.781 0.414 0.021 
Main Respondent Characteristics: 
       % Female  2630 0.678 0.467 433 0.683 0.466 0.791 
Age 2624 56.795 19.205 430 53.998 20.429 0.024 
% Widowed 2630 0.362 0.481 433 0.400 0.490 0.275 
% Divorced/Separated 2630 0.090 0.286 433 0.087 0.282 0.836 
% Main resp. has schooling 2623 0.563 0.496 432 0.635 0.482 0.034 
% Main resp. currently attends school 2623 0.014 0.118 432 0.022 0.148 0.218 
Highest grade of Main resp. 2599 3.281 3.685 427 3.752 3.768 0.091 
Household Characteristics: 
       Monthly Per Capita Total Expenditure (in usd) 2630 31.743 25.298 433 37.158 32.059 0.002 
Monthly Per capita Food Expenditure (in usd) 2630 20.008 18.618 433 23.100 21.382 0.006 
HFIAS Score 2630 13.985 6.157 433 14.175 6.048 0.709 
% households that have suffered from a shock 2628 0.893 0.309 432 0.875 0.331 0.235 
% households affected by flood 2628 0.039 0.193 432 0.023 0.150 0.129 
% households affected by drought 2628 0.449 0.497 432 0.406 0.492 0.177 
Notes: Weighted results using original baseline weights, p-values obtained by clustering at ward level. 
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Table 3.3. Household Level Selective Attrition 
  Panel Attrited 
  Comparison Treatment 
p-
Value Comparison Treatment 
p-
Value 
Household Demographics: N Mean N Mean 
 
N Mean N Mean 
 Household Size 882 5.28 1748 5.13 0.534 152 4.45 281 4.47 0.951 
# Children under 5 882 0.81 1748 0.76 0.546 152 0.77 281 0.79 0.883 
 # Children 6-17 882 2.29 1748 2.29 0.982 152 1.82 281 1.91 0.617 
 # Adults 18 - 59 882 1.31 1748 1.22 0.411 152 1.16 281 1.05 0.475 
 # Elderly (>60) 882 0.87 1748 0.86 0.828 152 0.68 281 0.68 0.991 
% households that have disabled 
members 882 28.55 1748 25.95 0.267 152 24.92 281 0.23 61.30 
% households that have chronically ill 
members 882 38.38 1748 37.03 0.626 152 32.73 281 0.34 89.00 
% households that have elderly 
members 882 65.66 1748 65.25 0.905 152 54.64 281 0.59 55.30 
% households categorized as labor 
constrained 882 82.93 1748 84.16 0.600 152 76.78 281 78.69 68.30 
Main Respondent Characteristics: 
          % Female  882 65.02 1748 0.69 13.80 152 66.90 281 69.04 0.619 
Age 879 56.92 1745 56.74 0.904 151 54.85 279 53.58 0.656 
% Widowed 882 35.86 1748 36.35 0.849 152 40.04 281 39.95 0.991 
% Divorced/Separated 882 8.05 1748 9.39 0.372 152 4.41 281 10.80 0.017 
% Main resp. has schooling 881 59.42 1742 55.00 0.167 152 69.32 280 60.60 0.114 
% Main resp. currently attends school 881 1.13 1742 1.54 0.439 152 2.16 280 2.28 0.937 
Highest grade of Main resp. 875 3.39 1724 3.23 0.400 152 3.95 275 3.65 0.501 
Household Characteristics: 
          Monthly Per Capita Total Expenditure 
(in usd) 882 32.45 1748 31.45 0.572 152 37.55 281 36.97 0.887 
Monthly Per capita Food Expenditure 
(in usd) 882 20.18 1748 19.94 0.903 152 25.25 281 22.06 0.360 
HFIAS Score 882 13.92 1748 14.01 0.855 152 12.92 281 14.78 0.020 
% households that have suffered from a 882 87.24 1746 90.19 0.215 152 83.35 280 89.58 0.114 
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shock 
% households affected by flood 882 3.30 1746 4.09 0.633 152 2.62 280 2.14 0.790 
% households affected by drought 882 40.27 1746 46.80 0.117 152 39.42 280 41.10 0.818 
Notes: Weighted results using original baseline weights. p-values are provided for the test of statistical difference between 
comparison and treatment group values at baseline. p-values obtained by clustering at ward level.  
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3.4. Summary Statistics 
3.4.1 Balance 
Table 3.4 reports mean characteristics at baseline for both treatment and comparison 
groups. There are 1,746 households in the treatment group and 882 in the comparison group. To 
test for baseline balance between the two groups, we use OLS regressions with attrition-adjusted 
standardized weights and clustered robust standard errors at the ward level to account for 
clustering of households within wards. None of the 29 key household variables listed were found 
to be statistically significantly difference across treatment and comparison groups.  
 
The average household in the sample has a household size of about five with a per capita 
monthly expenditure of around $33-$35. Around 25-28 percent of these households take care of 
one or more disabled members. In addition, around 37 percent have at least one member who is 
chronically ill and almost two-thirds have one or more elderly members. These characteristics 
contribute to a high dependency ratio, which is reflected in the large number of households that 
are categorized as labor constrained (about 83-84 percent of the sample), which is of course a 
key program eligibility criterion. More than two-thirds of the main respondents are women, their 
average age is around 56-57 years, and more than half have had at least some level of schooling. 
About 10-11 percent households have a member that works for wages, but most of them are 
dependent on casual labor, what is known as ‘maricho’ labor in Zimbabwe—this is viewed as the 
least desirable form of work in rural areas of Africa. Aid received during the year is substantially 
lower for the treatment group.  
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Table 3.4. Baseline Mean Characteristics of Panel Sample Households 
  
Comparison 
Group 
Treatment 
Group 
p-Value    Mean 
Std. 
Error Mean Std. Error 
Household Demographics: 
     Household Size 5.14 0.21 5.02 0.14 0.637 
# Children under 5 0.80 0.06 0.76 0.05 0.618 
 # Children 6-17 2.21 0.12 2.23 0.08 0.937 
 # Adults 18 - 59 1.27 0.09 1.20 0.05 0.479 
 # Elderly (>60) 0.85 0.04 0.84 0.03 0.809 
% households that have disabled 
members 27.78 0.02 25.29 0.01 0.267 
% households that have chronically ill 
members 37.37 0.02 36.83 0.01 0.844 
% households that have elderly 
members 64.80 0.03 64.17 0.02 0.857 
% households categorized as labor 
constrained 82.95 0.02 84.01 0.01 0.641 
Main Respondent Characteristics: 
     % Female  65.90 0.02 69.56 0.02 0.173 
Age (Yrs) 56.68 1.40 56.29 0.88 0.808 
% Widowed 37.30 0.02 37.09 0.02 0.944 
% Divorced/Separated 8.08 0.01 9.57 0.01 0.350 
% Main resp. has schooling 60.92 0.03 55.84 0.02 0.111 
% Main resp. currently attends school 1.30 0.01 1.66 0.00 0.573 
Highest grade of Main resp. 3.47 0.12 3.30 0.14 0.334 
Household Characteristics: 
     Monthly Per Capita Total Expenditure 
(in usd) 34.96 2.46 32.41 1.14 0.351 
Monthly Per capita Food Expenditure 
(in usd) 22.11 1.79 20.62 0.88 0.459 
HFIAS Score (1-27) 13.87 0.40 14.04 0.27 0.747 
# of shocks experienced 2.44 0.21 2.69 0.13 0.310 
% households that have suffered from 
a shock 86.09 0.02 90.07 0.01 0.148 
% households where death has 
occurred in 12 mo 8.68 0.01 10.26 0.01 0.229 
# of livestock type 2.27 0.09 2.20 0.08 0.571 
% households that receive wages 10.97 0.01 10.24 0.01 0.642 
% households undertaking 
casual/maricho labor 48.49 0.03 46.22 0.02 0.581 
Aid received (in USD) 76.85 14.04 54.25 3.43 0.122 
Distance to Food Market (Km) 3.34 0.46 3.87 0.24 0.310 
Distance to Input Market (Km) 20.40 2.23 18.74 1.47 0.537 
Distance to Water Source (Km) 1.29 0.21 1.36 0.11 0.748 
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N 882   1746     
Notes: Attrition-adjusted weighted results. p-values obtained by clustering at ward level. 
 
3.4.2. Satisfaction with Life and Mediators 
Cronbach alpha for the Satisfaction with Life scale is 0.84 for baseline, follow-up, and 
both waves combined. This indicates that sub items of the scale have acceptably high internal 
validity for the scale. As per theory, factor analysis reveals a single construct behind the scale 
(see scree plot shown in Figure 3.2) 
Figure 3.2.  Scree Plot of the SWLS Scale 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.5a provides means of Satisfaction of Life scores across our two time periods. The 
total score ranges from 5 to 25. A higher score indicates greater life satisfaction. At baseline the 
average score for the Treatment group is 9.53 and for the Comparison group it is 9.92. The 
difference between Treatment and Comparison group at baseline is statistically significant for the 
total score at the eight percent level. Table 3.5a also provides average score for each of the sub-
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items, and there is no statistically significant difference between the two groups at baseline, with 
the exception of one sub-item, ‘The conditions of my life are excellent,’ which is statistically 
significant at the five percent level.   
 
We find that average scores have increased from baseline to follow-up for both groups. 
Figure 3.3a provides the kernel density of the Satisfaction with Life score, both in absolute value 
and in log of the total score. To understand which sub-items are driving the increase, Figure 3.3b 
provides a stacked bar chart showing responses to each of the options available for the five sub-
items as percent of the total. In each case, the percentage of respondents who indicated they 
‘Strongly Disagree’ with the five affirming statements that make up the scale has decreased from 
baseline to follow-up. Also, in each case the percentage who ‘Agree’ or ‘Strongly Agree’ has 
increased, as indicated by the increasing width of the darker colored boxes. For example, almost 
half (44 percent) of the respondents at baseline indicated that they strongly disagreed with the 
statement ‘In most ways my life is close to my ideal.’ This decreased to 27 percent at follow-up.  
The percent of respondents who indicated that they were neutral, i.e., neither agreed or 
disagreed, has increased from 17 percent to 30 percent, and the percent of respondents who 
‘Strongly Agreed’ doubled from about four percent at baseline to seven percent at follow-up. 
This same pattern is evident for the remaining four sub-items too.   
  
 
Table 3.5a. Average Satisfaction with Life Scores by Treatment and Comparison Groups 
    Treatment Group Comparison Group p-value of 
baseline 
difference   Baseline 
Follow-
up Baseline Follow-up 
Log of SWL score 2.17 2.39 2.22 2.32 0.05 
Satisfaction with Life Score 9.53 11.69 9.92 10.90 0.08 
In most ways  my life is close to my ideal 1.83 2.30 1.92 2.20 0.10 
The conditions of my life are excellent 1.77 2.24 1.88 2.13 0.03 
I am satisfied with my life 2.00 2.60 2.06 2.39 0.32 
So far I have gotten the important things I want in life 1.85 2.18 1.97 2.06 0.10 
If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing 2.07 2.36 2.09 2.11 0.70 
      I feel positive about my future (%) 13.17 29.42 12.21 19.12 0.68 
I generally feel happy (%) 29.68 48.87 29.62 41.98 0.98 
N 1744 1745 878 881   
Notes: Attrition-adjusted weighted means, p-values obtained by clustering at ward level 
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Figure 3.3a. Kernel Density of Satisfaction with Life Score 
The SWL scale score ranges from 5 to 25.  
 
A. Satisfaction with Life score       B. Log of Satisfaction with Life Score 
 
    
 
C. Log of Satisfaction of Life Score by Treatment and Comparison 
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Figure 3.3b. Frequency Tabulation of Satisfaction with Life Scale Questions 
(as % of total) 
 
 
 
 
Means of the mediating variables we analyze in the paper are provided in Table 3.5b. 
Following standard practice in this field, we measure two dimensions of social capital by using 
the following questions in our survey: 
1. Structural−We ask if anyone in the household has participated in the following eight 
organizations: church or mosque, women's livelihood group, marounds/mukaro, 
farmer group, business cooperative, labor union, youth association, and burial society. 
We code participation as a binary indicator if someone has participated in any of 
these organizations and construct another indicator to indicate if they have made any 
monetary contributions to the organization.  
2. Cognitive−To measure trust, we use responses to the following statement: It is easy 
for me to borrow salt from my neighbors. Our national partners suggested this 
question as a good measure of trust in the local context. We code responses on the 
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five-point Likert scale as a binary variable indicating individuals who had agreed or 
strongly agreed that they could borrow salt.  
 
Food security is measured by the Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS) 
score, which is a nine-item scale, with a reference period of the past four weeks where 
households are asked to rate their experience on a scale from ‘Rarely’ to ‘Often,’ generating a 
total score from 0 to 27. The psychometric properties of the scale have been tested to ensure that 
it provides a continuous measure of the degree of food insecurity of the household (Coates, 
Swindale & Bilinsky, 2007, p.18). A higher score indicates the household suffers from more 
food insecurity and is relatively worse off.  
 
As can be seen in Table 3.5b, we find no statistical significant difference at baseline 
between the Treatment and Comparison groups for all mediators analyzed. We observe an 
improvement in all indicators from baseline to follow-up. HFIAS score is about 14 at baseline 
and decreases to about 10.5 for both groups, thus indicating a reduction in food insecurity at 
follow-up.  Similar to life satisfaction, these households have on average experienced an 
improvement in their food security status. A vast majority of these households are members of 
social organizations such as church or farmers’ clubs, and about 40-50 percent are making 
monetary contributions to these groups. The percent of households that trust their neighbors to 
borrow salt has also increased from baseline to follow-up.  
  
 
Table 3.5b. Average Value of Mediators across Treatment and Comparison Groups 
  Treatment Group Comparison Group p-value of 
baseline 
difference   Baseline 
Follow-
up Baseline 
Follow-
up 
Household Food Insecurity Score 14.03 10.54 13.87 10.66 0.75 
At least one household member is member of any of eight 
listed organizations* (%) 84.09 78.40 84.62 77.27 0.81 
Has made Contributions to Social Networks* (%) 39.77 49.62 40.68 40.38 0.80 
Trusts neighbor to borrow salt (%) 40.85 54.89 40.41 53.44 0.89 
N 1746 1748 881 882   
* These are Church or Mosque, Women's livelihood group, Marounds/mukaro, Farmer group, Business cooperative, Labor 
union, Youth association, and Burial society  
Notes: Attrition-adjusted weighted means, p-values obtained by clustering at ward level 
8
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3.4.3. Determinants of life satisfaction 
Based on economic theory, we should observe a curvilinear relationship between life 
satisfaction and income.  There should be a strong positive relationship between the two at lower 
levels of income/wealth and a weaker relationship at higher levels of income. We use per capita 
expenditure of the household as a proxy for income. The relationship between the log of per 
capita expenditure and SWL shows the expected positive linear trend, and we indeed find a 
curvilinear relationship between per capita expenditure and Satisfaction with Life score (Figure 
3.4). Until about USD50, life satisfaction score is increasing and the slope is steep, thereafter the 
slope flattens out, and then surprisingly it begins to fall around USD80. However, the majority of 
the households in our panel sample at baseline lie below the USD50 cutoff. Only about 15 
percent have per capita household expenditure greater than USD50, and about five percent have 
per capita household expenditure greater more than USD80. Though there have been studies that 
have reported a negative correlation between average income and average life satisfaction 
(Helliwell, 2008) it is nevertheless surprising to see a hint of this negative relationship in such a 
poor setting. This suggests that there are factors other than income or expenditure, which play an 
important role in determining SWL and can indeed dominate the impact of rising 
income/expenditure, even when the absolute level of income is very low.  
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Figure 3.4. SWLS score and per capita expenditure of household at baseline 
(Panel Households only) 
 
 
Note: per capita expenditure is restricted between 1st and 99th percentile 
 
We therefore utilize Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to estimate the association of other 
individual and household characteristics with SWLS score. The regressions use attrition-adjusted 
standardized weights and clustered robust standard errors at the ward level to account for 
clustering of households within wards. We use baseline data for this analysis and results are 
presented in Table 3.6. The first column controls for main respondent and household 
characteristics such as gender, age (in quadratic form), marital status, the logarithm of per capita 
household expenditure; the second column adds household food insecurity as an explanatory 
variable; and the third column adds variables that measure social capital. 
 
In line with the literature on wellbeing, we find that being divorced or separated has a 
substantial and statistically significant negative effect on SWL score. It is associated with about 
eight to nine percent reduction in the SWLS score across all three models. Further, if the 
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respondent has attended school, their SWL score is predicted to increase by five to six percent. 
The occurrence of a death in the household is also consistently associated with a reduction in the 
SWLS score of the main respondent by about six to nine percent. Per capita expenditure is a poor 
predictor of SWL, once we control for household food insecurity. The impact of household food 
insecurity, as measured by the HFIAS, is in the expected direction, and statistically significant. 
Within social capital, the dimensions of trust and intensity of participation (as measured by any 
monetary contributions made to organizations) are positively significantly associated with 
satisfaction. However, simply being a member does not, in and of itself, seem to have an effect 
on satisfaction.  
Table 3.6. Baseline Determinants of Satisfaction with Life (Log of SWLS Score) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Main Respondent Characteristics: 
   Female  -0.009 -0.007 -0.019 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
    Age 0.006** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
    
Age Squared -0.000** 
-
0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    Widowed -0.022 -0.013 -0.010 
 
(0.029) (0.026) (0.025) 
    Divorced/Separated -0.092** -0.088** -0.081** 
 
(0.041) (0.039) (0.038) 
    Main resp. has schooling 0.064** 0.063*** 0.053** 
 
(0.025) (0.023) (0.023) 
    Chronically ill -0.032 -0.015 -0.010 
  85 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Household Characteristics 
   Log of Household Size 0.116* 0.061 0.044 
 
(0.059) (0.059) (0.060) 
    Number of elderly -0.010 -0.008 -0.008 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
    Number of children -0.015 -0.009 -0.009 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
    # of livestock type 0.016*** 0.010* 0.007 
 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
    Any income from wage labor? (Yes=1) 0.028 0.022 0.010 
 
(0.031) (0.032) (0.032) 
    Any income from maricho labor? (Yes=1) -0.046* -0.032 -0.027 
 
(0.025) (0.023) (0.022) 
    Per Capita Expenditure (Log usd) 0.047* -0.001 -0.018 
 
(0.025) (0.024) (0.026) 
    
# of shocks experienced 
-
0.023*** 
-
0.013*** -0.013*** 
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
    
Death in the household (Y = 1) 
-
0.092*** 
-
0.073*** -0.060** 
 
(0.029) (0.027) (0.025) 
Mediators: 
   
Log of Household Food Insecurity Score 
 
-
0.190*** -0.190*** 
  
(0.018) (0.018) 
    Member of any social network? (Yes=1) 
  
-0.028 
   
(0.035) 
    Has made Contributions to Social Networks? (Yes=1) 
  
0.074*** 
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(0.017) 
    Trusts neighbor to borrow salt 
  
0.087*** 
   
(0.024) 
Other covariates: 
   Mashona 0.110*** 0.125*** 0.130*** 
 
(0.028) (0.027) (0.026) 
    Masvingo 0.047** 0.068*** 0.081*** 
 
(0.021) (0.024) (0.025) 
    Constant 1.709*** 2.329*** 2.382*** 
 
(0.138) (0.145) (0.144) 
    Observations 2620 2620 2619 
Adjusted R-squared 0.060 0.131 0.148 
Notes:  * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the ward level. 
Attrition-adjusted weighted results.  
 
3.5. Specification 
3.5.1. Total Impact of the HSCT Program 
We utilize the panel sample of households to conduct a difference-in-differences (D-in-
D) analysis to estimate the impact of the program on life satisfaction. Since the SWLS is only 
asked to the main respondent of the household, the unit of analysis for this model is the main 
respondent, and we control for both main respondent (individual) and household characteristics.  
 
Equation (1): 
𝑌ℎ𝑗𝑡  =  β0 + β1Post𝑡 + β2Transfer𝑗 + β3(Transfer ∗ Post)𝑗𝑡
+ β4HHDemographicsℎ + β5HHMainRespℎ + β6Strata𝑗 + β7Prices𝑗𝑡
+ β8Week𝑡 + εℎ𝑗𝑡   
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where  
Yhjt is the score on Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS) measured in log scale for 
main respondent for household h in Ward j at time t;  
Postt is an indicator that equals 1 if the time period is 2014 (12 month follow-up) 
Transferj is an indicator that equals 1 if the household is in a treatment Ward  
HHDemographics refers to log of household size, and the number of people 
below 5, between 6-17, between 18-60, and those above 60  
HHMainResp refers to the household’s Main Respondent characteristics, which 
include indicators for if the household main respondent is female, widowed, 
divorced/separated, has attended school, currently attends school, and linear 
variables for the highest grade attained and age of the household main respondent 
Strata are indicators of the strata used in selecting Wards. It includes two 
dummies to indicate if the household was located in Mashonaland East or 
Masvingo. The reference strata is Mtabeleland North.  
Pricesjt refer to a vector of cluster level prices of eight staple items.  
Weekt is the week in which the household is interviewed.  
β3 represents the impact estimator, or the effect of being a cash transfer 
beneficiary 
 
We run ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, clustering standard errors at the ward 
level. To increase statistical power (McKenzie, 2012), we control for baseline values for main 
respondent characteristics and household demographics except for prices, which we maintain as 
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exogenous and allow to vary by time period. The program has had no inflationary effect in 
treatment wards. 
 
As described earlier, the study design is a ward level longitudinal matched design where 
households in both comparison and treatment districts went through official program targeting. 
Participation in the program is not demand-driven: the program eligibility identification process 
determines eligibility, and there were no refusals to participate in the program among eligible 
households, i.e., take up is universal among the eligible. Therefore, there is no self-selection into 
the treatment group. 
 
The identifying assumption of the difference-in-differences model is of ‘parallel trends’, 
i.e., the trajectory of the dependent variable over the study time period would be the same across 
treatment and comparison wards in absence of the program. As described in the Study Design 
section, comparison wards were ‘matched’ to treatment wards by a scoring system based on five 
variables, which cover level of development and agro-ecological characteristics, to try to 
maintain the validity of this assumption. Trends in household consumption and production are 
expected to depend on these five indicators. In addition, baseline balance tests indicate that 
households across the treatment and comparison samples are balanced on a number of key 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics (see Table 3.4). This is as expected since all 
households are eligible for the HSCT, having been selected according to the same program 
eligibility criteria. We do not have multiple pre-baseline data points to confirm parallel trends 
and must therefore maintain this as an identifying assumption. The fact that households 
themselves are balanced on key characteristics, and that comparison Wards are both 
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geographically adjacent and are matched on characteristics that would determine trends in 
consumption, wellbeing and production suggest that this assumption is plausible.   
 
The D-in-D model does not control for differences between the treatment and comparison 
groups on account of household or individual unobserved characteristics. Our impact estimate 
(β3 in the above equation) may be biased if there are unobserved characteristics influencing both 
the program and our outcome measure. A fixed effects model at the household level can address 
the issue of unobserved characteristics that are fixed over time as a source for endogeneity. Note 
though, that the threat unobservable characteristics impose to the validity of our model is 
minimal because, as mentioned above, households in both arms are selected according to 
program rules and take up is universal among the eligible, so there is no self-selection into the 
treatment group. There is a second reason, however, why employing the fixed effects model is 
warranted for estimating the impact on the SWL score. Subjective measures such as the SWL 
scale can lead to responder bias since some element of their predisposition or attitudinal 
characteristics will enter into the responses they give for the set of five questions that comprise 
the SWL. If respondents interpret and answer these questions relative to their personal frame of 
reference and this heterogeneity is correlated with other covariates, then our coefficient estimates 
may be biased. It is, therefore, important to have panel data, where we follow the same 
respondent from one year to the next to control for this type of responder bias. We estimate 
Equation (2) using only the subsample of households where the main respondent has not changed 
from baseline to follow-up. This is our preferred model: 
Equation (2): 
𝑌ℎ𝑗𝑡  =  αℎ +  β1Post𝑡 + β2Transfer𝑗 ∗ Post𝑡 + β3Prices𝑗𝑡 + β4Week𝑡 +  νℎ𝑗𝑡 
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where  
Yhjt is log of the Satisfaction with Life score of the main respondent in 
household h in Ward j at time t  
αh (h=1….H) is the intercept for each household (h household-specific 
intercepts) 
Post, Prices, and Week are as described in Equation (1) 
β2 represents the impact estimate and νhjt is the time-varying error term 
Standard errors are clustered at the ward level. 
 
Out of the 2,630 households that comprise our panel sample, over 76 percent (2,007 
households) has the same main respondent across the two time periods.  Table B.2 of Appendix 
B shows the difference in household characteristics between households where the main 
respondent remained the same to those where it changed at follow-up. We find significant 
differences between the two groups. On average, household where the main respondent had 
changed tend to be larger, have lower per capita total expenditure, and belong to the male 
gender. However, baseline characteristics between treatment and comparison households in this 
‘same respondent’ panel continue to be balanced  (Appendix B Table B.3).   
 
Together with the log of the Satisfaction with Life score, we run estimations on three 
other outcomes. First, we construct a binary variable that takes the value of one, if the main 
respondent’s Satisfaction with Life score is greater than the average for the sample, and zero 
otherwise. The mean Satisfaction with Life score, across both treatment and comparison groups 
at baseline in our sample is about ten. We, therefore, use the value of 10 as a cutoff. This binary 
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variable acts as a threshold level and helps us understand what percentage of the beneficiaries 
experience a jump across the baseline mean score of 10. We also utilize two other questions from 
the survey which asked the respondent to rate “I feel positive about the future” and “I feel happy 
most of the time” to create two subjective wellbeing indicators. We code responses on the five-
point Likert scale as a binary variable indicating individuals who had agreed or strongly agreed 
with these affirmative statements.  These additional questions address different but related 
domains of the subjective wellbeing construct. Conceptually, movement along these indicators 
should be in the direction as that of satisfaction with life.  
 
3.5.2 Mediation of the Total Impact  
Any impact of the cash transfer on overall life satisfaction of beneficiaries will be 
mediated through how people spend that income. As mentioned earlier, we are interested in 
analyzing if the impact is mediated through satisfaction of basic needs as indicated by food 
insecurity, and through satisfaction of higher-order needs as indicated by an increase in social 
participation. Availability of cash allows people to make the necessary monetary contributions to 
institutions such as the church, and even offer assistance to other households. This increased 
ability to participate in community social life and social networks, increases their social 
inclusion.   
 
To analyze mediation of the cash transfer impact through these pathways we utilize the 
Barron-Kenny approach (Barron & Kenny, 1986), which is a linear structural equation model 
that estimates causal mediation effects. It decomposes the total treatment effect into indirect and 
direct effects, where the indirect effect provides one explanation of why the treatment works 
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(through the mediator that is being analyzed), and the direct effect represents all other channels.  
However, Keele et al (2015) highlight that estimates generated by this model can be interpreted 
as consistent estimates only under the assumption25 of sequential ignorability, i.e., first, we have 
to assume that the treatment assignment is statistically independent of both the outcome and the 
mediator, and second, to estimate the impact of the mediator as a pathway, we have to assume 
that the mediator itself, is also statistically independent of the outcome. The task here is to 
identify how variation in the mediation variable, induced only by the treatment, and not due to 
any other confounder that also impacts the outcome, is impacting variation in the outcome. The 
first assumption of randomized treatment assignment is satisfied since the present study is 
designed to mimic a randomized experiment. However, the second assumption requires 
randomized mediator assignment as well. Since we cannot accomplish that experimentally, 
Keele et al suggest that we control for possible pre-treatment confounders that affect both the 
mediator and the outcome (Z). We, therefore, further augment the Barron-Kenny model by 
controlling for the set of Z, pre-treatment confounders which impact both Life Satisfaction and 
the mediators. The model below conceptualizes the relationship.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
25 The linear structural equation model also requires two other assumptions to hold apart from sequential 
ignorability: the ‘no-interaction assumption’, i.e. the direct and indirect effect should not vary as a 
function of the treatment status, and the functional form of the expected value of the mediator and the 
outcome is linear and additive.  
Cash Transfer 
(D) 
M 
(Mediator) 
Satisfaction 
With Life (Y) 
Direct Effect 
Z 
(Confounders that 
impact both M & Y) 
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The estimation equations are as follows: 
Reduced Form Model to estimate the Total Effect of the cash transfer: 
Equation (3) 
𝑌ℎ𝑗𝑡  =  β0 + β1Post𝑡 + β2Transfer𝑗 + β3(Transfer ∗ Post)𝑗𝑡 + β4Xℎ + β5Zℎ + u
1
ℎ𝑗𝑡 
where X is the set of confounding variables (main respondent and household 
characteristics) outlined in Equation (1) above and Z is a set of confounding variables 
that impact both the mediators and Life Satisfaction. Based on the baseline determinants 
of life satisfaction analyses, we include the following variables in this set: household per 
capita monthly expenditure, dummy variables to indicate whether the household gets 
wages from wage labor and/or casual (maricho) labor, a variable that counts the number 
of different types of livestock the household, a variable that counts the number of 
different types of shocks the household has been exposed to such as death of family 
member, droughts, floods, etc., and a dummy variable that specifically accounts for a 
death in the household in the last 12 months.  
 
Structural Form Model to estimate the Direct Effect and Indirect Effect of the cash 
transfer:  
Equation (4): 
𝑌ℎ𝑗𝑡  =  Υ0 + Υ1Post𝑡 + Υ2Transfer𝑗 + Υ3Transfer ∗ Post𝑗𝑡 + Υ4Xℎ + Υ5Zℎ  + Υ6Mediatorℎ𝑡
+ u2ℎ𝑗𝑡 
Equation (5):  
Mediatorℎ𝑗𝑡  =  α0 + α1Post𝑡 + α2Transfer𝑗 + α3Transfer ∗ Post𝑗𝑡 + α4Xℎ + α5Zℎ + u
3
ℎ𝑗𝑡 
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The total effect of the cash transfer (β3) is composed of: 
1. Direct Effect - Partial impact of the cash transfer (γ3) controlling for the 
mediator M 
2. Indirect Effect - Partial impact of the cash transfer on the mediator (α3) 
multiplied by the partial impact of the mediator on Y, controlling for the cash 
transfer (γ6) 
i.e., β3 = γ3 + α3*γ6 
If γ3 is substantially less than β3, or in the extreme if it is equal to zero, then we know that 
most of the impact of the cash transfer is through the mediator, i.e. there is 100 percent 
mediation.  
 
3.6. Results and Discussion 
3.6.1. Total Impact Results 
Table 3.7 provides the results of the difference-in-differences (D-in-D) analysis to 
estimate the impact of the program on life satisfaction. It shows the average Intention To Treat 
(ITT) impact of the cash transfer. The SWL score increases by 14.2 percent for the full panel 
sample. The impact is similar if we stratify households based on transfer value per person as a 
share of their per capita expenditure. We choose 20 percent as a cutoff because experience from 
the Transfer Project indicates that impacts are substantially smaller and more inconsistent when 
the transfer is less than 20 percent of pre-program consumption (Davis & Handa, 2015). 
However, in the case of SWL score, transfer share does not seem to matter, as the impact 
estimate stays around 14 percent for both categories. To check for differences across sub-groups 
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of households, we stratify our sample based on the gender of the main respondent. Interestingly, 
we find that male main respondents experienced a greater impact, 16 percent, on their SWL 
score compared to female main respondents where the estimate is relatively lower at 13 percent.  
The same pattern is true if we use the SWL score dummy variable. The proportion of 
households, whose SWL score jumps across the baseline mean of 10, increases by 16 percentage 
points (pp). The impact is similar across households receiving transfers greater than or less than 
20 percent of their pre-program consumption expenditure. The impacts are also much larger for 
male main respondents (23 pp), when compared to female (12 pp). The proportion of households 
where the main respondent ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ about feeling positive for the future, 
increase by about 10 pp in the full panel sample and by 16 pp for households with male main 
respondents. The impact estimate of the ‘Feel Happy’ indicator is only significant when we use 
the full panel sample and for households where the transfer is less than 20 percent of 
expenditure.  
To control for attitudinal bias in the SWL score, we restricted the sample to only those 
households where the main respondent had not changed from 2013 to 2014 and run an individual 
fixed effects model, which controls for personality traits and other unobserved idiosyncrasies of 
the individual that are fixed over the one-year time period. Results are provided in Table 3.8. 
This model yields a significant 17.3 percent increase in the SWL score; the number of 
respondents who can be categorized as ‘satisfied’ by using the binary variable increase by 19.4 
pp; a 12.4 pp increase in respondents who ‘feel positive’, and a 11.6 pp increase in respondents 
who ‘feel happy.’
  
 
Table 3.7. Impact Estimates of the Cash Transfer on Life Satisfaction and Other Subjective Wellbeing Indicators: 
Difference-in-Differences Pooled Cross-section Model 
  
Using Full 
Panel Sample 
Households where 
transfer is >= 20% of p.c. 
total exp. 
Households where transfer is 
<20% of p.c. total exp. 
Households 
with Female 
Respondent 
Households 
with Male 
Respondent 
 
DinD N DinD N DinD N DinD N DinD N 
Log SWL 0.142*** 5255 0.141*** 2753 0.144*** 2502 0.129*** 3592 0.160*** 1663 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.044) 
 SWL Dummy 0.162*** 5260 0.161*** 2754 0.159*** 2506 0.121** 3596 0.232*** 1664 
 
(0.034) 
 
(0.050) 
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.055) 
 Feel Positive 0.096*** 5254 0.091** 2752 0.102** 2502 0.058 3590 0.164*** 1664 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.043) 
 Feel Happy 0.082* 5253 0.016 2753 0.147*** 2500 0.092 3592 0.064 1661 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.078) 
 
(0.051) 
 
(0.058) 
 
(0.069) 
 Notes: * p<0.10   **p<0.05   ***p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the Ward level in parentheses.  
Attrition adjusted weighted results. Estimations use difference-in-difference modeling among panel households. All 
estimations control for baseline household size and demographic composition, main respondent's gender, age, education and 
marital status, week of interview, strata, and a vector of cluster level prices.  
  
9
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Table 3.8. Impact Estimates of the Cash Transfer on Life Satisfaction and Other Subjective Wellbeing Indicators: 
Individual Fixed Effects Model 
  
All Household 
FE 
Individuals from 
hhlds where 
transfer is >= 
20% of p.c. total 
exp. 
Individuals from 
hhlds where 
transfer is < 20% 
of p.c. total exp. Females Males 
 
DinD N DinD N DinD N DinD N DinD N 
Log SWL 0.173*** 4010 0.165*** 2135 0.189*** 1875 0.162*** 2930 0.193*** 1080 
 
(0.040) 
 
(0.049) 
 
(0.049) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.054) 
 SWL Dummy 0.194*** 4014 0.218*** 2136 0.174*** 1878 0.163*** 2934 0.257*** 1080 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.054) 
 
(0.063) 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.074) 
 Feel Positive 0.124*** 4008 0.125** 2134 0.127*** 1874 0.105*** 2928 0.172*** 1080 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.044) 
 Feel Happy 0.117** 4009 0.057 2135 0.184*** 1874 0.110 2930 0.129 1079 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.084) 
 
(0.063) 
 
(0.071) 
 
(0.083) 
 Notes: * p<0.10   **p<0.05   ***p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the Ward level in parentheses.  
Attrition adjusted weighted results. Estimations control for week of interview and a vector of cluster level prices.  
 
9
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3.6.2. Mediation Results 
Tables 3.9 – 3.13 present results from the estimation equations (3), (4), and (5), outlined 
in the Empirical Approach section. We compare the coefficient of the D-in-D indicator in Model 
(1) with that of Model (2) to assess if the program impact has attenuated when accounting for the 
mediator. While the total effect of the program on SWLS is to increase it by 14 percent, we find 
that the direct effect, after controlling for mediator, HFIAS score, is reduced somewhat to 11.5 
percent. The product of two coefficients provides the indirect effect: the D-in-D coefficient in 
Model 4, multiplied with the HFIAS coefficient in Model 2. We find that food insecurity is 
mediating about 16 percent of the total impact of the cash transfer on life satisfaction (Table 3.9).  
 
In addition to controlling for ‘Z’ confounders, Keele et al (2015) suggest that controlling 
for pre-treatment values of the mediator are another useful way to account for sequential 
ignorability. Therefore, we add the pre-treatment mediator value as an additional control in 
Model (3) and (5), and find that this does not change our results.  
 
We then extend the analysis to explore social capital as a potential pathway. These results 
are provided in Table 3.10 and Table 3.11. Contributions mediate the impact by only about 5 
percent (as calculated from Model 2 and 4 in Table 3.10) and trust does not mediate any impact 
(as calculated from Model 2 and 4 in Table 3.11). Again, controlling for pre-treatment mediator 
values does not change our results.  
 
  
 
  
Table 3.9. Impact Estimates of HSCT on Satisfaction With Life Score Mediated through Food Insecurity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
log_swl log_swl log_swl log_hfias log_hfias 
    Direct Effect Direct Effect 
Indirect 
Effect 
Indirect 
Effect 
DinD Indicator 0.138*** 0.115*** 0.115*** -0.117** -0.112** 
 
(0.032) (0.029) (0.028) (0.053) (0.052) 
      Log Baseline p.c. expenditure 0.086*** 0.048** 0.049** -0.205*** -0.049** 
 
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.036) (0.022) 
      Log Household Food Insecurity Score 
 
-0.187*** -0.190*** 
  
  
(0.011) (0.012) 
  
      Log of Household Food Insecurity Score 
(Baseline Value) 
  
0.006 
 
0.564*** 
   
(0.014) 
 
(0.015) 
      Percent of CT impact mediated in Col (1) 
explained by mediator 
   
15.9% 15.4% 
      N 5255 5255 5255 5260 5260 
adj. R-sq 0.103 0.183 0.183 0.121 0.358 
Notes: * p<0.10   **p<0.05   ***p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the Ward level in parentheses.  
Attrition adjusted weighted results. Estimations use difference-in-difference modeling among panel households. All estimations 
control for baseline household size and demographic composition, main respondent's gender, age, education and marital status, 
week of interview, strata, and a vector of cluster level prices.. We also control for baseline values of  'Z' confounders: per capita 
expenditure, # of livestock type, if household receives wage income or maricho income, number of shocks experienced, and death 
of a household member.  
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Table 3.10. Impact Estimates of HSCT on Satisfaction With Life Score Mediated through Contributions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
log_swl log_swl log_swl any_contrb any_contrb 
    Direct Effect Direct Effect Indirect Effect Indirect Effect 
DinD Indicator 0.138*** 0.131*** 0.131*** 0.066* 0.090** 
 
(0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.039) (0.037) 
      Log Baseline p.c. expenditure 0.086*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.124*** 0.014 
 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.011) 
      Has made Contributions to Social 
Networks 
 
0.100*** 0.102*** 
  
  
(0.016) (0.018) 
  
      Has made Contributions to Social 
Networks (baseline value) 
  
-0.004 
 
0.610*** 
   
(0.016) 
 
(0.011) 
      Percent of CT impact mediated in Col 
(1) explained by mediator 
   
4.8% 6.7% 
      N 5255 5255 5255 5260 5260 
adj. R-sq 0.103 0.116 0.116 0.108 0.426 
Notes: * p<0.10   **p<0.05   ***p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the Ward level in parentheses.  
Attrition adjusted weighted results. Estimations use difference-in-difference modeling among panel households. All estimations control 
for baseline household size and demographic composition, main respondent's gender, age, education and marital status, week of 
interview, strata, and a vector of cluster level prices.. We also control for baseline values of  'Z' confounders: per capita expenditure, # 
of livestock type, if household receives wage income or maricho income, number of shocks experienced, and death of a household 
member.  
 
1
0
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Table 3.11. Impact Estimates of HSCT on Satisfaction With Life Score Mediated through Trust 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
log_swl log_swl log_swl trust_salt trust_salt 
    Direct Effect Direct Effect 
Indirect 
Effect 
Indirect 
Effect 
DinD Indicator 0.138*** 0.136*** 0.135*** 0.021 0.033 
 
(0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.044) (0.044) 
      Log Baseline p.c. expenditure 0.086*** 0.085*** 0.082*** 0.028 -0.010 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.026) (0.016) 
      Trusts neighbor to borrow salt 
 
0.062*** 0.049*** 
  
  
(0.015) (0.016) 
  
      Trusts neighbor to borrow salt (baseline 
value) 
  
0.027 
 
0.514*** 
   
(0.019) 
 
(0.012) 
      Percent of CT impact mediated in Col (1) 
explained by mediator 
   
0.9% 1.2% 
      N 5255 5254 5251 5257 5254 
adj. R-sq 0.103 0.108 0.109 0.039 0.286 
Notes: * p<0.10   **p<0.05   ***p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the Ward level in parentheses.  
Attrition adjusted weighted results. Estimations use difference-in-difference modeling among panel households. All estimations 
control for baseline household size and demographic composition, main respondent's gender, age, education and marital status, week 
of interview, strata, and a vector of cluster level prices.. We also control for baseline values of  'Z' confounders: per capita 
expenditure, # of livestock type, if household receives wage income or maricho income, number of shocks experienced, and death of a 
household member.  
 
1
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In addition to a difference-in-differences model, we use the fixed effects model to 
analyze mediation. Results are provided in Table 3.12. We find that food security mediation rises 
marginally from the previous model to 16.5 percent, and mediation by social capital declines to 
3.5 percent. Trust does not mediate any impact in this model as well.  
 
To further explore the role of mediators, we conducted a subsample analysis as shown in 
Table 3.13. While food insecurity is mediating 20 to 25 percent of the total impact on SWL score 
for households where the main respondent remains the same and for female main respondents, it 
plays a negligible role in mediating the impact on male respondents. Contributions made to 
social networks and trust are negligible mediators in the case of these subsamples too.  
 
In summary, the quantitative analyses show that that the HSCT Program has improved 
the beneficiaries’ judgment of their overall life satisfaction. If we consider our individual fixed 
effects results, which is our most robust model since it controls for attitudinal bias, the total 
impact of the transfer on the Satisfaction of Life score is 17 percent; proportion of respondents 
that cross the SWL baseline mean score of ten increase by 19 percentage points; and the 
proportion of respondents that ‘feel positive’ or who ‘feel happy’ increase by about 12 pp. Our 
mediation analysis informs us that lowered food insecurity has a 16 percent average causal 
mediation effect. However, contributions made to social networks and trust, are not substantively 
mediating an increase in life satisfaction in this particular context.
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Table 3.12. Mediation Estimates: Fixed Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Food Security log_swl log_swl log_hfias 
    
Direct 
Effect 
Indirect 
Effect 
DinD Indicator 0.159*** 0.133*** -0.136** 
 
(0.035) (0.030) (0.057) 
    Log Household Food Insecurity Score 
 
-0.193*** 
 
  
(0.014) 
 
    Percent of CT impact mediated in Col (1) 
explained by mediator 
  
16.5% 
    N 5255 5255 5260 
adj. R-sq 0.132 0.215 0.131 
    Contributions to Social Networks log_swl log_swl any_contrb 
    
Direct 
Effect 
Indirect 
Effect 
DinD Indicator 0.159*** 0.154*** 0.079** 
 
(0.035) (0.034) (0.039) 
    Has made Contributions to Social 
Networks 
 
0.069*** 
 
  
(0.021) 
 
    Percent of CT impact mediated in Col (1) 
explained by mediator 
  
3.4% 
    N 5255 5255 5260 
adj. R-sq 0.132 0.137 0.024 
    Trust log_swl log_swl trust_salt 
    
Direct 
Effect 
Indirect 
Effect 
DinD Indicator 0.159*** 0.154*** 0.079** 
 
-0.035 -0.034 -0.039 
    Trusts neighbor to borrow salt 
 
0.069*** 
 
  
-0.021 
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Percent of CT impact mediated in Col (1) 
explained by mediator 
  
1.2% 
    N 5255 5254 5257 
adj. R-sq 0.132 0.135 0.069 
Notes: * p<0.10   **p<0.05   ***p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the Ward level 
in parentheses. Attrition adjusted weighted results. Estimations control for week of 
interview and a vector of cluster level prices. 
  
Table 3.13. Impact Estimates of HSCT on Satisfaction With Life Score: Mediation Subsample Analyses 
  
Total 
Effect 
(1) 
  
Direct Effect Indirect Effect 
  
Including the following as control: 
      
  N 
Food 
Insecurity Contributions Trust Food Insecurity Contributions Trust 
 
ϒ 
 
ϒ3 ϒ3 ϒ3 ϒ6 α3 ϒ6 α3 ϒ6 α3 
Same Main Resp.  
401
0 0.160*** 0.127*** 0.153*** 0.158*** 
-
0.200*** 
-
0.160** 0.107*** 0.066 0.079*** 0.013 
  
(0.037) (0.033) (0.037) (0.037) (0.014) (0.067) (0.016) (0.040) (0.015) (0.050) 
Percent of CT 
impact mediated in 
Col (1) explained 
by mediator 
     
20.0% 
 
4.4% 
 
0.6% 
 
            Female Main 
Resp. 
359
2 0.126*** 0.094** 0.119*** 0.123*** 
-
0.197*** 
-
0.162** 0.105*** 0.073 0.066*** 0.044 
  
(0.043) (0.039) (0.042) (0.042) (0.015) (0.063) (0.019) (0.046) (0.020) (0.053) 
Percent of CT 
impact mediated in 
Col (1) explained 
by mediator 
     
25.3% 
 
6.1% 
 
2.3% 
 
            
Male Main Resp. 
166
3 0.153*** 0.147*** 0.149*** 0.154*** 
-
0.165*** -0.040 0.083*** 0.050 0.058** -0.019 
  
(0.044) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.021) (0.070) (0.021) (0.064) (0.023) (0.067) 
Percent of CT 
impact mediated in 
Col (1) explained 
by mediator 
     
4.3%   2.7%   -0.7%   
Notes: * p<0.10   **p<0.05   ***p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the Ward level in parentheses.  
Attrition adjusted weighted results. Estimations use difference-in-difference modeling among panel households. All estimations control for 
baseline household size and demographic composition, main respondent's gender, age, education and marital status, week of interview, strata, 
and a vector of cluster level prices.. We also control for baseline values of  'Z' confounders: per capita expenditure, # of livestock type, if 
household receives wage income or maricho income, number of shocks experienced, and death of a household member.  
  
1
0
5
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3.6.3. Qualitative Data 
To better understand some of these results, we also utilized qualitative data that was 
collected at follow-up in the treatment districts as part of the impact evaluation. The qualitative 
data is comprised of in-depth interviews (IDI) with eight caregivers and nine youths in 
beneficiary households, 18 semi-structured interviews with government officials in different 
ministries, and 18 focus group discussions with six to eight key community members that 
include community leaders such as the chief or village head and others who have knowledge of 
the local community such as school teachers and women’s groups leaders. For details on 
methodology, please refer to AIR (2015). Three common themes that are pertinent to this paper 
emerged across all interviews and discussions. First, beneficiaries and others noted that the cash 
was useful in putting food on the table and meeting basic needs such as soap and blankets. They 
also mentioned spending the cash on livestock (mainly goats and chickens) and upgrading their 
dwelling units (such as corrugated roofs and cementing the floor). As one youth, aged 16 years, 
in Binga reported: 
I know about the programme and that my family receives the money…I do not know 
who takes charge of how we use the money between my Aunt and Uncle. All I know is that 
they buy groceries for the family, things like sugar and mealie-meal…Since we started 
receiving the money, the family has been able to buy bathing and washing soap besides food. 
 
Similarly, a caregiver in Mwenezi commented: 
I am paying school fees, buying food and we are planning with other beneficiaries 
to do mukando so that we can serve and buy something big at the like goats. At the 
moment I haven’t yet bought any livestock because of school fees and food….I think these 
transfers are very much helpful in our lives because a lot has changed for the better like 
having toiletries, school shoes and mainly food is now on our tables.  
 
Payment of school fees (and accompanying expenditure on uniforms and stationary) is 
the second recurrent theme to emerge. Being able to send their children to school is important for 
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caregivers in these communities as this was repeatedly brought up. They were using the cash and 
the knowledge that there would be a future stream of cash income for either clearing a backlog of 
unpaid school fees, paying current term fees, and/or negotiating paying part of the fees.  This is 
in line with findings from a qualitative study conducted by Oxford Policy Management (OPM) in 
October 2012 in two districts, Chivi and Goromonzi, which were among the pilot districts of the 
HSCT Program (Attah et al, 2016). Below are a few comments from in-depth interviews with 
beneficiaries, both caregivers and youths: 
I have knowledge on how these transfers are managed because my mother is a 
beneficiary and she is the one who make all the decisions on how this money is used. My 
mother bought a goat from her savings and I really appreciate because since we started 
receiving these transfers my mother bought me books and at times paid for my school fees 
and there is a big change on our daily food stuffs. (Youth aged 18 years in Binga) 
 
I hope these children will grow up and be people who can be responsible for 
themselves and never be beggars and this can be achieved through education….The cash 
transfer has made a very big difference because all my children are now up to date in their 
school fees payment and they are going to school in complete school uniforms. (Caregiver in 
Mwenezi) 
 
Are these findings reflected in the quantitative data? Did the cash transfer indeed lead to 
an increase in education expenditure and did that in turn lead to greater life satisfaction? Results 
are provided in Table 3.14. We only included those households who had school going children in 
this sample. We find that indeed, the impact estimate on education related purchase is 
statistically significant. The cash transfer has increased expenditure purchases by about 35 
percent (Column 4). However, it is mediating the impact on life satisfaction by only about three 
to five percent.  
  
Table 3.14. Impact Estimates of HSCT on Satisfaction With Life Score Mediated through Education Expenses 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
log_swl log_swl log_swl LD_exp_educ_purchases LD_exp_educ_purchases 
    
Direct 
Effect 
Direct 
Effect Indirect Effect Indirect Effect 
DinD Indicator 0.160*** 0.154*** 0.151*** 0.350*** 0.366*** 
 
(0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.074) (0.068) 
      Log Baseline p.c. expenditure 0.081*** 0.073*** 0.077*** 0.489*** 0.081*** 
 
(0.021) (0.023) (0.024) (0.058) (0.026) 
      Log hhld educational purchases 
 
0.016 0.022* 
  
  
(0.012) (0.013) 
  
      Log hhld educational purchases 
(baseline) 
  
-0.010 
 
0.638*** 
   
(0.010) 
 
(0.013) 
      Percent of CT impact mediated in 
Col (1) explained by mediator 
   
3.5% 5.0% 
      N 3948 3948 3948 3951 3951 
adj. R-sq 0.089 0.090 0.090 0.197 0.529 
Notes: * p<0.10   **p<0.05   ***p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the Ward level in parentheses.  
Attrition adjusted weighted results. Estimations use difference-in-difference modeling among panel households. All estimations 
control for baseline household size and demographic composition, main respondent's gender, age, education and marital status, 
week of interview, strata, and a vector of cluster level prices.. We also control for baseline values of  'Z' confounders: per capita 
expenditure, # of livestock type, if household receives wage income or maricho income, number of shocks experienced, and death 
of a household member.  
1
0
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Lastly, the qualitative data tells us that the impact of the cash transfer on social capital 
was mixed. The cash was increasing social participation by enabling beneficiaries to join 
informal group savings and investment clubs, locally known as ‘mukando’ or ‘maround’, or 
farmers clubs which enable sharing of agricultural tools and implements and burial societies. 
Beneficiaries were also able to engage in reciprocity with their relatives. However, it was also 
leading to tension within the community between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. This 
explains why we do not see any impact of the cash transfer on our ‘trust’ indicator, and therefore 
also the fact that trust was not found to be a mediating factor for increasing satisfaction with life. 
This finding was also reported in the qualitative study conducted by OPM in October 2012 
(OPM, 2013). In addition, in our interviews with them, HSCT beneficiaries reported that they 
were proactively being excluded from other government and non-government aid programs. As 
one key informant put it, “The Mudzi community has rejected the harmonisation i.e having an 
individual receiving from more than one programme as such at least everyone should benefit 
from one of the programmes”. The comments below testify to this mixed experience: 
The cash from Social Welfare has improved my family well-being and my relations 
with my relatives have improved since I am now in a position to borrow them cash when they 
need it. (Caregiver in Binga) 
 
However, my relationship with some villagers has gone sour mainly because they feel 
I should not have benefited from the HSCT programme because I am still young and 
therefore able to work for my family. I feel I am now discriminated from benefiting from 
other programmes such as food for work through Save the children. Some villagers no longer 
want to assist those who benefited from the programme because they feel that they are now 
better off than the non beneficiaries. (Caregiver in Binga) 
 
There is a great change in my relationship with the family because if you receive your 
transfer and you bring sugar to your family they become happy and also when relatives visit 
they can now drink tea and they feel important whenever they receive such a welcome from 
someone who didn’t manage to feed a visitor before. (Caregiver in Mwenezi) 
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This has changed my relationship because now they understand my problems than 
before and now I can manage to borrow from others without any fear knowing that I will pay 
back when we receive other transfers. (Caregiver in Mwenezi) 
 
The impact of the cash transfer on social participation is therefore complex, and while it 
can enable beneficiaries to be active participants in their community, it can also lead to tension 
between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. 
 
3.7. Conclusion 
This paper is based on the premise that an important component of wellbeing is the 
individual’s self-perception of how well they are doing. We focus on one component of 
subjective wellbeing, Satisfaction With Life. We aim to understand if the Harmonized Cash 
Transfer Program in Zimbabwe succeeds in improving the beneficiaries’ judgment of their 
overall life satisfaction. We find that total impact of the transfer on the Satisfaction of Life score 
is in the range of 14 to 17 percent. The point estimate at the higher end of that range is obtained 
from our most robust model, the individual fixed effects model.  
 
There is heterogeneity of impact across subsamples. Specifically, the impact on male 
main respondents is higher, between 16 to 20 percent, as compared to female respondents, which 
is around 13-16 percent. This finding is consistent with a long tradition of studies finding large 
and consistent gender gap in self-reported health measures (Nathanson, 1975). Explanations for 
this gap have varied from ‘true’ health differences (Case and Paxson, 2005; Malmusi et al., 
2012), to socio-economic variables that impose more social obligations on women and lower 
perceived control and self-esteem (Denton et al, 2004), to systematically different gender 
thresholds (Lindeboom and van Doorslaer, 2004; Peracchi and Rossetti, 2008), and more 
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recently to different individual discount rates (Soytas and Kose, 2014)  Further work needs to be 
conducted to understand what is driving these differences across genders in the case of life-
satisfaction specifically.  
 
To understand what is driving the treatment effect, we decompose the total effect of 14 
percent into direct and indirect effects. The indirect effects explore specific potential 
explanations for why the treatment is working. In this paper, we chose to analyze two specific 
mediators through which the additional cash income might be influencing life satisfaction: 
through satisfaction of basic needs as indicated by decreased food insecurity, and through 
satisfaction of a higher level need as indicated by increase in social participation or ‘social 
capital’. We hypothesized that even at low-income levels, money may be used to satisfy not just 
basic physiological needs but also higher-level needs such as social participation, which 
improves the person’s SWB. Our mediation analyses uncovered an average causal mediation 
effect of about 16 percent through lowered food insecurity and only 5 percent through an 
increase in occurrence of contributions made to social networks. Trust was not found to be 
mediating factor in increasing life satisfaction in this particular context. Our findings from the 
qualitative data further corroborate that the impact of the cash transfer on social participation is 
complex and while it can enable beneficiaries to be active participants in their community, it can 
also lead to tension between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Further research is required to 
tease apart the impact of the cash transfer on inter-household dynamics and at the community 
level.  
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Despite the challenges of measuring subjective wellbeing, there is now an increased 
focus on explicitly including it as part of program evaluations. It is important in and of itself, and 
can provide a positive reinforcement of improvements obtained in traditional program evaluation 
measures, such as improved educational outcomes and economic decision-making. Further, by 
identifying pathways through which subjective wellbeing is affected by the cash transfer, policy 
makers can use that knowledge to better design and implement social protection programs. This 
paper has demonstrated that even in the short period of a year, the HSCT has had a positive 
impact on the beneficiary’s perception of satisfaction with life. While some of that improvement 
can be attributed towards fulfillment of basic needs such as food security, it is not clear if 
increased social engagement has contributed to that improvement.  
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CHAPTER 4: DO GOVERNMENT CASH TRANSFERS CROWD OUT INFORMAL 
INTER-HOUSEHOLD TRANSFERS? 
 
4.1. Introduction & Background 
The standard framework used to analyze the relationship between private inter-household 
transfers and a public transfer is that of altruism (borrowing from the intra-household transfer 
model of Becker, 1974) versus exchange (Bernheim et al. 1985). If the private transfers are 
motivated by altruism, then it follows that there exists a negative relationship between public and 
private transfers. This is because the household that is making the transfer will infer that the 
recipient household’s welfare has been partly taken care of due to the public transfer. If however, 
the primary motivation is exchange, then the relationship is less straightforward. In such a 
model, the donor makes cash/in-kind payments in lieu of certain expected services (for example, 
child care). Public transfers will raise the implicit price of these services, and private transfers 
could fall/rise depending on price elasticity of these services. Attanasio and Rios-Rull (2000) and 
Strobbe and Miller (2011) highlight a third reason, that of risk sharing practices, wherein 
households use private transfers to share idiosyncratic risk. There exists a substantial body of 
literature on the empirical analysis of the crowding-out effect of public transfers/insurance (this 
includes programs such as Medicaid, AFDC, and old age pensions) on private transfers.   
 
The application of this theoretical literature to cash transfer programs in developing 
countries has provided mixed evidence. Some of the early empirical analyses in this area focuses
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on the Progresa program in Mexico. While Teruel and Davis (2000) reject the crowding-out 
effect for Progresa on private monetary transfers, Albarran and Attanasio (2001) find a 
significant impact on both the incidence and size of private transfers. Angelucci et al (2006) 
analyzed the impact of the cash transfer in urban Mexico on loans and in-kind transfers and 
found that treated households are both, 10 percentage points less likely to receive an in-kind 
transfer, and observed lower loans for the treated group. As such, there is no clearly identified 
pattern of crowding-out effects for the Progresa program at least.  
 
A more recent study by Nielsen and Olinto (2007) uses the difference-in-difference 
model to estimate the impact of conditional cash transfers in Nicaragua and Honduras on three 
kinds of private transfers: remittances, food transfers, and food/money donations from NGOs.  
They find no effect on remittances in either country but an impact on food transfers in 
Nicaragua. This is similar to the finding by Teruel and Davis (2000). Strobbe and Miller (2011) 
estimate the crowding effect on three types of private transfers – gifts, remittances, and informal 
loans. They find that the government cash transfer in Malawi leads to crowding-out for gifts and 
remittances but not for informal loans. Thus, existing empirical literature indicates that cash 
transfer programs impact transfers/gifts received from different sources differently. Crowding-
out may occur for certain types of transfers, for example, in-kind transfers of food that are given 
by a geographically proximate support network. However, remittances by migrant household 
members might not be impacted by the transfer, at least in the short term.  
 
In this paper, we analyze this question utilizing longitudinal data collected for the 
evaluation of the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer (HSCT) Programme, a government-run 
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unconditional cash transfer program in Zimbabwe. The HSCT is an unconditional cash transfer 
program targeted to ultra-poor households who are food poor and labor constrained. Payments to 
beneficiaries have occurred regularly on a bi-annual basis. The data we have permits us to 
analyze impacts on aggregate measure of gifts received in cash and kind from family, friends or 
neighbors. This includes remittances, but we do not have information to parse out remittances 
from the aggregate measure that combines gifts and remittances. In addition, we analyze impacts 
of the transfer on the household’s ability to make contributions to social networks or to take out a 
loan.   
 
We find that, on aggregate, there is no evidence of crowding out of inter-household gifts 
in cash/kind. In addition, we do not find an impact of the Program on loans outstanding of the 
beneficiary. However, contributions made to social groups has increased by 29 percent, thus 
indicating that households are using the cash transfer to ‘re-enter’ social networks.  
 
4.2. The Zimbabwe Harmonized Social Cash Transfer Program 
We use data collected for the evaluation of the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer (HSCT) 
Programme, an unconditional cash transfer program, introduced in 2011 by the Government of 
Zimbabwe. Program implementation is being done in a phased manner and it is anticipated that 
eventually the Program will cover the entire country. In January 2016, the Program covered 
52,500 households, and approximately 300,000 households are expected to be eligible for the 
program at full-scale.  
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Benefits are structured such that the size of the transfer varies with household size: a one-
person household receives USD10, two-person receives USD15, three-person receives USD20, 
and a household made up of four or more persons receives USD25. The program thus provides 
between $10 and $25 per month, which represents about 20 percent of total household 
consumption expenditure.  
 
The program is targeted at households that are food-poor and labor constrained. Eligible 
households are identified through a detailed targeting census that is conducted by ZIMSTAT, the 
national statistical agency. All households are screened using the targeting survey fielded by 
ZIMSTAT, and data is then processed to compute a proxy poverty score that serves as the first 
eligibility criterion. A household is considered food-poor when it is living below the food 
poverty line26 and is unable to meet the most basic needs of its members. A list of ten indicators 
that measure the ability of the household to meet basic needs is used to determine eligibility on 
this criterion.27 At least three of these have to be met for the household to be eligible for the 
Program.  
 
The Program has a clearly defined approach for categorizing a household as labor 
constrained, which is the second eligibility criterion. Throughout the paper, we use this definition 
                                                        
26 Food poverty line is the threshold where total household expenditure is below what is required to meet 
the food energy requirement for each household member, set at 2,100 kcal/day/person. 
27 The 10 indicators as given in Form1R, which is used for assessing eligibility are: only one or no meals 
per day; grains lasted for less than three months last harvest season; no/minimal livestock; no blankets; no 
rooms/huts for sleeping; rudimentary house material; live on begging or some piece work; get no/minimal 
regular support from relatives or others; have no valuable assets, e.g. animal drawn cart, vehicle; and the 
household is landless or owns less than one acre. 
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to operationalize the attribute of being labor constrained. A household is considered labor 
constrained when: 
1. There is no able bodied household member between 18-59 years who is fit for 
productive work, OR 
2. The dependency ratio is three or more, i.e., one fit to work household member 
between 18-59 years has to take care of three or more dependents. Dependents are 
those household members who cannot or should not work because they are under 
18 years of age or they are elderly (over 59 years of age) or they are unfit for 
work because they are chronically ill or disabled or still in school, OR 
3. The dependency ratio is between two and three and the household has a severely 
disabled or chronically sick household member who requires intensive care.  
 
The phased roll out of the HSCT allows us to use households in regions slotted to enter 
the program at a later date to form a comparison group. Within districts the program operates at 
an administrative unit known as the Ward. Child Protection Committees (CPCs) are formed 
within each Ward who are responsible for ensuring that targeting of households is conducted 
thoroughly and who are in charge of communication of program rules and operational activities 
(such as payment dates) between the district social welfare office and beneficiary households. 
The geographic area of a Ward varies by population density as each Ward comprises a cluster of 
anywhere from 10-20 villages. The Ward comprises the primary sampling unit for the sample 
design. 
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Phase 1 of the HSCT expansion occurred in 2011-12 and covered ten districts. Wards for 
the treatment group of the evaluation were selected from Phase 2 areas, which entered the 
program in 2013. Wards for the control group were selected from areas that were slotted for 
Phase Four expansion and that were geographically close to Phase 2 areas. A detailed analysis of 
all Wards in these areas (Phase 2 areas and Phase 4 areas geographically close to Phase 2 areas) 
was then conducted by the study team led by the national research partner Ruzivo Trust based in 
Harare. Each Ward was assigned a point score based on five characteristics: forest cover, 
nearness to main roads, resistance to shocks, nearness to business centers, and water sources. On 
each criterion a Ward was scored from 1 (low) to 3 (high) and the maximum score possible was 
thus 15.28 Power calculations based on the expected number of households per Ward indicated 
that a total of 60 Treatment and 30 Comparison Wards were necessary for the study.29 The 60 
treatment Wards were stratified across the three treatment districts (Mudzi, Mwenezi and Binga), 
and the 30 comparison Wards were likewise stratified to areas adjacent to the three treatment 
districts.  
 
Wards in treatment areas were ranked from highest point score (most vulnerable) to 
lowest and paired with each stratum. Then, for each treatment Ward pair with a given score, a 
comparison Ward with the same score in the same stratum was selected to serve as the ‘matched’ 
comparison Ward. In cases where more than one comparison Ward existed with the same score, 
one was picked randomly. In cases where no comparison Ward existed with the exact same 
                                                        
28 Details of the Ward level analysis are available upon request.  
29 Sample size calculations were based on the power to detect a meaningful change in the height-for-age 
z-score of children under age 60 months, the indicator for which the largest effective sample size was 
required (Handa et al., 2013). 
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score, the Ward with the closest point score was selected. Figure 4.1 provides a map showing the 
geographic location within Zimbabwe of the study sites.  
 
Figure 4.1. Map of Zimbabwe 
 
 
 
 
Source: Constructed using Stata 13.1. The darker outlines in the map are province boundaries. 
  Shape files obtained from http://www.gadm.org/ 
 
In the selected study Wards (both treatment and comparison), program targeting was 
conducted by the Department of Social Services following standard program operation 
guidelines. Out of the eligible households, the evaluation team randomly selected 34–60 
households in each ward, using the random number generator tool in excel. This generated a 
sample of 3,063 households across 90 wards. Data were collected through a detailed household 
survey, conducted at baseline and 12-month follow-up. The study flow chart is provided in 
Figure 4.2.  At follow up, the household attrition rate was 14 per cent. As part of the impact 
evaluation, detailed attrition analysis was conducted, and while differential attrition was ruled 
out, it was concluded that overall attrition (households remaining in the study were no longer 
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representative of households in the original sample) might be a problem (American Institutes for 
Research, 2014). To correct for this problem, inverse probability weighting was used to adjust 
sampling weights. We use these generated analytical weights for our panel data impact analysis.  
 
Note that all households in comparison Wards in the study sample are actual eligible 
households who will receive benefits once the program reaches their area, and eligibility criteria 
are the same across the country. Given the universal program take-up, these households thus 
serve as a close approximation for the counterfactual for treatment households. The distinction 
between this design and what might be deemed a perfect design--a social experiment-- is that 
Wards were not randomly assigned to treatment. In a large-scale national program where 
program roll out is determined by both technical (e.g. poverty) and political considerations, 
randomizing roll out is often not feasible. When the eligibility criteria are applied uniformly, 
targeting is supply-driven (as the case in Zimbabwe), and take-up is universal, the threat to 
internal validity in our design is the geographical differences across Phase 2 and Phase 4 areas. 
Our stratified matched design was chosen to minimize geographical differences.  
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Figure 4.2. Study Flow Chart 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
July 2013 
Intervention Households receive cash payments 
June-August 2014 
Follow-up Survey: 2630 households (Attrition 14%) 
Treatment: 1748/2029  Comparison: 882/1034 
June – August 2017 
End-line Survey Anticipated 
May – July 2013 
Baseline Survey: 3063 households 
Treatment: 2029 households in 60 Wards 
Comparison: 1034 households in 29 Wards 
March – May 2013  
Targeting and selection of beneficiary households in study Wards 
by ZIMSTAT 
May 2013 
Random sample of households pulled from eligibility list in each 
Ward 
November 2012 
Confirmation of ranking and matching process for treatment and 
comparison Wards by Ministry of Labour & Social Services and 
Ruzivo Trust 
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4.3. Summary Statistics 
Table 4.1 reports mean characteristics at baseline for both treatment and comparison 
groups. We retain only the panel sample of households for this part of our analysis. There are 
1,746 households in the treatment group and 880 in the comparison group. To test for baseline 
balance between the two groups, we use OLS regressions with clustered standard errors at the 
ward level (to account for clustering of households within wards). None of the 29 key household 
variables listed were found to be statistically significantly different at the five per cent level 
across treatment and comparison groups at baseline.  
 
The average household in the sample has a household size of about five with a per capita 
monthly expenditure of around $33-$35. Around 25-28 percent of these households take care of 
one or more disabled members. In addition, around 37 percent have at least one member who is 
chronically ill and almost two-thirds have one or more elderly members. These characteristics 
contribute to a high dependency ratio, which is reflected in the large number of households that 
are categorized as labor constrained (about 83-84 percent of the sample). That our sample should 
have such a high concentration of labor-constrained households makes sense because as 
mentioned earlier, one of the program criterions for household eligibility is labor-constrained 
status of the household. More than two-thirds of the main respondents are women, their average 
age is around 56-57 years, and more than half have had at least some level of schooling. About 
10-11 percent households have a member that works for wages, but most of them are dependent 
on casual labor, what is known as ‘maricho’ labor in Zimbabwe—this is viewed as the least 
desirable form of work in rural areas of Africa. Aid received during the year is substantially 
lower for the treatment group.  
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Table 4.1. Baseline Mean Characteristics of Panel Sample Households 
  
Comparison 
Group Treatment Group 
p-Value    Mean 
Std. 
Error Mean Std. Error 
Household Demographics: 
     
Household Size 5.14 0.21 5.02 0.14 0.637 
# Children under 5 0.80 0.06 0.76 0.05 0.618 
 # Children 6-17 2.21 0.12 2.23 0.08 0.937 
 # Adults 18 - 59 1.27 0.09 1.20 0.05 0.479 
 # Elderly (>60) 0.85 0.04 0.84 0.03 0.809 
% households that have disabled 
members 27.78 0.02 25.29 0.01 0.267 
% households that have chronically ill 
members 37.37 0.02 36.83 0.01 0.844 
% households that have elderly 
members 64.80 0.03 64.17 0.02 0.857 
% households categorized as labor 
constrained 82.95 0.02 84.01 0.01 0.641 
Main Respondent Characteristics: 
     
% Female  65.90 0.02 69.56 0.02 0.173 
Age (Yrs) 56.68 1.40 56.29 0.88 0.808 
% Widowed 37.30 0.02 37.09 0.02 0.944 
% Divorced/Separated 8.08 0.01 9.57 0.01 0.350 
% Main resp. has schooling 60.92 0.03 55.84 0.02 0.111 
% Main resp. currently attends school 1.30 0.01 1.66 0.00 0.573 
Highest grade of Main resp. 3.47 0.12 3.30 0.14 0.334 
Household Characteristics: 
     Monthly Per Capita Total Expenditure 
(in usd) 34.96 2.46 32.41 1.14 0.351 
Monthly Per capita Food Expenditure 
(in usd) 22.11 1.79 20.62 0.88 0.459 
HFIAS Score (1-27) 13.87 0.40 14.04 0.27 0.747 
# of shocks experienced 2.44 0.21 2.69 0.13 0.310 
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% households that have suffered from a 
shock 86.09 0.02 90.07 0.01 0.148 
% households where death has occurred 
in 12 mo 8.68 0.01 10.26 0.01 0.229 
# of livestock type 2.27 0.09 2.20 0.08 0.571 
% households that receive wages 10.97 0.01 10.24 0.01 0.642 
% households undertaking 
casual/maricho labor 48.49 0.03 46.22 0.02 0.581 
Aid received (in USD) 76.85 14.04 54.25 3.43 0.122 
Distance to Food Market (Km) 3.34 0.46 3.87 0.24 0.310 
Distance to Input Market (Km) 20.40 2.23 18.74 1.47 0.537 
Distance to Water Source (Km) 1.29 0.21 1.36 0.11 0.748 
N 882   1746     
Notes: Attrition-adjusted weighted results. p-values obtained by clustering at ward level. 
 
Table 4.2 provides incidence and value of inter-household transfers and related outcomes 
across our two study arms and two time periods. There is a statistically significant difference 
between percent of households that receive inter-household transfers across treatment and 
comparison groups at baseline. More than half the households in the treatment group and more 
than one-third in the comparison group receive gifts in cash or kind from other households at 
baseline. This declines by about eight percentage points in 2014 for the treatment group and by 
sixteen percentage points in the Comparison groups. The monetary value of transfers received 
has also declined across both treatment and comparison groups. On the other hand, percentage of 
households that make gifts in cash/kind has increased. At baseline, 12-14 percent households in 
our sample were making cash/in-kind gifts. This increases to 21 percent for the treatment group 
and 15 percent for the comparison group at follow-up. However, value of transfers made has 
declined from $69.5 per household to $48 per household for the treatment group (or $25 per 
capita to $20 per capita).  This decline may be because of lower value of transfers made by 
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households who have started making transfers in the follow-up period. Indeed, average per capita 
value of transfers made across the entire treatment sample has increased from $3 at baseline to 
$4 at follow-up. Value of transfers made has increased for the Comparison group.  
 
We construct an indicator called reciprocity, which takes on a value of one if the 
household has both received a transfer and made a transfer to another household in the same time 
period. About 14-15 percent of the households in our sample demonstrate reciprocity, across 
both treatment and comparison groups. Further, we also construct indicators for households that 
did not receive/make a transfer, but indicate that there is someone they could have potentially 
approached to request help in the form of cash or gifts in kind and likewise, that they know of 
someone who they in turn would potentially help, if requested. Households that could potentially 
undertake such transfers comprise about 14 percent of our treatment group at baseline, with a 
slight reduction to 12 percent at follow-up. The reduction is however larger for the comparison 
group, declining from 9-12 percent at baseline to about 5 percent at follow-up.   
 
Inter-household transfers are just one mechanism by which poor households manage risk 
and cope with liquidity constraints. Households may increase contributions made to a social 
network such as a church, or a farmer’s group30. The cash may also enhance the ability of a 
beneficiary to take out a loan, as he or she will be more credit worthy owing to a predictable 
source of income that is promised by the program. The beneficiary household might also use the 
transfer amount to pay off an outstanding loan. On the other hand, the HSCT may not only 
crowd out private inter-household transfers as previously described but also aid received from 
                                                        
30 We specifically asked for eight such networks: church, women’s livelihood group, trade association, 
farmer group, business cooperative, labor unions, youth association and burial society 
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other Government and Non government programs. The averages for these related outcomes are 
shown in the bottom panel of Table 4.2. At baseline, about 40 percent of the households made 
monetary contributions to social networks. While this stayed constant for the comparison group, 
the number of households making contributions increased to 50 percent for the treatment group. 
Aid received is higher for the comparison group during both time periods. Aid received and the 
number and amount of loan outstanding declined for both groups at follow-up.
  
 
Table 4.2. Means of Inter-Household Transfers and Related Outcomes by Treatment and Comparison Groups 
 
Treatment Comparison p-value of 
baseline 
difference  
Baseline Follow-up Baseline Follow-up 
  N Avg. N Avg. N Avg. N Avg. 
Inter-Household Transfer Received 
         % Households that Rcvd Gifts from other 
Households (0/1) 1748 56.4 1748 48.2 882 69.2 882 52.6 0.001 
Value of Gifts Rcvd: sub sample ($) 964 118.8 885 75.2 569 153.2 536 134.3 0.113 
Per capita Value of Gifts Rcvd: sub sample 
($) 964 35.7 885 26.3 569 48.3 536 44.8 0.068 
Per capita Value of Gifts Rcvd: entire sample 
($) 1745 20.1 1748 12.7 879 33.4 882 23.5 0.009 
Inter-Household Transfer Made: 
         % Households that MADE Gifts to other 
Households (0/1) 1748 13.6 1748 20.8 882 12.3 882 15.0 0.595 
Value of Gifts MADE: sub sample ($) 207 69.5 351 48.2 109 28.5 154 52.3 0.171 
Per capita Value of Gifts MADE: sub sample 
($) 207 25.2 351 20.8 109 7.2 154 16.3 0.139 
Per capita Value of Gifts MADE: entire 
sample ($) 1747 3.4 1748 4.3 881 0.9 882 2.4 0.157 
Reciprocity & Potential for 
receiving/making transfers: 
         % Reciprocity (0/1) 1035 14.9 985 26.5 601 13.9 556 24.4 0.726 
% Households that have potential households 
to request for a transfer (Yes=1) 781 13.4 863 12.1 310 9.9 356 4.7 0.208 
% Households can potentially make a transfer 
if requested (Yes=1) 1540 13.9 1397 12.3 772 12.4 728 4.9 0.501 
          Related Outcomes: 
         
1
3
2
 
  
% Households that made contributions to 
Social Networks? (Yes=1) 1748 39.7 1748 49.6 882 40.6 882 40.4 0.804 
Contributions made to Networks: sub sample 
($) 656 33.3 806 33.6 352 23.0 372 27.0 0.128 
Contributions made to Networks: entire 
sample ($) 1748 13.2 1748 16.7 882 9.4 882 10.9 0.213 
Aid received from NGOs and other Govt 
Programs ($) 1748 54.3 1748 29.3 882 76.8 882 42.5 0.122 
% Households that took out a loan? (Yes=1) 1748 9.4 1748 7.1 882 8.8 882 6.5 0.692 
Amount of loan outstanding: sub sample  ($) 139 80.1 105 79.3 73 93.3 47 136.0 0.682 
Amount of loan outstanding ($): entire sample 
($) 1748 7.5 1748 5.6 882 8.2 882 8.9 0.835 
Notes: 
 'sub sample' means that sample is restricted to only those hhlds that receive/make transfers/contributions/loans 
 'entire sample' means that it is coded zero for hhlds that receive/make transfers/contributions/loans 
Notes: Weighted means, p-values obtained by clustering at ward level 
1
3
3
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4.4 Baseline Determinants of Inter-household Transfers 
In Table 4.3, we utilize Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and baseline data to understand 
how key socioeconomic characteristics of the household are associated with gifts received and 
made by households.  The estimating equation is as follows: 
 
Equation (1): 
Yh  =  β0 + β1HHMainResph + β2HHDemographicsh + β3Xh + β4Reciprocityh + εh 
where  
Yhj is the inter-household gift received or made by household ‘h’ in ward ‘j’. 
There are four outcomes of interest: 1) Incidence of Gift received, 2) Value of gift 
received, 3) Incidence of Gift Made, and 4) Value of Gift Made 
HHMainResp refers to the household’s Main Respondent characteristics, which 
include age and indicators for if the main respondent is female, widowed, 
divorced/separated, has attended school, and is chronically sick. 
HHDemographics refer to household size and number of children and elderly 
X is a vector of other independent variables that have an important relationship in 
influencing the probability and amount of inter-household transfers. These include 
variables that measure the household’s ownership of assets and means of 
livelihood. It includes a productive assets score31; a household amenities score32; 
                                                        
31 We use Principal Components Analysis to identify the principal components of 30 different variables 
that indicate ownership of assets such as tractor, plough, and other agricultural tools and total land area of 
the household. Based on this analysis and the scree plot shown in Appendix A Figure A.1a, we retain the 
first principal component as our Physical Assets score for the household, which explains 21.5 percent of 
the variability in the data. The subsequent components each explain less than six percent of the variation. 
32 Household amenities score is made up of variables such as if the house has: a toilet; a cooking room; 
ventilation in the cooking room; access to energy for lighting such as kerosene, diesel, electricity or solar 
  135 
indicators for whether the household gets wages from wage labor, does casual 
(maricho) labor, has planted any crops this harvest season, is labor constrained, 
has any loan amount outstanding, has been exposed to an idiosyncratic shock such 
as death of a working family member or covariate shocks such as droughts or 
floods; and a variable that measures the dollar amount of social support the 
household receives from any NGO/Government body.  
Reciprocity includes four indicators that capture if the household has 
received/made a transfer and if the transfer is made with any expectation of a quid 
pro quo.  
We also control for the geographical province within which the households are 
located. 
 
According to results shown in Table 4.3, there is no clear pattern of the type of 
households that are more likely to receive or make gifts, although the coefficients are largely in 
the expected direction. If the main respondent is female then the household is significantly more 
likely to receive gifts and if female households make any gifts to other households, these 
transfers are 62 percent lower in value as compared to male respondents. Those who are 
widowed are more likely to receive a gift and less likely to make one. Ownership of productive 
assets increases the value of gifts made as well as received. If the household receives income 
from wages, then it is significantly more likely to make gifts and the value of gifts it makes are 
higher by 70 percent. If the household has planted crops in the last season, the value of the gifts 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
power; more than two rooms; and sturdy walls made of bricks, stone or cement. We again utilize 
Principal Components Analysis and the scree plot associated with this is shown in Appendix A Figure 
A.1b. Here also we retain the first component as the Amenities score for the household. It explains 31.3 
percent of the variation among the variables. 
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it receives decreases significantly. If the household has taken out a loan, the value of a transfer it 
makes is significantly higher. If the household has suffered from an idiosyncratic shock, then it is 
significantly more likely to receive a gift and value of any transfer it makes is significantly 
reduced. However, if it has suffered from a covariate shock such as a drought or flood, which 
affects other households in the area, then as expected, the value of transfers it receives is 
reduced. Value of the gift received or made declines significantly if the transfer comes with the 
understanding that it will be returned in the future. Perhaps the most interesting result in this 
analysis is that a household is 14 percentage points more likely to receive a gift if it has made 
one, and likewise it is 7 percentage points more likely to make a transfer if it has received one.  
 
Table 4.3. Socioeconomic Variables Associated with Gifts Received or Made  
(Baseline Sample) 
  
Gifts 
Rcvd. 
Per capita 
Gifts 
Rcvd. 
Gifts 
Made 
Per capita 
Gifts 
Made 
  0/1 
Log of 
USD 0/1 
Log of 
USD 
Main Respondent Characteristics 
    Female Household 0.070** 0.069 0.016 -0.615*** 
Age of Head 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 
Widowed 0.062* -0.002 
-
0.069*** 0.134 
Divorced/Separated -0.023 -0.219 -0.03 -0.201 
Main resp. has schooling 0.013 -0.081 0.016 -0.095 
Main resp. is chronically ill 0.005 0.046 0.026 -0.438* 
Household Demographics 
    Log of Household Size -0.157** -1.271*** -0.065* -1.517*** 
Number of elderly 0.013 -0.015 -0.029 -0.251 
Number of children 0.013 -0.044 0.000 -0.024 
Other Covariates 
    Household Amenities score 0.004 0.047 0.009 0.093 
Productive Assets score 0.003 0.112*** 0.020*** 0.184*** 
Any income from wage labor? (Yes=1) -0.054 -0.134 0.148*** 0.703*** 
Any income from maricho labor? (Yes=1) -0.048* -0.075 0.015 -0.167 
Labor Constrained 0.014 0.064 -0.013 0.354 
Planted crops last rainy season (Yes=1) -0.062 -0.359*** 0.050** -0.776 
  137 
Aid received (in USD) 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.000 0.000 
Household took out a loan -0.02 0.043 0.053 0.451* 
Suffered from idiosyncratic shock? 
(Yes=1) 0.074** -0.153 0.009 -0.437** 
Suffered from covariate shock? (Yes=1) -0.001 -0.250*** 0.013 -0.301 
Mashona 0.013 0.026 0.063*** -0.125 
Masvingo 0.138*** 0.347** 0.016 0.401 
Reciprocity 
    Made a transfer 0.143*** -0.096 
  Expects to give something back in return (Yes=1) -0.667*** 
  Received a Transfer 
  
0.072*** -0.239 
Expects recipient to give something in return (Yes=1) 
  
-0.363** 
Constant 0.537*** 5.520*** 0.149** 5.581*** 
     Observations 2615 1528 2615 316 
Adjusted R-squared 0.112 0.281 0.073 0.442 
Notes: Weighted results, standard errors were clustered at the ward level.   
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 
 
4.5. Impacts on Inter-Household Transfers and Related Outcomes 
We utilize the longitudinal sample containing baseline and 12-month follow-up data to 
conduct a difference-in-differences (D-in-D) analysis to estimate the impact of the program on 
inter-household transfers.  
 
Crowding-out can occur on the extensive margin, i.e. the probability of receiving a 
transfer, and on the intensive margin, i.e. amount of transfer conditional on it being positive. 
(Gerardi & Tsai, 2013). We therefore estimate Equation (2) below, first testing for the likelihood 
of incidence of an informal transfer (gift received or made) and then use a continuous variable 
measuring the monetary value of the transfer as the dependent variable in cases where the 
transfer has been made.  
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Equation (2): 
𝑌ℎ𝑗𝑡  =  β0 + β1Post𝑡 + β2Transfer𝑗 + β3Transfer ∗ Post𝑗𝑡
+ β4HHDemographicsℎ + β5HHMainRespℎ + β6Strata𝑗 + β7Prices𝑗𝑡 + εℎ𝑗𝑡  
where  
Yhjt is the outcome of interest for household h from Ward j at time t 
 First Part: Yhjt equal to 1 if the household received an informal transfer  
Second Part: Yhjt equal to $ amount of the transfer if Yhjt >0 (using the same 
covariates) 
Postt is an indicator that equals 1 if the time period is 2014 (12 month follow-up) 
Transferj is an indicator that equals 1 if household is in a treatment Ward  
HHDemographicsh refers to log of household size, and the number of people 
below 5, between 6-17, between 18-60, and those above 60. 
Pricesjt refer to a vector of cluster level prices of eight staple items.  
HHMainResp refers to the same vector of variables as in Equation (1). 
 
β3 represents the impact estimator, or the effect of being a cash transfer beneficiary. We 
run ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, clustering standard errors at the ward level. We 
control for baseline values for main respondent characteristics and household demographics 
except for prices, which we maintain as exogenous and allow to vary by time period. The 
program has had no inflationary effect in treatment wards. 
 
Table 4.4 provides results of our difference-in-differences model on our outcomes of 
interest (averages of which are provided in Table 4.2). Almost none of the impact estimates on 
  139 
both incidence or value of gifts exchanged are significant, with one exception. Households that 
state they would potentially provide help, in case of need, to someone they know has increased 
by five percent.  
 
In the panel comprised of related outcomes, we find that the HSCT has increased the 
probability of a household making a contribution to a social network by nine percentage points 
and, the value of the contribution, if its made, has increased by about 29 percent. However, the 
program has not led to an increase in the probability of the beneficiary taking out a loan, nor has 
it decreased the size of the loan. There are no significant impacts on amount of aid received.  
 
In Table 4.5, we conduct a subsample analysis and stratify households based on gender 
and on transfer value per person as a share of their per capita expenditure. We choose 20 per cent 
as a cut-off because experience from the Transfer Project indicates that impacts are substantially 
smaller and more inconsistent when the transfer is less than 20 per cent of pre-program 
consumption (Davis and Handa, 2015). We stratify by gender of main respondent33 because 
previous research has shown that economic inequalities exist by gender (Flato et al, 2017). 
Female-headed households are more likely to have a higher number of children and elderly 
(Milazzo & van de Walle, 2015), and at the same time relatively poorer access to land, formal 
employment, and credit markets (World Bank, 2012). This is true for our current sample too. 
Male-headed households owned larger plots of land, had a slightly higher use and purchase of 
crop inputs, were more likely to own livestock and have a larger herd size and men were more 
likely to be engaged in wage employment (American Institutes for Research, 2013).  
                                                        
33 We use main respondent as a proxy for household head here. Our survey did not explicitly ask for 
‘Household Head’. An inconsistent definition and no accepted definition of headship is a challenge in this 
literature.  
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Our stratified results are similar to the total sample in that there is no evidence of 
crowding-out of inter-household transfers. In fact, for households where the transfer is greater 
than 20 percent of per capita total monthly expenditure, we find a four percentage points increase 
in the incidence of gifts made in cash or kind to other households. For male-respondent 
households, while there is no change in the incidence of gifts made, we find a substantial 
decrease in the value of gifts made by the 284 households that are making transfers. This impact 
however does not hold if we include the entire subsample of 1663 male-respondent households. 
We also see an increase of almost 9 percentage points in the number of male-respondent 
households who do not currently receive transfers but can potentially request a transfer if they 
feel the need.  
 
There is a 7 percentage point increase in households who do not yet make transfers but 
say that they could potentially make a transfer if requested by someone in need for two sub-
samples: female-respondent households and households that receive less than the 20 per cent 
cutoff of per capita monthly expenditure. Both these subsamples also see a significant increase in 
the number of households who have started making contributions to social networks by about 10-
percentage point for the latter subgroup and 12 percentage points for female-respondents.  
 
The impact estimate on value of contributions made to social networks is significant for 
all samples except the male-respondent sample. The magnitude of the impact is high, ranging 
from 26 per cent for households receiving a transfer size more than 20 per cent cutoff to 38.4 per 
cent for female-respondents. It is highest for households with a female respondent and not 
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significant for male respondent households. This is as expected since females typically have 
restricted access to credit and insurance markets and need to rely on informal arrangements and 
social groups to insure against risk and overcome liquidity constraints. In so far as the Program is 
enabling female-respondent households to start making contributions to social groups and 
increase their participation in these, it is strengthening informal networks for the specific 
vulnerable demographic category of females. It is important however to mention that female-
headed households can be a heterogeneous category where in not all such households are 
necessarily vulnerable.  Recent research coming out of Latin America (Liu et al, 2017) has 
critiqued the ‘feminization of poverty’ paradigm and indicated that in certain cases female 
headship in fact indicates increased female empowerment. However, due to the fact that most 
female-headed households are female-headed due to widowhood or separation, the empirical 
results indicate a close correlation between female-headship and poorer living conditions.  
 
Similar to the overall results provided in Table 4.4 for the entire sample, in our 
subsample analysis too we do not find impacts of the Program on the probability of the 
beneficiary taking out a loan, or size of loan, or on amount of aid received. 
  
Table 4.4. Impacts Estimates on Inter-Household Transfers and Related Outcomes 
    DinD Tac Time N adj. R-sq 
Inter-Household Transfers Received 
(1) 
Households that Rcvd Gifts from other Households 
(0/1) 0.066 -0.135*** -0.130** 5258 0.064 
  
(0.063) (0.033) (0.060) 
  
(2) 
Households that Rcvd Gifts from other Households 
(0/1): Sample restricted to those who received a 
transfer at baseline -0.024 -0.009 -0.451*** 3077 0.347 
  
(0.060) (0.016) (0.057) 
  
(3) 
Value of Gifts Rcvd (annual per capita LOG USD): 
only for sample that receives transfers -0.146 -0.313** -0.381*** 2953 0.235 
  
(0.174) (0.136) (0.125) 
  
(4) 
Value of Gifts Rcvd (annual per capita LOG USD): 
only for sample that receives transfers; Sample 
restricted to those who received a transfer at baseline -0.233 -0.319** -0.335** 2413 0.244 
 
 
(0.187) (0.129) (0.132) 
  
(5) 
Value of Gifts Rcvd (annual per capita LOG USD): 
coded such that it is zero for hhlds that do not receive 
transfers 0.231 -0.603*** -0.638*** 5252 0.154 
  
(0.226) (0.151) (0.207) 
  Inter-Household Transfers Made 
(6) 
Households that MADE Gifts to other Households 
(0/1) 0.037 0.006 0.046** 5258 0.037 
  
(0.026) (0.022) (0.022) 
  
(7) 
Value of Gifts MADE (annual per capita LOG USD): 
only for sample that makes transfers -0.488 0.159 0.523** 821 0.237 
  
(0.298) (0.193) (0.225) 
  
(8) 
Value of Gifts MADE (annual per capita LOG USD): 
coded such that it is zero for hhlds that do not make 
transfers -0.015 0.053 0.137** 5256 0.037 
  
(0.066) (0.044) (0.059) 
  Reciprocity & Potential for receiving/making transfers: 
1
4
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(9) Reciprocity 0.004 0.000 0.125*** 3176 0.054 
  
(0.033) (0.026) (0.026) 
  
(10) 
Household has potential households which it can 
request for a transfer (1 = Yes) 0.027 0.024 -0.036 2299 0.033 
  
(0.027) (0.022) (0.023) 
  
(11) 
Household can potentially make a transfer if 
requested (1 = Yes) 0.050** 0.012 -0.077*** 4435 0.053 
  
(0.021) (0.014) (0.016) 
  Other Related Outcomes 
(12) 
Has made Contributions Made to Social Networks? 
(1 = Yes) 0.093*** 0.006 -0.003 5258 0.085 
  
(0.035) (0.032) (0.027) 
  (13) Contributions made to Networks (LOG USD) 0.294*** 0.031 0.011 5258 0.099 
  
(0.092) (0.093) (0.074) 
  
(14) 
Contributions made to Networks (LOG USD) sub 
sample  0.150 -0.015 0.030 2186 0.059 
 
 
(0.122) (0.089) (0.088) 
  
(15) 
Aid received from NGOs and other Govt Programs 
(LOG USD) -0.063 -0.375 -0.446* 5258 0.093 
  
(0.253) (0.307) (0.250) 
  (16) Took out a loan? (1 = Yes) 0.004 0.005 -0.016 5258 0.025 
  
(0.019) (0.014) (0.013) 
  (17) Amount of loan outstanding (Log USD) -0.246 -0.278 0.289 364 0.070 
  
(0.286) (0.208) (0.228) 
  Notes:   
* p<0.10   **p<0.05   ***p<0.01 
Standard errors clustered at the district-ward level in parentheses.  
Estimations use difference-in-difference modeling among panel households. All estimations control for baseline household size, 
main respondent's gender, age, education and marital status, province, household demographic composition, and a vector of 
cluster level prices.  
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Table 4.5. Impacts Estimates on Inter-Household Transfers and Related Outcomes: Subsample analyses 
    
Households 
where transfer is 
>=20% of p.c. 
total exp. 
Households 
where transfer 
is< 20% of p.c. 
total exp. 
Households with 
Female 
Respondent 
Households with 
Male Respondent 
  
DinD N DinD N DinD N DinD N 
Inter-Household Transfers Received 
   
(1) 
Households that Rcvd Gifts 
from other Households (0/1) 0.101 2754 0.035 2504 0.058 3594 0.080 1664 
  
(0.070) 
 
(0.067) 
 
(0.066) 
 
(0.079) 
 
(2) 
Households that Rcvd Gifts 
from other Households (0/1): 
Sample restricted to those who 
received a transfer at baseline 0.007 1544 -0.044 1533 -0.041 2175 -0.001 902 
  
(0.064) 
 
(0.069) 
 
(0.059) 
 
(0.083) 
 
(3) 
Value of Gifts Rcvd (annual 
per capita LOG USD): only 
for sample that receives 
transfers -0.091 1507 -0.245 1446 -0.223 2076 0.032 877 
  
(0.254) 
 
(0.187) 
 
(0.199) 
 
(0.200) 
 
(4) 
Value of Gifts Rcvd (annual 
per capita LOG USD): only 
for sample that receives 
transfers; Sample restricted to 
those who received a transfer 
at baseline -0.193 1195 -0.317 1218 -0.300 1719 -0.064 694 
  
(0.253) 
 
(0.204) 
 
(0.216) 
 
(0.214) 
 
(5) 
Value of Gifts Rcvd (annual 
per capita LOG USD): coded 
such that it is zero for hhlds 
that do not receive transfers 0.339 2752 0.110 2500 0.171 3589 0.356 1663 
  
(0.231) 
 
(0.253) 
 
(0.251) 
 
(0.228) 
 Inter-Household Transfers Made 
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(6) 
Households that MADE Gifts 
to other Households (0/1) 0.041* 2754 0.021 2504 0.043 3594 0.027 1664 
  
(0.022) 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.040) 
 
(7) 
Value of Gifts MADE (annual 
per capita LOG USD): : only 
for sample that makes 
transfers -0.342 336 -0.559 485 -0.127 537 
-
1.240*** 284 
  
(0.450) 
 
(0.357) 
 
(0.316) 
 
(0.375) 
 
(8) 
Value of Gifts MADE (annual 
per capita LOG USD): coded 
such that it is zero for hhlds 
that do not make transfers 0.038 2753 -0.082 2503 0.012 3593 -0.061 1663 
  
(0.056) 
 
(0.119) 
 
(0.076) 
 
(0.102) 
 Reciprocity & Potential for receiving/making transfers: 
   (9) Reciprocity -0.000 1596 -0.009 1580 0.005 2212 0.010 964 
  
(0.037) 
 
(0.051) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(10) 
Household has potential 
households which it can 
request for a transfer (1 = Yes) 0.060 1245 -0.008 1054 -0.008 1513 0.085* 786 
  
(0.045) 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.035) 
 
(0.050) 
 
(11) 
Household can potentially 
make a transfer if requested (1 
= Yes) 0.025 2417 0.067** 2018 0.072** 3056 0.006 1379 
  
(0.030) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.032) 
 Other Related Outcomes 
   
(12) 
Has made Contributions Made 
to Social Networks? (1 = Yes) 0.073 2754 0.104** 2504 0.115*** 3594 0.048 1664 
  
(0.046) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.065) 
 
(13) 
Contributions made to 
Networks (LOG USD) 0.261** 2754 0.324** 2504 0.384*** 3594 0.107 1664 
  
(0.109) 
 
(0.136) 
 
(0.108) 
 
(0.203) 
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(14) 
Contributions made to 
Networks (LOG USD) sub 
sample  0.276* 938 0.072 1248 0.235* 1514 -0.143 672 
  
(0.145) 
 
(0.150) 
 
(0.137) 
 
(0.248) 
 
(15) 
Aid received from NGOs and 
other Govt Programs (LOG 
USD) -0.118 2754 -0.023 2504 -0.293 3594 0.422 1664 
  
(0.345) 
 
(0.235) 
 
(0.273) 
 
(0.274) 
 (16) Took out a loan? (1 = Yes) -0.022 2754 0.022 2504 0.016 3594 -0.023 1664 
  
(0.024) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(17) 
Amount of loan outstanding 
(Log USD) -0.027 181 -0.296 183 -0.158 245 -0.080 119 
  
(0.395) 
 
(0.544) 
 
(0.318) 
 
(0.399) 
 Notes:           
* p<0.10   **p<0.05   ***p<0.01 
   Standard errors clustered at the district-ward level in parentheses.  
The Ns in this table refer to subpopulation number of observations 
   Estimations use difference-in-difference modeling among panel households. All estimations control for baseline household size, 
main respondent's gender, age, education and marital status, province, household demographic composition, and a vector of 
cluster level prices.  
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4.6. Conclusion and Policy Implication 
In this paper, we analyzed the Zimbabwe Harmonized Social Cash Transfer Program, a 
government-run unconditional cash transfer program in Zimbabwe, targeted to ultra-poor 
households who are food poor and labor constrained. Specifically, we asked if the HSCT had 
crowded-out inter-household transfers, which includes remittances and gifts from family, friends, 
and neighbors. We find that on average, the HSCT has not led to a crowding-out effect on 
private inter-household informal transfers. We also do not find any impact of the Program on 
loans and amount outstanding of the beneficiary.  
 
One important result, however, is that the number of households making contributions to 
social groups has increased by 9 percentage points and further, the value of these contributions 
has increased by 29 percent. This indicates that the HSCT provides the beneficiary with an 
increased ability to participate in community life and ‘re-enter’ social networks, which increases 
their social inclusion, which would in turn have an impact on their economic and mental 
wellbeing. Further we find that these impacts are higher for the specific demographic category of 
female-respondent households. There is an increase of almost 12 percentage points in the number 
of female-respondent households who make contributions and a 38 per cent increase in the value 
of these contributions. As per previous research, females have typically restricted access to credit 
and insurance markets and formal wage employment. Informal networks are one channel they 
utilize to cope with idiosyncratic risk and/or liquidity constraints. The fact that a cash transfer 
program can enable women to strengthen their networks points to an important role they fulfill as 
a social protection program.     
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APPENDIX A: Remaining Tables and Figures for Chapter 2 
 
Figure A.1a. Scree Plot after PCA for Productive Assets Owned by the Household 
 
 
 
Figure A.1b. Scree Plot after PCA for Household Amenities 
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Figure A.2. Age Distribution of Household Members 
 
 
 
Figure A.3. Kernel Densities of Household Food Security and Food Consumption  
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Table A.1. Full Results from Interacted Model Comparing Pre/Initial Harvest vs. Peak 
Harvest 
  (1) (2) 
  Food Security Score 
Log P.C. Food 
Consumption  
 
Estimate 
Interacted 
Estimate Estimate 
Interacted 
Estimate 
Pre/Initial Harvest Dummy 5.799* 
 
-0.104 
 
 
(3.092) 
 
(0.267) 
 Household Demographics: 
   Household Size (log) -0.036 1.682 -1.499*** 0.090 
 
(1.136) (1.710) (0.196) (0.245) 
     # Children under 5 -0.277 -0.233 0.098** -0.056 
 
(0.332) (0.452) (0.049) (0.076) 
      # Children 6-17 -0.469** 0.157 0.081** -0.019 
 
(0.211) (0.296) (0.039) (0.049) 
      # Adults 18 - 59 0.103 -0.903** 0.098*** 0.027 
 
(0.340) (0.447) (0.032) (0.041) 
      # Elderly (>60) 0.003 -0.604 0.112** -0.069 
 
(0.378) (0.531) (0.052) (0.078) 
Main Respondent Characteristics: 
   Female  -0.680* -0.344 -0.084* 0.003 
 
(0.343) (0.645) (0.044) (0.068) 
     Age -0.029 0.005 -0.002 0.001 
 
(0.019) (0.025) (0.002) (0.002) 
     Widowed  (Yes=1) 0.128 -0.248 0.067 -0.123 
 
(0.456) (0.778) (0.063) (0.089) 
     Divorced/Separated  (Yes=1) 0.915 -0.250 0.046 -0.055 
 
(0.621) (0.878) (0.067) (0.111) 
     Attended School  (Yes=1) 0.234 0.271 0.064 0.008 
 
(0.598) (0.708) (0.048) (0.070) 
Other Socio-Economic Characteristics: 
  Distance to Food Market -0.100** 0.099* 0.005* -0.011* 
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(0.042) (0.054) (0.003) (0.006) 
  
  
  Distance to Input Market 0.038*** -0.035* 0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.013) (0.020) (0.001) (0.001) 
     Distance to Water Source 0.024 -0.144 -0.019* 0.003 
 
(0.170) (0.204) (0.011) (0.022) 
     Productive Assets Score 0.518*** -0.250 0.070*** -0.014 
 
(0.162) (0.229) (0.011) (0.019) 
     Household Amenities Score 0.660*** -0.172 0.052*** -0.027 
 
(0.188) (0.240) (0.015) (0.020) 
     # of livestock type 0.078 0.115 0.036*** 0.013 
 
(0.166) (0.262) (0.012) (0.019) 
     Any income from wage labor? 
(Yes=1) 1.893** 0.209 0.137** 0.029 
 
(0.724) (0.868) (0.059) (0.101) 
     Any income from maricho labor? 
(Yes=1) -0.281 -1.410** 0.071* -0.046 
 
(0.527) (0.632) (0.042) (0.062) 
     Planted crops last rainy season 
(Yes=1) 2.174*** -1.206 -0.042 0.037 
 
(0.665) (1.147) (0.070) (0.100) 
     
Labor Constrained (Yes=1) 0.784 
-
3.422*** 0.010 0.066 
 
(0.700) (1.060) (0.064) (0.075) 
     Aid received (in USD) -0.004* 0.004 -0.000 0.001** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
     Monthly remittances low (< 
$25/month) -0.317 -2.709** -0.141** -0.099 
 
(0.774) (1.071) (0.070) (0.081) 
     Has loan outstanding  (Yes=1) -1.013* 1.286 0.136** 0.039 
 
(0.606) (1.214) (0.068) (0.162) 
     Suffered from a shock? (Yes=1) -1.056 -0.632 0.027 -0.132 
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(0.756) (0.985) (0.063) (0.083) 
Other Covariates: 
    Masvingo -0.448 -1.240 0.209*** 0.149** 
 
(0.628) (0.856) (0.046) (0.073) 
     Constant 15.191*** 
 
4.795*** 
 
 
(2.559) 
 
(0.234) 
 
     Observations 2121 
 
2121 
 Notes: 
 * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,*** p<0.01.   
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the ward level. Standardized baseline weights 
utilized. Mashonaland observations not included.  
 
 
Table A.2. Difference-in-Difference Model:  Impact of the Cash Transfer on Food 
Security Measures  (without controlling for week of interview) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
  
Per capita Food 
Consumption 
Household Food 
Security Score 
Household Diet 
Diversity Score 
Impact Estimate 1.648 0.094 0.716*** 
 
(1.146) (0.573) (0.189) 
    Treatment Indicator -1.295 0.179 -0.195 
 
(1.175) (0.440) (0.124) 
    Follow-up Indicator -3.287*** 3.098*** 0.412** 
 
(1.174) (0.494) (0.169) 
    Observations 5245 5245 5245 
Adjusted R-squared 0.323 0.109 0.191 
Notes: 
* p<0.10   **p<0.05   ***p<0.01 
Standard errors clustered at the Ward level in parentheses.  
Estimations use difference-in-difference modeling among panel households. All 
estimations control for baseline household size, main respondent's gender, age, education 
and marital status, strata, household demographic composition, and a vector of cluster 
level prices.  
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APPENDIX B: Remaining Tables and Figures for Chapter 3 
 
Table B.1. Household Level Estimates of Differential Attrition 
  Not Weighted Weighted 
  
Coefficient 
of 
Variable 
Coefficient 
of 
Interacted 
Variable 
Coefficient 
of 
Variable 
Coefficient 
of 
Interacted 
Variable 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treatment -0.1301 
 
-0.1022 
 
 
(-1.27) 
 
(-0.67) 
 
     Household Size -0.0139*** 0.0036 -0.0181*** 0.0082 
 
(-3.29) (0.65) (-3.59) (1.39) 
     % households that have disabled 
members 0.0107 0.0025 0.0068 -0.0017 
 
(0.50) (0.09) (0.25) (-0.05) 
     % households that have chronically ill 
members 0.0072 -0.0022 -0.006 -0.0014 
 
(0.28) (-0.08) (-0.23) (-0.05) 
     % households that have elderly 
members -0.0488 0.0278 -0.0957 0.0918 
 
(-1.37) (0.66) (-1.29) (1.15) 
     % households categorized as labor 
constrained -0.0158 -0.0044 -0.0333 -0.0107 
 
(-0.61) (-0.13) (-1.32) (-0.27) 
     Main Respondent Characteristics: 
    Female  -0.0121 0.0035 0.0145 -0.0399 
 
(-0.39) (0.09) (0.27) (-0.70) 
     Age -0.0014 0.0002 0.0008 -0.0025 
 
(-1.28) (0.14) (0.28) (-0.84) 
     Widowed 0.044 -0.009 0.0031 0.0321 
 
(1.01) (-0.18) (0.04) (0.39) 
     Divorced/Separated -0.0682 0.0716 -0.1053* 0.1239** 
 
(-1.63) (1.47) (-1.98) (2.01) 
     Main resp. has schooling 0.0151 0.0258 0.0503* -0.0292 
 
(0.62) -0.77 (1.86) (-0.73) 
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Main resp. currently attends school 0.0054 0.007 0.0283 -0.0242 
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.25) (-0.17) 
     Household Characteristics: 
    Monthly Per Capita Total Expenditure 
(in usd) 0.0008 0.0004 0 0.0009 
 
(1.20) (0.45) (-0.01) (1.34) 
     HFIAS Score -0.0012 0.0034 -0.0027* 0.0072** 
 
(-0.75) (1.53) (-1.81) (2.46) 
     % households that have suffered from 
a shock -0.0236 0.0223 -0.0363 0.0528 
 
(-0.75) (0.55) (-1.22) (1.36) 
     % households affected by flood -0.007 -0.0491 -0.0493 -0.0113 
 
(-0.09) (-0.57) (-0.63) (-0.13) 
     % households affected by drought 0.005 -0.0373 0.0201 -0.0558 
 
(0.20) (-1.25) (0.51) (-1.27) 
     _cons 0.3323*** 
 
0.3432*** 
 
 
(4.37) 
 
(2.68) 
 
     N 3046 
 
3046 
 adj. R-sq 0.0221 0.0228  
* p<0.10 **p<0.05  *** p<0.01     
Notes: Linear probability estimates of probability of attrition at follow-up. Column (1) reports 
coefficient of variable shown in the first column; Column (2 ) shows coefficient of that same 
variable interacted with the treatment dummy. Columns (3) and (4) provide results of the 
same analysis using standardized weights. Clustered t-statistics shown in parentheses below 
coefficients. 
 
 
 
Table B.2. Baseline Mean Characteristics of Panel Households - by Same/Different 
Main Respondent 
  
Same 
Respondent 
both periods 
Different Main 
Respondent at 
followup p-Value: 
Comparing 
both 
groups   Mean 
Std. 
Error Mean 
Std. 
Error 
Household Demographics: 
     Household Size 4.68 0.110 6.12 0.185 0.000 
# Children under 5 0.71 0.034 0.95 0.072 0.001 
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 # Children 6-17 2.06 0.066 2.69 0.113 0.000 
 # Adults 18 - 59 1.08 0.042 1.60 0.095 0.000 
 # Elderly (>60) 0.83 0.026 0.88 0.050 0.309 
% households that have disabled 
members 26.26 0.015 25.39 0.022 0.762 
% households that have chronically ill 
members 36.01 0.013 39.78 0.022 0.105 
% households that have elderly 
members 65.89 0.017 60.01 0.035 0.095 
% households categorized as labor 
constrained 84.99 0.010 80.02 0.021 0.021 
Main Respondent Characteristics: 
     % Female  73.98 0.013 52.82 0.023 0.000 
Age 58.02 0.813 51.80 0.992 0.000 
% Widowed 42.95 0.017 20.70 0.017 0.000 
% Divorced/Separated 9.94 0.009 6.81 0.014 0.024 
% Main resp. has schooling 54.18 0.017 66.33 0.028 0.000 
% Main resp. currently attends school 1.06 0.003 2.94 0.007 0.019 
Highest grade of Main resp. 3.08 0.120 4.12 0.151 0.000 
Household Characteristics: 
     Monthly Per Capita Total Expenditure 
(in usd) 34.48 1.321 29.43 1.180 0.002 
Monthly Per capita Food Expenditure 
(in usd) 21.71 0.983 19.24 1.071 0.070 
HFIAS Score 14.14 0.227 13.55 0.400 0.152 
# of shocks experienced 2.58 0.129 2.72 0.102 0.244 
% households that have suffered from a 
shock 88.64 0.014 89.59 0.014 0.553 
% households where death has occurred 
in 12 mo 9.12 0.006 11.69 0.019 0.215 
# of livestock type 2.09 0.060 2.61 0.106 0.000 
% households that receive wages 9.65 0.009 12.74 0.018 0.103 
% households undertaking 
casual/maricho labor 43.47 0.017 56.63 0.034 0.000 
Aid received (in USD) 59.28 4.889 65.73 7.023 0.243 
Distance to Food Market 3.75 0.242 3.61 0.252 0.594 
Distance to Input Market 19.17 1.211 19.39 1.691 0.862 
Distance to Water 1.25 0.084 1.59 0.149 0.001 
      N 2005   623     
Notes: Attrition-adjusted weighted results.  
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Table B.3. Baseline Mean Characteristics of Same Respondent Households - by T & C 
 
Comparison 
Group 
Treatment 
Group 
p-Value: 
Comparing 
both groups 
 
Mean Std. Error Mean Std. Error 
 
Household Demographics: 
     Household Size 4.72 0.191 4.67 0.134 0.819 
# Children under 5 0.75 0.057 0.70 0.041 0.476 
 # Children 6-17 2.03 0.125 2.07 0.078 0.766 
 # Adults 18 - 59 1.12 0.070 1.07 0.052 0.589 
 # Elderly (>60) 0.82 0.049 0.83 0.030 0.890 
% households that have disabled 
members 28.36 0.031 25.43 0.017 0.401 
% households that have chronically 
ill members 35.73 0.025 36.11 0.015 0.893 
% households that have elderly 
members 66.62 0.030 65.60 0.021 0.779 
% households categorized as labor 
constrained 85.03 0.016 84.97 0.012 0.983 
Main Respondent 
Characteristics: 
     % Female  72.66 0.028 74.50 0.015 0.558 
Age 58.18 1.547 57.96 0.955 0.892 
% Widowed 44.27 0.023 42.43 0.022 0.563 
% Divorced/Separated 10.18 0.013 9.85 0.011 0.843 
% Main resp. has schooling 58.48 0.030 52.50 0.021 0.107 
% Main resp. currently attends 
school 0.38 0.003 1.33 0.004 0.040 
Highest grade of Main resp. 3.22 0.176 3.02 0.153 0.394 
Household Characteristics: 
     Monthly Per Capita Total 
Expenditure (in usd) 36.24 3.357 33.79 1.282 0.499 
Monthly Per capita Food 
Expenditure (in usd) 22.66 2.417 21.33 0.988 0.613 
HFIAS Score 13.77 0.478 14.29 0.253 0.344 
# of shocks experienced 2.30 0.222 2.69 0.151 0.147 
% households that have suffered 
from a shock 84.72 0.030 90.18 0.014 0.106 
% households where death has 
occurred in 12 mo 8.35 0.010 9.42 0.008 0.405 
# of livestock type 2.08 0.075 2.10 0.079 0.868 
% households that receive wages 9.54 0.014 9.70 0.011 0.931 
% households undertaking 
casual/maricho labor 45.90 0.037 42.52 0.018 0.416 
Aid received (in USD) 75.34 13.700 52.97 3.714 0.119 
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Distance to Food Market 3.49 0.585 3.85 0.249 0.564 
Distance to Input Market 19.74 2.181 18.95 1.453 0.765 
Distance to Water 1.25 0.191 1.25 0.089 0.998 
N 654   1352     
Notes: Attrition-adjusted weighted results.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
